Re-conceptualising the integrated water management model: reflections from the New Zealand experiment by Tulloch, Susan M.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lincoln University Digital Thesis 
 
 
Copyright Statement 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
This thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the Act 
and the following conditions of use: 
 you will use the copy only for the purposes of research or private study  
 you will recognise the author's right to be identified as the author of the thesis and 
due acknowledgement will be made to the author where appropriate  
 you will obtain the author's permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
  
 
 
Re-conceptualising the Integrated Water Management Model:  
Reflections from the New Zealand Experiment 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
at 
Lincoln University 
by 
S. Tulloch 
 
Lincoln University 
2010 
 
 Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Re-conceptualising the Integrated Water Management Model:  
Reflections from the New Zealand Experiment 
 
By S. Tulloch 
 
The widely accepted, but increasingly criticised concept and process of Integrated 
Water Management (the IWM model) has been embedded within the wider 
environmental management and planning literatures for well over a century. 
Unfortunately, particularly over the last four decades, it has become equally well 
known for its ‘implementation gap’ - the inability to translate the concept into 
sustainable outcomes for the freshwater systems under management. The literature is 
increasingly clear that more conceptually robust and practically applicable approaches 
to IWM are urgently required. The literature is also increasingly cognisant that IWM 
rule-sets neither exist nor operate in a social vacuum. In particular, wider social 
systems of institutional arrangements are increasingly considered as key influences 
upon IWM outcomes. Institutional arrangements are here considered to be those 
formal and informal rule-sets generated by, inter alia: social worldviews and cultural 
perspectives, including perceptions of the resource system; traditional or customary 
uses of the resource, and; social norms, laws, or systems of property rights. 
 
Paradoxically, the IWM implementation gap is particularly acute in places such as 
New Zealand, Florida, or British Columbia, which would appear to have every IWM 
advantage: developed, ‘Western’ jurisdictions with plentiful (if geographically and 
temporally heterogeneous) freshwater resources; the technology and physical 
infrastructure to ensure reliable freshwater supplies, and; extant collaborative (or at 
least, cooperative) IWM policies, programmes, or plans. Yet, these are the very places 
where the emergent polycentric (meaning ‘many centred’) challenges facing IWM 
efforts, already exceed the ability of the IWM model to address them in ways that are 
considered both equitable and efficient.  
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 Three broad questions relating to the above are considered in this thesis. Firstly, why 
have sustainable freshwater outcomes from IWM efforts in places such as New 
Zealand (the selected case study nation) remained so elusive? Secondly, how do wider 
social systems of institutional arrangements influence the sustainability intentions of 
IWM rule-sets? And thirdly, how may institutional design address the current 
generation of polycentric difficulties facing IWM, which already exceed the capacity 
of institutional design to address? 
 
From the above, the thesis has two aims. The first aim is to reconceptualise IWM to 
provide a more robust theoretical understanding of its elements, processes and 
problems. Related to this, the second aim is to employ that understanding to inform an 
analysis of the role of institutional arrangements in IWM outcomes in New Zealand, 
under the RMA.  
 
In order to achieve these two aims, four broad research objectives are identified. The 
first research objective is to seek more realistic and conceptually robust theoretical 
underpinnings for IWM. Based on this, the second objective is the development of an 
evaluative framework for the re-conceptualised IWM process. The third objective is 
the employment of the evaluative framework in the multi-scale case study analysis of 
the role of institutional arrangements in IWM outcomes in New Zealand. The final 
research objective for this thesis is: to identify insights arising from the study, and to 
draw conclusions on: the theoretical underpinnings for re-drawn IWM and the 
evaluative framework, and; the influence of key institutional arrangements on IWM 
outcomes in New Zealand, including some suggestions towards improved future 
outcomes. 
 
Key findings from the first two (conceptual) research objectives are drawn from 
insights from Commons Theory and the complexity thinking approach (whereby 
systems adapt, or sometimes ‘learn’ through experience of changing contexts). I argue 
for a theoretical perspective of the IWM model as a complex adaptive process of 
social learning, with respect to the governance of freshwater. I also argue that the 
IWM model alone will not be able to overcome historically embedded unsustainable 
social perspectives of freshwater. Thus, a complex adaptive systems perspective of 
IWM, and consideration of the potential influence of institutional arrangements, are 
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 key to the ‘success’ or otherwise of IWM efforts, especially with respect to the 
emergence of problematic polycentric IWM challenges.  
 
Key empirical findings from the multi-scale case study indicate that existing 
institutional arrangements relating to the expressions of property rights, markets, and 
cosmologies and worldviews, are deeply embedded in the national, regional, and local 
histories, and are key barriers to sustainable freshwater outcomes. At the national 
scale, the internationally renowned Resource Management Act (1991) has become a 
symbolic policy through non-implementation. At this scale, the change from a 
pioneer, exploitative perspective to a more mature, conservationist one with respect to 
New Zealand’s freshwater systems, is yet to be achieved. Findings for Canterbury (the 
regional scale) indicate that the recent, potentially sustainable Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy has been a victim of its own success, undermined by national 
government response to a perceived threat to abstractive ‘business as usual’. This is 
particularly with respect to the continued development of the economically valuable 
dairy industry in that region. Study findings also suggest that New Zealand and 
Canterbury are now in real danger of being locked-in to the export of freshwater in 
the shape of low-value-added milk powder. However, in a typical IWM paradox, the 
potential compromise of sustainability at the national and regional scales may yet 
result in benefits at the local level, for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, the local-scale 
element of the study.  
  
 
Keywords: Integrated Water Management; Institutional Arrangements; Commons 
Theory; Complexity Thinking; Polycentric; Social Transformations; New Zealand; Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere. 
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 1 Sustainable Freshwater Systems?  
1.1 The Sustainable Freshwater Challenge 
Sustainable freshwater system limits are those within which cumulative patterns of 
freshwater use may be indefinitely supported by both the resource, and its dependent 
human societies. It is widely accepted that the identification and acceptance of 
sustainable limits to freshwater system use is critical to societal, and individual, 
wellbeing (Abernethy, 2005; Anderies et al., 2004; Hardin, 1968; Mitchell, 2005; 
Ostrom, 1990). After all, at the very least, a continuing supply of sufficient potable 
water is an essential and non-substitutable requirement for life: thus, if humanity as a 
species wishes to thrive, the importance of achieving and maintaining sustainable 
freshwater outcomes is difficult to overstate.  
 
Regrettably, it would seem that the difficulties implicit within any such enterprise are 
almost as acute as the need for their success (Biswas, 2004; Kerr, 2007). Many 
countries around the world are now struggling with detrimental consequences of 
freshwater overexploitation at national, regional, and local scales (Gibson et al., 2000; 
Kerr, 2007; Lovell et al., 2002; Margerum, 2008). Inexorable rises in cumulative 
socio-economic pressures are resulting in overuse, threatening the current and future 
productive capacity of these resources, as well as their dependent human and non-
human communities (Abernethy, 2005; Carpenter et al., 1999; Hedelin, 2007; Janssen 
& Anderies, 2007; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005).  
 
Institutions, also called rules or rule-sets, are designed to regulate, manage, or govern 
(in a widening range of decision-making activities), types and levels of freshwater use 
within a social-ecological-system (SES) (Anderies et al., 2004; Bakker, 2003; 
Edwards & Steins, 1998; Gibbs & Bromley, 2003; Schlager et al., 1994). In 
accordance with social science usage, the terms institutions and rules are used 
synonymously in this study (Ostrom, 1990). Institutions are widely recognised as 
being designed over three levels of decision-making: the constitutional-choice level, 
where normative issues of how a society views itself and its freshwater systems are 
decided; the collective-choice-level, considered as potentially the most influential as 
well as the most problematic, where specifics of provision and allocation are 
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 negotiated, and; the operational-choice level, where individuals make decisions about 
whether, and how, they will use their allocation of freshwater system benefits 
(Edwards & Steins, 1998; Ostrom, 1990).   
 
Social-ecological-systems (SESs) are here considered as human societies and their 
supporting freshwater systems, connected through sets of rules that guide 
interpersonal and inter-group interactions, as well as individual or group interactions 
with the resource. Social-ecological-systems may be of any scale, and their 
characteristic of, inter alia, investing in the design, implementation, and monitoring 
of rules whose purpose is to generate and maintain sustainable freshwater outcomes, 
is of particular interest to this study (Anderies et al., 2004; Janssen & Anderies, 2007; 
Ostrom, 2008). 
 
1.2 Integrated Water Management 
The term integration means ‘to bring together’, and Integrated Water Management 
(IWM) has been recommended in the environmental management and planning 
literatures in one form or another since the 1880s (Reisner, 1986; Roche, 1994). The 
IWM model is comprised of a concept and a process, and as a whole aims to protect 
or enhance the long-term ability of complex and interconnected land, water, and 
ecological systems to continue their production of socially desired, multi-dimensional 
benefits over time (Hooper, 2006; Margerum, 2008). The IWM concept suggests that 
this aim is best achieved through the consideration of ongoing interactions between 
selected key elements or subsystems (such as annual floods and attendant soil erosion, 
for instance), often managed at the scale of the catchment (Blomquist & Schlager, 
2005; Mitchell, 2005). For some decades now, IWM has been the preferred approach 
to institutional design in the natural resources policy literature (Abernethy, 2005; 
Born & Sonzogni, 1995; Cairns, 1991; Margerum, 1999b; Mitchell, 2005). 
Unfortunately, the IWM model has been badly compromised by perverse outcomes 
for freshwater systems, and by extension, their dependent human and ecological 
communities. The perverse outcomes have been identified as the result of an ongoing 
IWM implementation gap, which is a critical and increasingly urgent problem that has 
begun to call the underpinning concept into question (Biswas, 2004; Hooper, 2006; 
 2
 Hooper et al., 1999; Margerum & Hooper, 2001; Mitchell, 1997; Ostrom, 1999; 
Owens et al., 2004).  
 
The IWM process is essentially one of quantifying availability and cost of freshwater 
system benefits, and distributing those multidimensional costs and benefits between 
competing uses and users through the design and implementation of sets of rules 
(Hooper, 2006; Margerum & Born, 2000). The IWM process is used to address 
‘wicked’ problems: those which have exceeded the capacity of simpler management 
strategies - the intractable, ‘wicked,’ ‘messes’ and ‘metaproblems’ (Bardwell, 1991; 
Cairns, 1991; Margerum & Born, 1995; Swaffield, 1998). More specifically, 
Gunningham (2008, p8) suggests that they are ‘wicked’ because they are of “such a 
scale, persistency, and complexity as to defy solution”. Therefore, almost by 
definition, IWM must address problems that are typically characterised by a high 
degree of diversity within the water resource, its uses, users, and user groups, and the 
costs and benefits accruing to those individuals or groups. This means that the 
decision-making process in IWM will be an inherently contested, and politically 
negotiated, one (Ascher, 2001; Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Koontz & Johnson, 
2004; Rhoades, 2000; Ryan, 2001).  
 
It should be made plain at this point that IWM is not the same thing as sustainability, 
(as demonstrated by, for example, Carter et al., 2005; Margerum, 1999b, 2001, 2008; 
Margerum & Hooper, 2001; Scrase & Sheate, 2002), even although IWM institutions 
are designed specifically to generate and maintain sustainable freshwater outcomes. It 
is, however, the intention of IWM institutions (in the form of, for example, policies, 
plans, and programmes), to generate and maintain sustainable freshwater outcomes 
(Bakker, 2003; Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2005; Dolsak & 
Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom, 2008). Since the 1980s, efforts to address perverse outcomes 
from the IWM implementation gap, noted above, have largely focused on the 
development of a more collaborative (inclusive and deliberative), planning process 
(Born & Sonzogni, 1995; Hooper et al., 1999; Margerum & Born, 1995; Margerum & 
Hooper, 2001; Meppem, 2000; Mitchell, 1990; Ryan, 2001; Singleton, 2002). 
Unfortunately, these efforts are not succeeding (Biswas, 2004; Blomquist & Schlager, 
2005; Mitchell, 2005). 
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 1.2.1 Challenges for IWM 
Despite the considerable advancements in the processes of decision-making in 
freshwater planning and management, and of improvement in IWM plan quality and 
implementation, IWM has become increasingly criticised for its ‘failure’ to reliably 
generate and maintain sustainable freshwater outcomes (Biswas, 2004; Blomquist & 
Schlager, 2005; Carter et al., 2005; Healy, 2005; Hooper, 2006). Further, emergent 
problems facing decision-makers are now considered to exceed the capacity of extant 
institutional designs (Hajer, 2003; Lovell et al., 2002; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005; Steins et 
al., 2000). 
 
Paradoxically, issues with institutional design for ‘successful’ IWM are particularly 
acute in some jurisdictions such as those in New Zealand, Florida, or British 
Columbia, and which appear to have every IWM advantage (Hooper et al., 1999; 
Memon & Weber, 2008; Olsson et al., 2006; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005). In this study, I 
consider IWM advantages to include: extant collaborative (or at least, cooperative) 
IWM policies, plans, and programmes; abundant freshwater (albeit spatially and 
temporally heterogeneous), and the technological and physical infrastructure to ensure 
reliable potable supplies to their populations. Yet these are the very SESs where 
emergent, polycentric challenges to sustainable IWM outcomes are already beyond 
the ability of collaborative institutional designs to address in a manner “perceived to 
be both legitimate and effective” (Hajer, 2003, p. 176). ‘Polycentric’ as applied to 
IWM challenges and structures is described in greater detail in chapters 3-5. Broadly, 
‘polycentric’ IWM is considered in this thesis as: presenting Hajer’s (2003) five 
preconditions for a good deliberation (locus of decision-making power is unclear; a 
new multi-scale spatiality to decision-making; a need to re-think the form of citizen 
involvement; scientific authority has been undermined, and; the context of policy-
making is unclear); emerging from ‘failed’ collaborative IWM efforts; having no 
single decision-making authority, and thus being subject to emergent, self-organising 
change and actions. In other words, polycentric IWM will be uncontrollable from 
‘above’ (i.e., higher levels of decision-making). Polycentric challenges to IWM 
include the need to coordinate increasingly normative and contested collaborative 
decision-making at multiple scales, by multiple authorities, on perennial problems. 
Perennial in this case is used to indicate the tendency of unresolved IWM problems to 
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 become more contested and difficult as time passes, rather than remaining in a stable 
chronic state. 
 
This incapacity to address polycentric problems is recognised in the wider literature 
relating to sustainable freshwater governance, as well as the IWM scholarship 
(Connick & Innes, 2003; Healy, 2005; Ostrom, 2008; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005). The 
literature is very clear that given the complexity and context-dependent nature of 
freshwater governance, there is no ‘one way’, or single scale, which can reliably 
generate and maintain sustainable freshwater outcomes (Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 
2005; Gibson et al., 2000; Guerin, 2007; Lovell et al., 2002; McNeill, 2008). New 
perspectives are urgently needed, as are new institutional designs capable of their 
accommodation (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Lovell et al., 2002; Ostrom, 2001; 
Scholz & Stiftel, 2005; Wilson & Bryant, 1997; Yaffee, 1999). 
 
1.2.2  Research Problem 
Arising from the IWM implementation gap and resulting unsustainable freshwater 
system outcomes discussed above, the overarching research problem of interest to this 
study is therefore that more realistic and conceptually robust perspectives for IWM, 
along with new approaches to institutional designs, are urgently required (Blomquist 
& Schlager, 2005; Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2005; Connick & Innes, 2003; Hajer, 
2003; Healy, 2005; Lovell et al., 2002; Ostrom, 2008).  
 
In response to this problem, two broad areas of interest to this research have been 
identified from the wider freshwater governance literature.  
 
The first area of interest to this study is the influence of wider institutional 
arrangements on the outcomes of IWM rules. Institutional arrangements are the 
‘operational rules-in-use’, (Ostrom, 1990), which have endured, and ‘accreted’ in an 
SES over time (Healy, 2005), and can include inter alia formal and informal, new and 
old, rules, social norms and appreciations of water, worldviews, systems of property 
rights, customs, or laws. 
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 The second area of interest to this study, related to the first, is the complex adaptive 
process (whereby systems ‘learn’ through experience of failure), of social freshwater 
sustainability transformation from an exploitative freshwater appreciation to a 
conservationist one, as a key driver for ‘successful’ (i.e. sustainable) IWM outcomes. 
A social sustainability transformation is defined in this thesis as essentially the change 
in a society’s appreciation of the freshwater system from one that considers it as 
‘limitless’ to one that understands the importance of its conservation. 
 
As stated above, the first area of interest for this study is the influence of institutional 
arrangements on the outcomes of IWM rules. It has become increasingly apparent that 
freshwater institutions are neither crafted, nor operate in a social vacuum (Blomquist, 
1992), and are “seldom politically innocent” (Singleton, 2002, p. p71). On the 
contrary, IWM rule-sets are only one part of the wider institutional arrangements 
which guide freshwater decision-making in an SES (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; 
Connick & Innes, 2003; Healy, 2005; Memon & Selsky, 2001; Olsson et al., 2006; 
Ostrom, 2008). It is increasingly argued that it is, in fact, the wider institutional 
arrangements of an SES which will generate emergent patterns of interaction and 
outcomes, perverse or sustainable, from the intention of IWM institutions (Bakker, 
2003; Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Healy, 2005; Memon & Selsky, 2001; Ostrom, 
2008; Steins & Edwards, 1999a). This perspective promotes consideration of the 
influence of institutional arrangements on institutional design for IWM, and 
evaluation of IWM outcomes (Anderies et al., 2004; Connick & Innes, 2003; Healy, 
2005; Memon & Skelton, 2007; Ostrom, 2001, 2008; Owens, 1997; Woolley & 
McGinnis, 1999; Young, 2002).  
 
Following on from the above, the second area of interest to this research on IWM is 
the closely related complex adaptive process of social sustainability transformation, 
with respect to freshwater systems (identified from ideas including those from: 
Janssen & Anderies, 2007; Olsson et al., 2006; Ostrom, 1999, 2001, 2008). In this 
study, I will identify the social sustainability transformation as a crucial and non-
substitutable driver for ‘successful’ IWM outcomes. Analysis of IWM literature from 
a complexity thinking viewpoint suggests that IWM has been “failing” to address 
increasingly wicked problems. Hence, in this study I will argue that when IWM is 
viewed as a process of social learning (a complex adaptive process), this increasing 
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 wickedness of IWM problems arguably also suggests that IWM may, in fact, be 
working reasonably well.  
 
Broadly, in this thesis I will argue that long-term failure to transform social 
appreciation of freshwater systems is typically the outcome of successful use of 
avoidance tactics, e.g., the use of more efficient technology, or even better 
coordination of uses through IWM. Unfortunately, this means that unsustainable 
social appreciations of water have been reinforced, and further embedded in the 
society as an institutional arrangement, which is more difficult to change than a 
simple rule, such as granting water consents. This obviously creates a feedback loop, 
through which the initial problem has become a more wicked challenge for the next 
cycle of social learning and development. In each successive cycle of ‘failed’ IWM, 
the freshwater sustainability gap will be larger, and more difficult and costly to close. 
Thus, the whole system becomes less robust, and more vulnerable to disturbance 
(Healy, 2005; Janssen & Anderies, 2007; Olsson et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2001). This is 
described by Olsson et al., (2006, p8) as a process whereby “the costs of maintaining 
the current system continue to mount, the natural resource base is degrading further, 
and the regional economy is becoming increasingly brittle”. Brittle is here used as the 
antonym for robustness: the ability of any system to withstand disturbance, arising 
either internally or externally. Where a region’s economy is concerned, brittleness 
therefore refers to the degree to which the region is ‘locked in’ to a particular sector or 
economic driver. 
 
The scenario of increased costs, a degrading resource base, and an increasingly brittle 
regional economy, described above, certainly appears to be the case in New Zealand 
generally, and in the Canterbury Region in particular. As already noted, New Zealand 
is one of the jurisdictions worldwide where IWM has failed to generate and maintain 
sustainable freshwater outcomes. The IWM situation in New Zealand is overviewed 
in the following section. 
 
1.3 IWM in New Zealand 
New Zealand is a small island nation comparable in size to the UK or the State of 
Colorado with little more than 4 million people, ("Statistics New Zealand," 2009 
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 accessed 5th Dec 2009). The country lies approximately 2,000km south-east of 
Australia, and enjoys plentiful rainfall, although this is unevenly distributed across 
the country and over annual cycles. New Zealand is ranked 12th out of 193 countries 
for its abundance of freshwater. Yet, per capita water demand is 2-3 times higher 
than other OECD countries (MfE, 2009a)  
 
New Zealand would seem to have every IWM advantage, particularly including low 
population density, plentiful freshwater, and the technological, physical, and 
institutional infrastructure to make the best advantage of these. However, the country 
is on a highly unsustainable trajectory of socio-economic pressures on freshwater 
systems (National Policy Statement for Freshwater, 2009; OECD, 2007; MfE, 2008; 
Barnett & Pauling, 2005). Furthermore, New Zealand is experiencing exactly the type 
of emergent polycentric water governance challenges that are of particular interest to 
this study. These include multiple normative values of freshwater benefits, multiple 
decision-making authorities, and multiple governance scales. At the regional scale, 
IWM challenges are particularly notable in the Canterbury Region in the South Island. 
In Canterbury, a number of contributing factors have conspired to create a very 
wicked problem indeed (Memon, 2008a; Memon & Weber, 2008; Painter et al., 2008; 
Rodgers, 2009).  
 
1.3.1  New Zealand’s Resource Management Act, 1991 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (henceforth RMA), as New Zealand’s national-
scale IWM rule-set, is a world-leading and internationally admired mandate for 
devolved, catchment-based regional governance (Crawford, 2007; Ericksen et al., 
2003; Memon, 1993). This is to be achieved through ‘the integrated management of 
natural and physical resources’ ("Resource Management Act," 1991 Pt4, s. 30 (1)) by 
locally elected Regional Councils, in order to ‘promote sustainable management’ 
("Resource Management Act," 1991 Part 2 s. 5 (1)). Unfortunately, the RMA has not 
succeeded with respect to freshwater systems (MfE, 2008; OECD, 2007; Resource 
Management (Simplify and Streamline) Amendment Bill ", 2009).  
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 There is a wealth of literature on IWM in New Zealand, and on the RMA in particular 
(a small selection of this includes: Burton, 1995; Cocklin & Blunden, 1998; 
Crawford, 2007; Cullen et al., 2006; Ericksen et al., 2003; Hooper, 2006; Jackson & 
Dixon, 2007; Memon, 2008a; Memon & Skelton, 2007; Oram, 2007; Rodgers, 2009; 
Salmon, 2007; Tipa & Welch, 2006; Valentine et al., 2007; Wheen, 1997; J. Williams, 
2006). Issues such as lack of vision, lack of political will, shortfalls in leadership, and 
in capacity, are already widely acknowledged as central to the failures of the RMA in 
freshwater governance. However, these issues cannot be addressed through the 
narrow confines of IWM institutions or their planning processes. These are problems 
whose roots lie within the broader social scope of institutional arrangements.  
 
Studies have yet to address the origins and processes of multi-scale emergence of 
polycentric IWM in New Zealand. In particular, the analysis of the way that New 
Zealand’s institutional arrangements have compromised the sustainability intention of 
the RMA (as IWM rules) from a perspective of cycles of complex adaptive change in 
SESs at multiple scales, are yet to be undertaken. This study intends to contribute to 
these topics.  
 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives 
Following on from the above discussion, the two aims of this thesis are as follows. 
The first aim is to reconceptualise IWM to provide a more robust theoretical 
understanding of its elements, processes and problems. Related to this, the second aim 
is to employ that understanding to inform an analysis of the role of institutional 
arrangements in IWM outcomes in New Zealand, under the RMA.  
 
In order to analyse the causes and extent of the IWM implementation gap in New 
Zealand (or any other country for that matter), I need to analyse the way that the 
multi-scale IWM institutions within the RMA framework have interacted with the 
wider, multi-scale institutional arrangements of the society, to generate the current 
overlapping and interacting problemsheds at national, regional, and local scales. A 
problemshed for IWM is the multi-dimensional domain, or extent, of the freshwater 
governance problem under consideration (Giordano, 2003; Margerum & Born, 2000).  
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 In order to achieve the two aims of this study as proposed above, I must fulfil the 
following four broad research objectives: 
• The first research objective is the search for more realistic and conceptually 
robust theoretical underpinnings for IWM. 
• Based on this, the second objective is the development of an evaluative 
framework for the re-conceptualised IWM process. 
• The third objective is the employment of the evaluative framework in the multi-
scale case study analysis of the role of institutional arrangements in IWM 
outcomes in New Zealand.  
• The final research objective for this thesis is to identify insights arising from the 
study, and to draw conclusions on:  
a) The theoretical underpinnings for re-drawn IWM; 
b) The evaluative framework, and;  
c) The influence of key institutional arrangements on IWM outcomes in New 
Zealand, and some suggestions towards improved future outcomes.  
 
1.5 Methods 
This study employs a qualitative, purposively constructed multi-scale case study of 
institutional arrangements for IWM in New Zealand. The multi-process evaluative 
framework for IWM, developed in Chapter Four, will be used in three ways. Firstly, it 
will be used to identify key institutional arrangements, and analyse their roles in the 
emergent polycentric IWM problemsheds at the national, and regional/local, scales. 
Secondly, it will be used to seek evidence of historical origins of the institutional 
arrangements identified as problematic. Thirdly, this information will inform analysis 
of the New Zealand freshwater sustainability transformation process, and the wider 
question of why sustainable freshwater outcomes from IWM have been so elusive in 
New Zealand, and other similar jurisdictions. Data was collected from multiple 
published and unpublished sources, including government documents, national 
statistics, books, peer-reviewed articles, media reporting and personal interviews. 
Collected data was analysed using the increasingly recognised technique of 
crystallisation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Maree et al., 2009; Miller & Crabtree, 1999). 
Crystallisation is described in greater detail in the following chapter, but may be 
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 summarised as, “consist[ing] of the analyst’s prolonged immersion into and 
experience of the text and then emerging, after concerned reflection, with an intuitive 
crystallisation of the text. This cycle of immersion and crystallisation is repeated until 
the reported interpretation is reached” (Miller & Crabtree, 1999, p. 19). 
 
1.6 Thesis Overview 
The remaining chapters in this thesis address the research problem, aim, and 
objectives as follows. Chapter Two presents the methods used in this study. Chapter 
Three presents a critique of the IWM literature on the origins, attributes, and 
challenges to sustainable IWM freshwater outcomes.  
 
Then, in Chapter Four, I turn to the wider literature on freshwater governance, seeking 
insights to help address the IWM challenges from related perspectives. I note a 
theoretical convergence within the IWM, Commons Theory, and complexity thinking 
approaches, regarding the attributes of collaborative planning and decision making. 
This can help to improve conceptual and practical understanding of IWM and its 
challenges. The identification of convergent insights from all three perspectives 
(IWM, Commons, and complexity thinking) enables me to develop a more robust, re-
framed model of what I term in this study collaborative IWM. From these 
contributing literatures, collaborative IWM is considered primarily as a process of 
social change and collective re-negotiation of different types of property rights, rather 
than being necessarily confined to ‘rational’ allocation processes for freshwater.  
 
However, although arguably more robust, I argue that this collaborative IWM model 
remains inadequate for polycentric challenges (as outlined in section 1.2.1), 
internationally or in New Zealand (Connick & Innes, 2003; Hajer, 2003; Healy, 2005; 
Janssen & Anderies, 2007; Ostrom, 2001, 2008; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005).  
 
Chapter Five addresses these challenges through a more critical consideration of three 
main questions raised in earlier chapters. Why have sustainable IWM freshwater 
outcomes been so elusive in jurisdictions such as New Zealand? What is the role of 
institutional arrangements in IWM outcomes? And, how do IWM problemsheds in 
countries like New Zealand exceed the capacity of current institutional design to 
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 address them? In Chapter Five, I propose a conceptual synthesis for IWM that 
addresses these challenges.  
 
In Chapter Six I will develop an evaluative framework for the re-drawn IWM process, 
able to analyse the emergence and processes of polycentric IWM as the most 
currently problematic area in the literature. In particular, the focus of this framework 
is on the way that the intentions of IWM institutions have been compromised by the 
society’s broader institutional arrangements, generating perverse IWM outcomes. 
 
In Chapter Seven I will apply the evaluative framework to the New Zealand national-
level SES (as a single jurisdiction that invests in the design of rules whose aim is to 
promote sustainable management of freshwater systems), during the IWM cycle of the 
RMA (1991-2009). Chapter Seven has three main sections. In section 7.2, I will 
identify the current national-scale IWM outcomes as a polycentric IWM problemshed. 
In section 7.3, I will identify particularly problematic institutional arrangements. I will 
then analyse the role of those problematic institutional arrangements in the 
compromise of the RMA intention at the national scale of freshwater governance 
(section 7.4).  
 
I will then re-focus the framework to evaluate the regional/local case study of Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere and Canterbury Region, during the same period (Chapter 
Eight). The same process is used in this chapter as in the previous one. A polycentric 
IWM problemshed, and particularly heavily implicated institutional arrangements, are 
identified. The problematic institutional arrangements are then analysed from the 
perspective of their influence on the IWM outcomes of the RMA in Canterbury, and 
for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere.   
 
In Chapter Nine I present an analysis of the historical origins of the problematic 
institutional arrangements, identified in Chapters Seven and Eight. Firstly, I seek 
evidence to suggest that these are institutional sediments (Healy, 2005), and the result 
of many cycles of avoidance, as expected from the synthesised conceptual perspective 
of IWM developed in Chapter Five. Secondly, I consider the role of the problematic 
institutional arrangements in New Zealand’s, potential multi-scale SES freshwater 
sustainability transformations.  
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In Chapter Ten I will first reflect upon and discuss the study findings, from the 
theoretical perspective of IWM argued for in Chapter Five. I will then present the 
conclusions of this study, including study strengths and shortcomings, suggestions for 
future research, and suggestions for future institutional arrangements for IWM in New 
Zealand.   
 13
  
2 Research Methods 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the methods employed in order to achieve the research aims. 
Following this broad introduction, the conceptual perspectives from which analysis is 
undertaken are developed and discussed in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. 
Framework elements that directed data collection are listed in section 2.3.1, and are 
detailed in Chapter Six. The following sections present the qualitative, and thus 
“inherently multi-method” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 5) research approach used in 
this study.  
 
Broadly, the following steps were undertaken. Firstly, a more theoretically robust 
model of collaborative IWM was identified through a comparative analysis of 
theoretical freshwater governance perspectives (detailed in Chapter Four). This model 
also identifies key polycentric IWM challenges, as the currently most problematic 
area. These polycentric challenges to collaborative IWM and sustainable freshwater 
outcomes are addressed through a conceptual synthesis in Chapter Five. The multi-
process evaluative framework for re-drawn IWM, developed in Chapter Six, is then 
tested through its use as a guide in the analysis of a purposively constructed, multi-
scale case study. Institutional arrangements for IWM in New Zealand at the national 
scale, and at the regional/local scale in the case of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere in 
Canterbury, were selected as especially wicked, interconnected examples of the 
emergent polycentric IWM challenges that are of particular interest to this research, 
and thus as a good trial of the framework’s capacity ‘in the field’. In these analyses 
reported in Chapters Seven and Eight, the evaluative focus is on the IWM process, 
and specifically on the influence of institutional arrangements on IWM outcomes. 
Following this, in Chapter Nine the focus of the evaluative framework is directed 
towards analysis of the historical origins of the currently problematic institutional 
arrangements. Finally, I employ the insights crystallised from the above analyses to 
consider the implications for New Zealand’s national, Canterbury’s regional, and Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere’s local SES freshwater sustainability transformation 
processes, reported in Chapter Ten.  
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2.2 Research Methodology 
As already stated, this research employs a qualitative, multi-scale (including time) 
case study approach. As I have noted above, multiple methods are inherent within 
the qualitative paradigm, and  
“the combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, 
perspectives, and observers in a single study is best understood, then, as a strategy 
that adds rigour, breath, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry” (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003, p. 5).  
 
A case study attempts to achieve a ‘holistic understanding’ of a phenomenon as it 
plays out, through the multiple sources of data and in-depth investigation noted 
above, providing a richness not available to surveys (Becker, 1998; Davidson & 
Tolich, 2003; Johnson, 2004; Lofland et al., 2006; Margerum, 2001). In particular, 
the qualitative paradigm has been selected because of its capacity to “grapple with 
complexity and pluralism”, and its focus on relationships (Davidson & Tolich, 2003, 
p. 123). Margerum (2001, p. 422) further suggests that “…the complexity of the 
phenomenon being studied [may] necessitate an iterative approach to the research 
analysis”. In line with complexity thinking, introduced in the previous chapter, 
qualitative research adopts the perspective that “no problem can be understood or 
solved in isolation from its greater environment. This is most simply expressed in the 
belief that ‘the whole [under analysis] is greater than the sum of the parts’ “ (Tolich 
& Davidson, 1999, p. 27). Evaluation research customises widely-used research 
methods to address context-specific issues (Davidson & Tolich, 2003), as described 
in the following sub-section. Typically addressing questions of why rather than how, 
evaluative research attempts to address specific real-world problems and facilitate 
goals in the field, and is often employed to analyse policy or management 
programme effectiveness (Ellingson, 2008).  
 
2.2.1 Crystallisation and Normative Analysis 
The flexibility in qualitative research to accommodate and integrate sometimes 
rapidly changing situations through adaptation of research focus, is supported by its 
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 proponents as a valuable attribute. On the other hand, this flexibility is criticised by 
quantitative researchers as lacking rigour or repeatability, and of being affected by 
unidentified (or implicit) researcher bias (Agrawal, 2002; Davidson & Tolich, 2003). 
As I will discuss in future Chapters, because IWM in collaborative and emergent 
polycentric IWM problemsheds is increasingly recognised as a-rational, or normative, 
any study findings will necessarily be open to multiple interpretations. In other words, 
in such analyses, “objective reality can never be captured. We know a thing only 
through its representations” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 5).  
 
Crystallisation is an emerging and increasingly recognised extension of the widely-
employed triangulation approach. Triangulation aims for the reduction of 
‘unreliability’ inherent in qualitative research, through development of greater 
“interpretative validity” and the confirmation of “data trustworthiness” (Maree et al., 
2009, p. 34). This is achieved through the use of multiple collection methods to 
identify the same data (or information) from multiple sources (perspectives of 
reporting), since this reduces the risks of either “chance associations [or] systematic 
biases” (Ibid, p34). 
 
Crystallisation, then, may be considered as an extension of the triangulation 
technique, developed as an interface between the more positive ‘hard’ Natural 
Science, and normative social science humanities and/or Arts (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2003; Ellingson, 2008; Maree et al., 2009; Miller & Crabtree, 1999). The increasingly 
recognised status of IWM as both Art and Science in the literature supports this 
approach (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Guerin, 2007; Gunningham, 2008; Healy, 
2005; Jones, 2002; Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007; Margerum & Whithall, 2004; Olsson 
et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2008; Steins et al., 2000). As with the challenges of institutional 
design for IWM noted in subsection 1.2.1, crystallisation acknowledges that there is 
“no one ‘correct’ telling of [an] event” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 6). Rather, 
‘intuitive’ crystallisation, as the result of reflective and iterative consideration of a 
subject from multiple perspectives, (sometimes drawn from multiple genres) 
“provides us with a deepened, complex, thoroughly partial, understanding of the 
topic. Paradoxically, we know more and doubt what we know. Ingeniously, we know 
that there is always more to know” (Richardson, 2000, c.f.Ellingson, 2008, p. 3).  
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 This research adopts the more constrained immersion/crystallisation approach 
advocated by Miller and Crabtree (1999),1 rather than the multi-genre crystallisation 
approach advocated by Ellingson (2008). The crystallisation of insights from the 
analysis of institutional arrangements for IWM in New Zealand was therefore an 
iterative, reflexive why and how process, including: 
• Real-world problem observation (e.g. why is the RMA under review? why is 
Canterbury experiencing such wicked problems? Why is Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere considered to be so degraded?); 
• Identification of gaps in IWM literature and practice (e.g. the need for new 
perspectives to address emerging polycentric IWM problemsheds), and the 
identification of theoretical convergence for collaborative IWM; 
• Synthesis of theoretical perspective and analytical framework (How can the 
emergence of polycentric IWM be better understood and analysed, as an effect 
of institutional arrangements on the sustainability intention of IWM rules? From 
which perspective does a crystallisation/consilience occur?);  
• Researcher observation of IWM practices in New Zealand, and the development 
of long-term informal relationships with individuals operating across a wide 
scale of national, regional, and local sectors. These include, for example: 
farming; facilitation of institutional design, and the interpretation, 
implementation, and evaluation of the resulting rule-sets; Environmental Law, 
or; sports and recreation.  
• Multi-scale evaluation of institutional arrangements for IWM in New Zealand, 
and analysis of empirical results (How have polycentric IWM challenges, 
nationally, regionally, and for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, come about?);  
• Reflection on empirical results, and generation or identification of insights, and; 
• Adjustment (e.g. how do insights affect the real situation, and/or the theoretical 
perspective? why are they important?). 
 
It should be noted, however, that in keeping with the ideas of the crystallisation 
process, these were not always addressed in the above linear order. 
                                                 
1  cited in section 1.5 as “consist[ing] of the analyst’s prolonged immersion into and experience of the 
text and then emerging, after concerned reflection, with an intuitive crystallisation of the text. This 
cycle of immersion and crystallisation is repeated until the reported interpretation is reached”  (Miller 
and Crabtree, 1999, p19) 
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2.3 Case Study Design: A Multi-scale, Interacting, IWM 
Wickedness 
As I have noted above, the case study in this thesis has been purposively selected in 
order to offer a prime example of the wickedness inherent in IWM, within and across 
multiple scales of SES. The decision to select what is arguably one of the most 
complex and fiercely contested governance nestings in New Zealand is related to the 
untested nature of the evaluative framework and its underpinning conceptual 
perspective. In particular, as has been noted in the literature, it is increasingly 
important for any evaluative framework, and analysis, of inherently imbricated 
(meaning overlapping and interacting, Gunderson and Holling, 2002) SESs to be able 
to move with ease across and within multiple levels of governance (Blomquist & 
Schlager, 2005; Edwards & Steins, 1998; Gibson et al., 2000; Healy, 2005; Ostrom, 
1990, 1999). Thus, the case study of New Zealand’s IWM wickedness and emergent 
multi-scale polycentric challenges was constructed to focus on three key levels of 
decision-making in that nation. Specifically, these were the national scale SES, the 
Regional level SES as represented by Canterbury, and the local scale as represented 
by Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere. The main focus for analysis was on the period 
between 1991 and 2009 (termed in this study the RMA cycle). The exception to this is 
the Creech Report, released on the 18th of February, 2010, and it’s surrounding 
context. Although released immediately prior to submission, this document was 
considered to be too significant, and too influential to the evaluation here undertaken, 
to omit.  
 
Analysis of each level of SES within the overall case study has brought its own results 
and conclusions. These have then been used to refine the research questions for the 
following SES level, as well as reflect upon the implications for the SES under 
analysis. These imbricated, particularly wicked SESs, together with an historical 
consideration of their social underpinnings, together offer an integrated, single 
package, reflecting governance challenges at each scale of IWM decision-making.  
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 As I will discuss in greater depth in Chapter Four, hidden contexts and hidden 
agendas are implicit within the whole topic of freshwater governance (Connick & 
Innes, 2003; Healy, 2005; Singleton, 2002; Steins & Edwards, 1999a). Thus it is the 
detailed nature of case studies (rather than statistical generalisation), that makes them 
ideally suited to analysis of emerging behaviours and theories (Davidson & Tolich, 
2003). Case studies are not readily transferable, but then, despite Hooper’s (2006, p1) 
definition of IWM as a “unified process”, neither is IWM (Hooper et al., 1999). 
However, a sufficiently generic framework for evaluation remains a requirement for 
individual IWM case studies, as well as for comparative analysis across cases, to 
continue the development of the framework (Adams et al., 2002; Agrawal, 2002; 
Edwards & Steins, 1998; Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007). It is hoped that as a generic 
evaluative tool, the framework developed in Chapter Six and applied in the New 
Zealand context to the national-scale SES, and in regional/local-scale SESs, can 
contribute in this respect. 
 
2.3.1 Data Collection Methods 
The collection of data focused upon the following main framework elements (see 
Chapter Six in particular, for a detailed description), as they pertain to each scale of 
interconnected SES:  
• External (higher scale SES) and historical contexts (the existing ‘institutional 
sediments’ Healy, 2005);  
• Internal contexts, comprising the resource characteristics, the extant IWM 
rule-sets, and the characteristics of user-groups;  
• Key institutional arrangements, such as laws, markets, cosmologies, or 
socially accepted customs;  
• Emerging patterns of resource exploitation and cumulative levels of multi-
dimensional resource use, and;  
• Resource, institutional, and social outcomes, together comprising the IWM 
outcomes for the SES under analysis. 
 
Data was collected from multiple published and unpublished sources, including: 
government documents; Laws, policies, plans and methods at multiple scales; peer-
reviewed articles; books; national statistics; committee minutes; media reports; 
 19
 researcher observation, and; personal interviews. I have already noted the deliberate 
selection of particularly wicked SESs in the construction of the multi-scale IWM case 
study through which the evaluative framework was tested. Naturally, the selection of 
data sources was subject to the same question of potential to provide information most 
relevant to the research questions. The selection of interview respondents was also 
carefully considered, particularly in order to provide the richest contextual insight to: 
positive support in the development of a collaborative IWM process, and the 
emerging polycentric IWM challenges at multiple scales; and the broadest range of 
Te-Waihora/Lake Ellesmere management perspectives, with greatest experiential 
depth and familiarity. Interview respondents were therefore selected from the 
following groups: Community Trusts (Water Rights Trust and Waihora Ellesmere 
Trust); practising IWM facilitators in Canterbury; research scientists; academia (in 
particular, the facets of environmental management, policy, and law); Environment 
Court Judges; mixed farming businesses; Ngai Tahu; Environment Canterbury 
(council and executive), and; Fish and Game. 
 
It is clear from the above list that several key perspectives have been omitted from 
this set of respondents. These include, for example, Ministry for the Environment, 
Federated Farmers, and Fonterra (a highly successful dairy cooperative), for example. 
Although these actors represent a significant aspect of the problemshed, it was 
decided to follow Anderies et al (2004) and Janssen and Anderies (2007), and to focus 
on SESs where stakeholders had already invested time and resources on collaborative 
planning. Also, in light of the untried status of the framework, and the inherent 
wickedness of the case study examples, as Connick and Innes (2003) suggest, 
‘failures’ were left as a topic for another time. This study has focused attention on 
those who have actively helped to drive the development of new polycentric IWM 
governance practices for New Zealand, and particularly for Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere, and for Canterbury Region. 
 
2.3.2 Personal Interviews: Ethical Considerations 
The protection of participant confidentiality and wellbeing is, of course, a critical part 
of any social science. Accordingly, before any interviews were undertaken or 
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 participants approached, the Ethics Guidelines of Lincoln University were consulted. 
In light of these guidelines, and after consultation with the supervisory team, it was 
decided that since interview respondents were being questioned in their capacity as 
public figures (as representatives of their affiliated organisations, and not as 
‘individuals’, per se), ethical clearance would not be required for this study.  
 
This chapter has provided the details of the research approach employed in this thesis, 
and the emergent crystallisation of insights. Results from this research can help to 
explain why sustainable freshwater outcomes have been so elusive in New Zealand. 
They can also help to develop a theory to explain the origins and processes of 
emergent, multi-scale polycentric IWM problemsheds. It is hoped that the study will 
contribute to the development of a more realistic and robust model for IWM, as called 
for in the literature. The next chapter, (Chapter Three), critiques the IWM literature 
and describes the concept, procedural development, collaborative planning process, 
and the polycentric challenges to IWM, as currently portrayed. 
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3 Origins and Attributes of IWM  
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
As noted in section 1.2, Integrated Water Management (IWM) approaches the wicked 
policy problems of providing and allocating limited, valued freshwater resource 
system benefits, and their associated costs and responsibilities, in two ways:  
• The concept of integration, and;  
• The process of integrated management, (Born & Sonzogni, 1995; Carpenter et 
al., 1999; Hooper, 2006; Hooper et al., 1999; Margerum, 1999b, 2008; 
Margerum & Born, 1995; Medema et al., 2008; Mitchell, 1997; Yaffee, 1999). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to critique the IWM concept (section 3.2), the 
development of IWM process as portrayed in the literature (section 3.3), and to 
specify the challenges to IWM that will be addressed in this research (section 3.4). 
 
3.2  Integration as a Management Concept for Freshwater 
Systems 
As stated in Chapter One, IWM has been advocated in the water management 
literature in one form or another since at least the late 1800s (Reisner, 1986; Roche, 
1994). In its current form, the concept of Integration was developed during the late 
1970s and early 1980s in response to the ‘narrow, sectoral, and uncoordinated’ (Born 
& Sonzogni, 1995; Cairns, 1991) planning failures of single resource/single benefit 
productivity maximisation, and the ‘impossibility’ of comprehensive environmental 
management (Bartlett, 1990; Born & Sonzogni, 1995; Margerum & Born, 1995; 
Mitchell, 2005; Slocombe, 1993; Yaffee, 1999). Achieving a balance between these 
management extremes remains an ongoing problem, and Mitchell (2005, p. 1342) has 
noted that there remains a driving need for balance between breadth of management 
(arising from the comprehensive approach) and depth of management (arising from a 
sectoral approach), in order to avoid what he terms “profound superficiality”. 
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 As a concept, integration aims to maintain desired environmental system functions 
through attention to key elements or subsystems, which are essential to the continuing 
productivity and wellbeing of the system whole. Integration as a concept has become 
widely accepted, and the idea of identifying critical subsystems for management of a 
wider whole, has endured for over a century as a robust and pragmatic approach to 
maintaining overall system health in highly complex, interconnected, and lamentably 
unpredictable natural resources, where information demands exceed the capacity of 
management systems (Bellamy et al., 1999; Born & Sonzogni, 1995; Bührs, 2009; 
Hooper, 2006; Hooper et al., 1999; Margerum, 1999b; Margerum & Born, 1995; 
Mitchell, 1997). 
 
3.3 The Development of IWM Process 
The process of IWM has two elements, the substantive (the ‘what gets done’) and the 
procedural (the ‘how it gets done’), described in the subsections below. The IWM 
literature has increasingly discussed these IWM process elements in terms of the 
planning process (plan development and implementation) for management of 
freshwater systems. The literature now defines IWM as a single, or unified, process 
that can result in collaborative and integrated management plans, designed to generate 
and maintain sustainable freshwater outcomes (Cardwell et al., 2006; Davis & 
Threlfall, 2006; Hooper, 2006; Medema et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2005). 
 
3.3.1  Substantive Attributes of IWM 
One widely cited definition of the substantive elements (the ‘what’ of integration), 
defines them as:  
• “A holistic approach, that considers the entire system rather than certain 
elements of subcomponents, and  
• Acknowledges interconnections in both the physical and human systems.  
• Is goal-oriented or focused on end points, and  
• Strategic, which includes focusing analysis early and biasing planning toward 
implementing actions” (Margerum, 1999, p152). 
 
There is an obvious paradox implicit within a holistic perspective (acknowledging 
that the whole being managed is greater than the sum of the parts) employing a 
process of rational reduction to identify elements for management. In Integration, this 
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 tension is understood to be accommodated by the expectation that trade-offs will be 
central to management (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Margerum & Hooper, 2001). 
Unfortunately, there is widespread agreement that making trade-offs is one of the 
most difficult tasks in IWM (Margerum, 1999b, 2008; Margerum & Hooper, 2001; 
McGinnis, 1999). The types of trade-offs that are made, the perspective from which 
criteria are considered, decision-makers authorised, and decisions reached and 
implemented, are critical social challenges to the implementation of any management 
concept (Margerum & Born, 2000; Steins & Edwards, 1999; Steins et al., 2000).  
 
3.3.2  Procedural Attributes of IWM 
Procedural aspects of IEM address the way in which the substantive elements are 
achieved and implemented. Despite the general acceptance of the concept, the 
procedural elements have been slow to emerge, and despite much work, have 
remained difficult to identify (Born & Sonzogni, 1995; Hooper et al., 1999; 
Margerum, 1999b; Margerum & Born, 1995). There are many reasons for this, 
including the complexity, difficulty, and contestation inherent within the process, and 
the vast range of contexts in which IWM operates. Another reason is that decision-
making processes have been changing from the regulatory origins and technical 
solutions of three decades ago, to the now more often employed art of political 
negotiation (Connick & Innes, 2003; Hajer, 2003; Healy, 2005).  
 
Over the last four decades, the procedural attributes of IWM have changed 
significantly from coercive, to cooperative, to collaborative, and now must develop 
further, to accommodate emerging polycentric challenges. Broadly, the process of 
planning for IWM may be either coercive (such as the early technical-rational 
‘command and control’ approaches to point source pollution) or cooperative (Ericksen 
et al., 2003). Coercive processes continue to be highly successful at resolving 
‘objective’ issues such as point source pollution. However, ‘command and control’ 
through centralised direction was unable to address the more normative aspects of 
IWM, such as competition between uses (Born & Sonzogni, 1995; Margerum & Born, 
1995). Cooperative processes for designing and implementing rules worked well for 
issues that could be resolved through the coordination of multiple uses, but were 
unable to address the more difficult topic of cumulative effects, or wider social issues 
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 underlying the allocation of multi-dimensional resource benefits between users 
(Ericksen et al., 2003; Mitchell, 1997).  
 
The category of cooperative IWM, in turn, can be further defined as what I label in 
this study as either collaborative IWM or polycentric IWM. Collaborative IWM 
processes were developed in response to cooperative difficulties noted above, but 
have struggled to cope with emerging polycentric challenges (Hajer, 2003; Ostrom, 
2001; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005). In this study, I consider collaborative IWM as 
organised around a single decision-making authority. Polycentric IWM, on the other 
hand, is based not on a single decision-making authority, but on many. These will be 
of differing jurisdictional or physical scales, extent of decision-making power, 
degrees of social development, or sectoral interest, and some should be expected to be 
in direct conflict with others (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Hajer, 2003; McGinnis, 
1999; McNeill, 2008; Ostrom, 2001). Ostrom (1999) notes that it is not possible to 
understand polycentric systems from the perspective of an organisation with a central 
director. As I will demonstrate in later chapters, the nature of the problemshed for 
polycentric IWM means that this process will need to simultaneously employ various 
SES-dependent procedural approaches to IWM planning for the management of 
multi-dimensional, multi-use competition between users. Furthermore, the IWM 
planning process will be repeated within and between every one of the multiple SESs 
present in polycentric systems, which exist across and over multiple jurisdictional 
scales (Berkes, 2002; Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Gibbs & Bromley, 2003; 
Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Hajer, 2003; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005).  
 
As currently portrayed in the literature, IWM is a context-dependent, collaborative 
approach to the coordination of human activities and interactions within a defined 
freshwater system. Two aspects are addressed in this approach. The first is the 
protection or enhancement of the long-term productive capacity of the freshwater 
system, over the widest possible range of socially desired, freshwater resource system 
functions and benefits. The second is the equitable distribution of those benefits, and 
their costs (allocation). Ongoing, long-term interaction and information exchange, 
based on trust, personal honour, and mutual respect between the different stakeholder 
representatives and decision-makers is therefore the key to collaborative planning for 
the coordination of a diverse range of management agencies, stakeholders, policies or 
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 laws, and actions, towards consensually agreed goals (Abernethy, 2005; Blomquist & 
Schlager, 2005; Born & Sonzogni, 1995; Cardwell et al., 2006; Ericksen et al., 2003; 
Hedelin, 2007; Hooper, 2006; Margerum, 2008; Margerum & Born, 1995; Mitchell, 
2005; Singleton, 2002; Tortajada, 2003; Weber & Khademian, 2005).  
 
As collaboration has “begun to supplement, if not actually substitute for more 
traditional forms of governance” (Connick & Innes, 2003, p. 178), the number and 
type of stakeholders involved has expanded, and collaborative processes now require 
more structured methods of information exchange and decision-making processes 
(Margerum, 2008; Margerum & Born, 2000). For collaborative IWM, the following 
procedural elements of plan development and implementation, recommended in the 
literature, are briefly described below (Hooper, 2006; Hooper et al., 1999; Margerum, 
1999b; Margerum & Born, 2000; Margerum & Hooper, 2001; Memon & Weber, 
2008).  
• Initiation: a current or future problem is experienced or identified, and 
defined, and an agenda is developed. 
• Problemshed definition: The role of this element is to make explicit, and 
develop agreement on three main topics. These are: the need for IWM; the 
multi-dimensional scope of the problemshed, and; the contexts from which the 
problemshed needs to be understood, in order to consider potential 
institutional designs to address it. 
• Resourcing for collaborative plan development and implementation: This 
element often operates continuously over the whole planning process, and 
where it extends to the alteration or renegotiation of property rights, this 
element is typically a vigorously contested issue than can represent the overall 
IWM process. 
• Coordination of the collaborative planning process: This is viewed as the 
core of IWM. The structures and processes for decision-making, particularly 
with respect to communication, and the sharing of information, are designed to 
coordinate the multi-SES (including government agencies) development of the 
IWM plan.  
• Outputs: The IWM policy, plan, or programme, is the expected IWM 
institutional output. This should describe clear management goals, including 
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 agreed criteria for the evaluation of the attainment or otherwise of those goals, 
and time-frames in which they will be reached.  
• Outcomes: These are expected to include sustainable or improved levels of 
multi-dimensional freshwater resource system use. Other IWM planning 
outcomes identified in the literature include: the development of social 
learning, stakeholder familiarity, common goals, and mutual understanding; 
that committees assert their role in management activities; that resources are 
available for implementation; that there is public support for implementation 
actions, and; that implementation begins immediately, to build confidence and 
momentum (Bellamy et al., 1999; Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Cardwell et 
al., 2006; Connick & Innes, 2003; Crawford, 2007; Ericksen et al., 2003; 
Hedelin, 2007; Hooper, 2006; Hooper et al., 1999; Margerum, 1999b; 
Margerum & Born, 2000; Margerum & Hooper, 2001; Medema et al., 2008).  
 
3.4  But Good Process Does Not Equal Desired 
Outcomes: Challenges to ‘Successful’ IWM  
Unfortunately, as already noted, these significant improvements to the collaborative 
planning process in IWM have not been adequate to reliably generate sustainable 
freshwater outcomes. Three interdependent barriers to IWM have been identified 
from the literature as of particular interest to this study. These are: the perennial 
nature of IWM problemsheds; the presence of imbricated scales and multiple 
dimensions, and finally; the increasingly vigorous but normative contestation over 
definition of multi-dimensional resource system values, benefits, and costs, within 
and between SESs (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Gibson et al., 2000; Kerr, 2007; 
Owens et al., 2004). 
 
3.4.1 Perennial Problems 
As stated in section 1.2, wicked problems are those that have exceeded the capacity of 
more straightforward attempts to manage them. They typically offer high levels of 
uncertainty, involve multiple competing uses and users over multiple dimensions 
including time, and are perennial. The term perennial is used here rather than 
persistent, since it better describes the unrelenting tendency of IWM problemsheds to 
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 become both more crowded within any given dimension, and to expand over multiple 
dimensions through time; generally as a result of continuing increases in socio-
economic pressures. Persistent implies a chronic, but steady state problem.  
 
The perennial nature of IWM problemsheds is a critical issue that needs clear 
acknowledgement from the outset. Dealing with a problem that can never be 
‘resolved’, but that must be periodically re-stated to keep pace with its changing 
context, offers a different perspective for analysis than that which may be used in a 
‘finite’ situation. What is needed is a sound generic framework for decision-making 
that can help managers, stakeholders, and users to manage as best they can at the time 
with the tools available to them, accepting that at some future point these decisions 
will have to be revisited in light of contextual changes which have altered the issues. 
This approach is also known as ‘satisficing’, ‘muddling through’, or bounded 
rationality (Bellamy et al., 1999; Connick & Innes, 2003; Edwards & Steins, 1998; 
Ferreyra & Beard, 2007; Healy, 2005; Jones, 2002; Margerum & Born, 2000; 
Margerum & Hooper, 2001; Meppem & Gill, 1998; Mitchell, 1997; Steins et al., 
2000).  
 
3.4.2 Multiple Scales of Governance  
The nature of freshwater as part of the global hydrological cycle means that any 
boundary drawn below the global level must necessarily be arbitrary (Mackenzie, 
1996), and will therefore be in the first place contested (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; 
O'Riordan, 2000), and in the second place, will only identify one element of a wider, 
imbricated system (Anderies et al., 2004; Gibson et al., 2000; Giordano, 2003; 
Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Janssen & Anderies, 2007). Furthermore, the physical 
scale of some freshwater systems, as they flow from mountains to sea, generates 
cross-boundary issues from down-stream effects, such as reduced levels of flow, or 
increased levels of pollutants. These, in turn, invoke multiple decision-making 
authorities, sometimes belonging to different nations. As Blomquist and Schlager 
(2005) point out, this means that even if a catchment level authority exists and is 
deemed legitimate, that will not negate the need for other forms of governance at 
scales above and below. This is one of the most intractable problems for catchment-
based IWM that has been reported so far. Recently, the literature has begun to agree 
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 that every scale at which more than one political jurisdiction exists will have to be 
considered, and that the current governance focus is on the difficulties relating to the 
regional scale (Abernethy, 2005; Janssen & Anderies, 2007; Kerr, 2007; Lovell et al., 
2002; Margerum & Whithall, 2004). 
 
3.4.3 Normative Contestation Within and Between Multiple SESs 
Further problems reported in the literature are the increasingly normative trade-offs 
that must be made during the coordination of collaborative-choice level decision-
making amongst multiple SESs in multi-scale, multi-dimensional freshwater systems 
(Bellamy et al., 1999; Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Connick & Innes, 2003; Hajer, 
2003; Jones, 2002; Lovell et al., 2002; Owens et al., 2004). A shorter description from 
the field is that IWM is akin to ‘herding cats’ (Donaldson, 2008). 
 
Recent work in this area of IWM has concentrated on the process of consensus-
building during the problemshed definition phase of the IWM planning process. This 
is because improvement of IWM outcomes has often been undermined by difficulties 
with the identification of goals and criteria (including time frames) for evaluation. In 
many cases, reaching agreement has virtually become the product, or outcome 
(Coggins, 1999; Connick & Innes, 2003; Ferreyra & Beard, 2007). The danger with 
this is that the underlying reason for the process, the health and continued productivity 
of the resource (particularly of the more normative, less easily quantified values), and 
its dependent communities (ecological and human) can easily be, and often is, 
compromised or subsumed in the struggle to reach agreements (McGinnis, 1999a; 
Owens, 1997; Singleton, 2002).  
 
The complexity and uncertainty inherent in freshwater systems means that ecological 
parameters are always open to challenge. This gives rise to the idea that the rational 
origins of IWM decision-making may in fact be a Quixotic enterprise: that without 
explicit consideration of normative influences, there is little reliability of ecologically 
rational outcomes (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; McGinnis, 1999a; Owens et al., 
2004). What Ostrom (1999, p494) describes as an approach based on the perception 
that  
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 “…what is needed is to gather reliable, statistical information on key variables, 
determine what the optimal harvesting pattern should be, divide the harvesting level 
into quotas, and assign quotas to users […] was not […] supported by the empirical 
research”. 
 
As socio-economic pressures increase, and resource uses become increasingly 
intensive, this is an attitude that is becoming more frequently voiced in the literature. 
For instance, “…the modern ‘resource management paradigm’ is maladaptive, 
bureaucratic, dysfunctional, and based principally on the economic values associated 
with ‘natural resources’ (Woolley & McGinnis, 1999, p. 579). Hajer, (2003, p190), 
meanwhile, stresses the need to “address the explicitly normative issues that come 
with the introduction of new practices in which some will be able to participate and 
others will not”. Unfortunately, Blomquist and Schlager (2005; p102) opine that 
“Emerging collaborative efforts are no better - they are impossible (because of 
collective action problems), impractical (because collaboration can emerge only on 
small scales) and perhaps even illegal”. It should be remembered, though, that 
proponents of integration have never claimed it to be a panacea for environmental 
planning problems. Rather, its supporters take care to repeat often that it is a ‘step 
towards’ desired outcomes; a step which, if taken, can lead on to sustainability, not a 
management end in and of itself (Margerum, 1999b).  
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided a critique of the concept, procedural development, 
collaborative and integrated planning process, and challenges pertaining to IWM as 
currently portrayed in the literature. In order to address the IWM challenges 
described, the following two chapters broaden the field of enquiry. In the following 
chapter, I will introduce key literatures pertaining to the characteristics of freshwater 
systems that relate to the potentially improved understanding of polycentric IWM 
challenges. Firstly, I will discuss complex adaptive systems, which as already noted, 
learn or adapt over time (section 4.2). Secondly, freshwater systems are also complex 
common-pool resources (section 4.3). Insights arising from a theoretical convergence 
amongst these two scholarships, and that of collaborative IWM as described in this 
chapter, can then be used to inform the problem of institutional design for ‘successful’ 
IWM, whether coercive, cooperative, collaborative, or polycentric (Chapter Five).  
 30
  
4 Managing Freshwater as a Complex, Adaptive, 
Common-Pool Resource  
4.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a critique of IWM as currently portrayed in the 
literature, which included the identification of three main challenges to the generation 
and maintenance of sustainable IWM freshwater outcomes. These were the perennial 
nature of IWM problems, the need to deal with multiple scales of governance, and the 
increasingly normative nature of IWM conflicts and contestations. In this chapter, I 
extend and focus the literature review, to broaden the conceptual field of enquiry in an 
effort to address these three challenges to IWM.  
 
I will introduce key freshwater system characteristics and theoretical perspectives on 
the generation and maintenance of sustainable freshwater outcomes, from two fields 
of scholarship in particular. The first theoretical perspective considered in this chapter 
is complexity thinking, as it relates to the process of complex adaptive change, and 
the emergence of self-organising constitutional hierarchies (section 4.2). The second 
theoretical perspective is Commons Theory, particularly as this relates to the 
characteristics, systems of property rights, and decision-making for complex, 
common-pool resources such as freshwater (section 4.3).  
 
Then, in section 4.4, I will propose a model for IWM, with particular focus on 
collaborative IWM. This model is drawn from a theoretical convergence identified in 
the complexity thinking, Commons Theory, and IWM literatures, and covers the IWM 
concept, systems perspective, and IWM processes. Section 4.5 provides a brief 
summary of the chapter and its contribution to the conceptual synthesis undertaken in 
Chapter Five.        
 
4.2 IWM for Complex Adaptive Systems 
It has long been understood that institutions need to be “designed to fit the character 
of the resource involved” (Schlager et al, 1994, p295, note 1). But “when our norms, 
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 concepts, and expectations offer a poor match to reality, it is time to rethink our 
world-view” (Connick and Innes 2003, p179). This section introduces the complexity 
thinking perspective, and describes the characteristics and processes of change in 
Complex Adaptive Systems (CASs), including complex adaptive processes involved 
in IWM, and wider social change. 
 
4.2.1 Complex Adaptive Systems and their Processes of Change 
The advent of the complex adaptive systems (CAS) perspective has dramatically re-
drawn the IWM landscape to great advantage, since clearer understanding of the 
systems under management and their processes of change are central to improved 
freshwater outcomes. However, complexity thinking and associated adaptive 
governance approaches represent a development in the understanding of the systems 
under management, not the underpinning management concept of integration itself. 
The CAS perspective is essentially a further development of the linear, interconnected 
systems perspective that preceded it, and the single-sector maximisation perspective 
which preceded that. However, complexity thinking has provided vital insights for a 
more realistic and richly contextual understanding of social systems, their structures, 
and processes of change over time.  
 
Complex Adaptive Systems occur in all shapes, dimensions, and scales, including 
freshwater systems, ecological and human societies, and institutional arrangements. 
These systems change over time through abrupt, non-linear cycles of adaptive change, 
learning, and development (Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Holling, 2004; Hughey & 
Taylor, 2009; Janssen & Anderies, 2007). Complex adaptive change happens over 
four stages: entrepreneurial exploitation (r), organisational consolidation (or capital 
accumulation) (K), creative destruction (Ω), and re-, or de- structuring (or capital 
release) (α), shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: The Phases of Complex Adaptive Change (Holling, 2004) 
 
In this thesis, I have adapted this representation to follow the process of complex 
adaptive change over linear time (Figure 2), and to reflect the fact that systems are not 
‘closed’. This is to say that systems do not reset to the same starting context at the end 
of each cycle.  
 
 
 Back Loop Ω, α Front Loop r, K Back Loop Ω, α 
Time 
Complex 
Adaptive 
System 
Disturbance or shock and 
capital release 
Entrepreneurial exploitation 
and capital accumulation 
Disturbance or shock 
and capital release 
Figure 2: Complex Adaptive Change Over Time 
 
The ‘front loop’ is the relatively steady, incremental growth and capital accumulation 
stage, r and K (exploitation and emerging patterns of interaction). The ‘back loop’ is 
typically more rapid and unpredictable, and involves the creative destruction of the 
system (Ω), and its subsequent elemental re-organisation (α). The back loop 
reorganises the system, and the cycle begins again. For instance, in natural systems, 
this process gives rise to ecological succession, whereby a trigger (a fire, a flood, or 
the turning of the seasons) will disturb the system, leading to resources being made 
available for a new generation (Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Hughey & Taylor, 2009; 
Janssen & Anderies, 2007). The length of time a CAS takes to complete the cycle 
from exploitation to collapse and renewal will vary from system to system.  
Ω α  r K α  { { Ω {
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In multi-scale or multi-element systems, new behaviours or characteristics can emerge 
from a coincidence of back loops in multiple cycles. This is one of the main reasons 
that chance – ‘the alignment of the stars’ - plays such a prominent (although little 
researched) role in IWM (Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Janssen & Anderies, 2007; 
Olsson et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2008). Any IWM outcome is, at least in part, the 
coincidental product of several processes of complex adaptive change, operating 
across different scales of many dimensions.  
 
The characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are central to understanding 
the process of change that underpins IWM problemsheds. Through iterations of the 
front- and back-loop processes described above, CASs ‘learn’ from experience, and 
alter their patterns of behaviour in light of changing contexts. Such systems typically 
present four broad characteristics that make “fixed policy a route to disaster” 
(Carpenter et al., 1999, p. 13). These are non-linearity, flows, diversity, and 
aggregation (Ostrom, 1999). Aggregation is a key theme in complexity-related 
literature, since it refers to the tendency of such systems to generate emergent 
properties that produce unanticipated outcomes (Bührs, 2009; Gunderson & Holling, 
2002; Janssen & Anderies, 2007; Ostrom, 1999).  
 
In the battle against entropy and disorder, it seems that some CASs naturally form 
into constitutional hierarchies. In a constitutional hierarchy, a group of individual 
CASs at a lower operating level can coalesce into larger units that, once emerged, 
display their own particular characteristics and have their own functions, 
organisations, and emergent properties, including new collective behaviours (Gibson 
et al., 2000; Ostrom, 1999). In such systems, Gibson et al, (2000, p221) observe that 
“there is no single ‘correct’ level to study”.  
 
From a complexity thinking perspective of cycles of learning and change, IWM can 
be viewed as a process of ongoing developmental cycles in an SES. Integrated water 
management is thus identified in this study as primarily a process of complex adaptive 
social change.  
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 4.2.1.1 Adaptive Governance 
The complexity thinking perspective has also given rise to ideas of adaptive 
governance. Adaptive Governance addresses the issues of complexity and uncertain 
change by enhancing the adaptive capacity of an SES through the process of social 
learning (Medema et al., 2008; Memon & Weber, 2008; Olsson et al., 2006; Painter & 
Memon, 2007; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005). The goals of adaptive governance are broadly 
twofold: firstly, to minimise abrupt, non-linear back-loop disturbances to the system 
as much as possible, through the enhancement of steady, incremental front-loop 
learning. Secondly, adaptive governance aims to enhance local-level capacity and 
diversity through institutional experimentation. 
 
While the above mentioned aims of adaptive governance are admirable in themselves, 
both aims contain serious flaws. The first aim of back-loop minimisation does not 
address the abrupt and non-linear changes that cannot be avoided, or those that should 
not be minimised, but enhanced as a source of transformative potential in an SES 
(Olsson et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2001). Complexity thinking therefore requires that 
decision-makers at all levels be able to ‘go with the flow’ of human ingenuity, 
particularly as it applies to the enhancement of individual benefit through new ways 
of exploiting resources. This highlights the need for decision-makers to be able to 
recognise long-term trends and indicators of market changes as part of strategic 
planning.  
 
Secondly, while institutional experimentation may well be a necessary aspect of social 
change, it also generates a difficult tension for decision-makers who may be asked to 
gamble the SES’s freshwater and social capital on new, or untried institutions, with a 
statistically high probability of failure (Ostrom, 1999). Furthermore, the high 
probability of failure means that there needs to be a degree of redundancy or ‘spare’ 
capacity present in the freshwater system, with which decision-makers may gamble. 
This is to ensure that the potential costs of institutional failure (for example, further 
degradation of the system through failure to identify and enforce limits to use) can be 
met by the SES, and do not exacerbate the freshwater overshoot for which 
institutional change was initially required. Unfortunately, ‘unused’ or ‘un-allocated’ 
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 freshwater benefits become increasingly scarce as systems near their sustainability 
limits.  
 
This situation can become particularly difficult where decision-makers are elected 
representatives who require local support to remain in office, and ‘agency’ capture is 
a well-recognised risk in collaborative decision-making (Coggins, 1999; Mitchell, 
1997; Owens, 1997; Singleton, 2000). It can be difficult to generate required levels of 
social support for approaches considered expensive and/or risky. The result of this is 
often an effective lock-in to inappropriate technologies, markets, and/or decision-
making structures and processes (Kline, 2001).  
 
4.2.1.2 Robustness for SESs 
Robustness in the governance of complex adaptive systems such as freshwater or 
societies, is a concept that has recently gained much ground, particularly as a 
contingent outcome for these communities (Anderies et al., 2004; Holling, 2004; 
Janssen & Anderies, 2007; Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007; Ostrom, 2001).  
 
The robustness of a complex adaptive system is the capacity of that system to 
continue to generate a desired benefit (for example, potable water, or the support of 
fisheries), in the face of internal or external system shocks (such as drought, for 
example). In other words, robustness can be considered as the system’s resilience to 
disturbance. However, disturbance in socially constructed complex adaptive systems 
(such as change or development in SESs or their institutional arrangements) is not 
subject solely to the laws of evolution (Blomquist, 1992; Janssen & Anderies, 2007). 
Therefore, the engineering term robustness is used in the literature, rather than the 
ecological term resilience, to reflect the element of conscious design that is sometimes 
present in human systems (Anderies et al, 2004).  
 
Robustness is needed for a system to withstand stress through provision of sufficient 
time and resources for adaptation to, or amelioration of that stress. As stated above, 
system robustness is increasingly cited as a desired outcome for IWM. This highlights 
the fact that while governance is an ongoing and non-substitutable requirement for 
sustainability, its structures and processes must sometimes be re-negotiated in 
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 response to, and importantly, in anticipation of, changing governance contexts. As a 
complexity thinking restatement of the Sustainability goals, robustness is an 
intuitively appealing notion. Unfortunately, unlike sustainability which is always 
desired, robustness may be a curse as well as a blessing, if it reifies inadequate or 
inequitable decision-making (Anderies et al., 2004; Giordano, 2003; Hajer, 2003; 
Steins & Edwards, 1999). Moreover, there remain the same difficulties with 
evaluating robustness as there are with evaluating sustainability: the identification of 
clear, objective targets in a world of normatively contested trade-offs (Blomquist & 
Schlager, 2005; McGinnis, 1999a; Owens et al., 2004).  
 
Institutions are increasingly being designed to enhance or generate robustness in an 
SES, but robustness also implies the closure of system limits: someone is going to 
have to decrease their rate of use in order to benefit other users. So far, that ‘someone’ 
has typically been the freshwater systems and their dependent ecological communities 
(McGinnis, 1999a; Owens, 1997; Owens et al., 2004). The concept of robustness 
implies that there are no more ‘avoidance tactics’ to be employed (Olsson et al., 
2006). Someone will have to ‘surrender’ something for the wellbeing of everyone: 
individual freedoms need to be curtailed for a collective benefit. The question then 
becomes how to distribute the loss? Moreover, robustness in complex adaptive 
systems, including SESs (as comprising freshwater, human societies, and their 
institutional arrangements), predicates on Goldilocks levels of redundancy: ‘just right’ 
(Olsson et al., 2006; Yorque et al., 2002). This is expensive to maintain (although 
arguably cheaper than a failed system in the long run), and in contradiction to the 
‘streamlining’ approach, which has been dominant in the jurisdictions of particular 
interest to this study, such as New Zealand.  
 
4.2.2 Social Change and Potential Sustainability Transformation 
From the perspective described above, IWM can be viewed as one of many complex 
adaptive processes of social change, which run concurrently in an SES. Social-
Ecological-Systems will go through successive IWM cycles as their contexts change 
over time. From a broader perspective of social change in freshwater governance, 
some social change can result in a social sustainability transformation with respect to 
the freshwater systems of an SES. Social transformation in societies is a back-loop 
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 process of change dependent on, in the first place, ecological crises, social change, or 
economic or political disturbances (Olsson et al., 2006). These three triggers open the 
‘window of opportunity’ (Ibid).  
 
After that, the route to social transformation in terms of freshwater sustainability 
depends on: the past, present, and expected contexts internal and external to the 
system; the type and degree of change required (the extent of the sustainability gap); 
and on who defines ecological limits from which perspective. In short, social 
transformation depends upon five key questions. Who or what benefits? Who or what 
pays? Who or what decides? How? How can the rules be changed? (Ostrom, 1990). 
These questions must be addressed not just in the redesign of IWM institutions, but in 
any redistribution of resource costs and benefits. The answers to these questions are 
expressed in an SES as individual bundles of re-negotiated property rights (Edwards 
& Steins, 1998; Ostrom, 2008; Schlager, 2005; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
 
The process of sustainability transformation (rather than the more common change, or 
adaptation) in societies, follows three main phases. The first phase is termed 
‘preparation’, and refers to the front-loop processes of exploration, experience and 
learning. The second phase is the opening of a window of opportunity, which is 
essentially a disturbance in one or several key SES systems. Windows of opportunity 
can be the result of: environmental crises, policy failure, fiscal crises, activist groups, 
lawsuits, or slowly changing institutional structures (Hajer, 2003; Healy, 2005; 
Olsson et al., 2006). The third phase is transition, where the system reorganises itself, 
and re-designs rules (Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Olsson et al., 2006). 
 
Windows of opportunity and resulting social change, adaptation, avoidance tactics, or 
sustainability transitions are largely about timing, and, critically, chance. Problems, 
solutions, and politics and policy entrepreneurs, must converge to open a window of 
opportunity. In other words, “a problem is recognised, a solution is available, the 
political climate makes the time right for change, and the constraints do not inhibit 
actions” (Olsson et al., 2006, p. 5).  
 
This section has briefly introduced complexity thinking, and its potential to contribute 
to the research problems. In particular, complexity thinking offers: 
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 • A view of IWM as ongoing cycles of social change, and learning from 
experience. 
• Further, it indicates that the complex adaptive IWM process is one of many 
running concurrently in SESs. Associated processes of interest to this study 
are those of social sustainability transformations, and coupled institutional 
change/collaborative planning processes.  
• Lastly, a complexity thinking perspective provides a theoretical understanding 
of constitutional hierarchies, and their emergent, self-organising, higher-scale 
systems.  
 
The next section introduces the characteristics of freshwater systems as complex 
common-pool resources (CCPRs). It is argued here that as a CCPR, the key aspect of 
decision-making is the re-negotiation of bundles of property rights. 
 
4.3  IWM for Complex Common-Pool Resources 
It is widely acknowledged that cumulative use of shared resources must be regulated 
in order to prevent the Tragedy of Open Access (Edwards & Steins, 1998; Giordano, 
2003; Ostrom, 1999). As with system robustness (section 4.2.1.2), this is another 
restatement of the sustainability challenge. In other words, renewable, limited, and 
shared natural resources must be managed in order to avoid over-exploitation and 
degradation, resulting in the loss of current or future benefits to the interdependent 
users. The heart of the Commons lies in property rights, and as Giordano (2003, p369) 
notes, “The Commons problem occurs when a resource domain2 is coincident with or 
intersects the rights domains of two or more resource users”, and that therefore, “the 
problem for any resource must be defined for a particular socio-political scale [SES] 
if its nature is to be fully articulated” (Ibid, p367). This is a key insight, reinforcing 
the idea that all governance scales should be involved in IWM.  
 
Commons Theory adopts the position that the people most fitted to decide on resource 
management issues are those most immediately affected by those decisions (the 
                                                 
2 A resource domain may be spatial extent or qualitative measure, and is the area through which the 
resource travels to fulfil its natural function. This is not fixed, but should be expected to change over 
time (Hajer, 2003).  
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 principle of subsidiarity). The management of common-pool resources has typically 
emerged from longer-term time-scales and small social and physical scales, since it 
draws heavily on detailed local knowledge of the resource system vagaries, as well as 
community and individual characteristics, for effective management (Agrawal, 2002; 
Anderies et al., 2004; Ostrom, 1990; Taylor, 1998). One of the shortfalls of more 
‘traditional’ Commons Theory, as it has developed since Hardin’s (1968) tragic, and 
by now notorious, misnomer, is that it has been largely limited to single-use 
resources, appropriated by relatively homogeneous user groups in stable 
circumstances (Agrawal, 2002; Anderies et al., 2004; Edwards & Steins, 1998). This 
is understandable, and even appropriate, given that the early intention was to show 
that collective ownership and management of CPRs can be as effective as either of the 
alternatives, (then perceived as market or state management, as a result of Hardin’s 
use of the term ‘commons’ instead of ‘open access’).  
 
However, the narrower focus of early Commons Theory as described above has led to 
limitations in the range of applicable approaches for contemporary multiple-use and 
complex (multi-scale) CPRs such as freshwater systems (Abernethy, 2005; Anderies 
et al., 2004; Edwards & Steins, 1998; Meinzen-Dick & Bakker, 1999; Ostrom, 1999). 
Commons scholarship has now come of age (Agrawal, 2002), and can contribute 
much to the richer, more imbricated process of governance for water, called for in the 
literature. 
 
4.3.1 Complex Common-Pool Resources 
As apparently inexorable socio-economic pressures continue to rise in catchments 
worldwide, and new system limits are identified through experiences of the 
consequences of breaking them, freshwater systems have become recognised as 
Complex Common Pool Resources. Definitions of Complex, or multiple-use 
Common Pool Resources include that from Steins and Edwards, (1999a, p309) who 
describe them as ”…resources that are used for different types of extractive and non-
extractive purposes by different stakeholder groups and are managed under a mixture 
of property rights regimes”. The terms complex and multiple-use as used in the 
literature are not always clear, so in this research a Complex Common-Pool Resource 
is taken to mean mobile, multi-scale, multi-dimensional, and multiple-use.  
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As with IWM, the heavily exploited benefits of water and its fugitive, diverse, 
ubiquitous yet subtractable flows of positive and normative values, make the equitable 
and efficient provision and allocation of these benefits an ongoing, hugely complex, 
and generally strongly contested affair. Further, it is becoming recognised that a full 
range of rights and responsibilities must be collectively renegotiated at every level of 
political jurisdiction where there exists more than one SES (Giordano, 2003). As 
Common Pool Resources evolve through increased levels of use into Complex 
Common Pool Resources, institutions need to be renegotiated to avoid adverse 
impacts resulting from the increased levels of cumulative use, and the resulting 
increase in user-group interdependence (Steins & Edwards, 1999). This iterative 
decision-making, inevitably, greatly increases transaction costs for system 
management as already noted in subsection 3.4.  
 
4.3.2 Institutions and Complex Common-Pool Resources 
As is by now widely appreciated, Common-Pool Resources display the conflicting 
property rights characteristics of ubiquity (making exclusion difficult and/or costly - a 
public property characteristic), and subtractability - a private property characteristic 
(Giordano, 2003; Ostrom, 1990; Schlager et al., 1994; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
Common Pool Resources are not necessarily common property. They can be ‘owned’ 
in several ways, each of which generates a different management approach, as shown 
in Table 1. Common-Pool Resources can be: public property, where the right of 
management is awarded to a government agency; common property, where the 
resource is managed by and for a defined community of individuals (or individual 
entities); or they can be private property, which is associated with the decision-
making of individual autonomies under market conditions.  
 
 
 41
  
Table 1 Types of Water Allocation or Provision Approaches. Adapted from: Bakker, 2001; Bruns 
and Meinzen-Dick, 2005; Steins and Edwards, 1999 
 User Group Management 
Agency 
Allocation Markets 
MIXED 
MODEL 
Management 
paradigm 
Complex Commons 
Management 
Integrated Water 
Management 
(IWM) 
Economic valuation 
Approach to 
Social arena 
Platforms for 
Resource use 
(re)negotiation 
Coordinated 
Collaborative 
Planning 
Markets for water 
and its uses/benefits. 
Key 
Characteristics 
Collective decision-
making among water 
users, for example, an 
irrigator’s association 
Bureaucratic 
agency controls 
directly 
Trading among 
users, temporary or 
permanent transfers. 
Property 
Rights 
Systems 
Common Property Public Property 
Private property 
(can be an 
individual or an 
individual entity). 
Advantages 
Legitimacy based on 
custom 
Local knowledge and 
experience. 
Adaptable 
Standard 
procedures 
Technical 
expertise 
River basin 
perspective 
Voluntary 
Prices reveal 
opportunity costs for 
users, create 
incentives to 
conserve. 
Disadvantages 
More difficult if users 
do not know each 
other and lack 
existing relationships, 
or if only selected 
users are represented. 
Information 
intensive 
Difficult to 
customise to 
particular 
conditions. 
Risk of neglecting 
impacts on third 
parties 
If transactions are 
rare or complex, 
then hard to 
establish prices. 
A
 M
ix
ed
 M
od
el
 w
ill
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ra
w
 fr
om
 a
ll 
th
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e 
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As decision-making rule-sets to define the “conditions of access to and control over a 
range of benefits arising from a collectively used resource system” (Edwards and 
Steins, 1998, p349), each of these systems of property rights offers benefits and 
problems. Further, property rights regimes are increasingly being viewed as lying 
along a continuum, rather than as competing and exclusive management approaches, 
and are increasingly being used in combination as a ‘mixed system’ (Bruns & 
Meinzen-Dick, 2005). It is critical to successful institutional design for complex 
common pool resources, to understand that property rights are not about the 
relationships between users and the resource. They are about defining the 
interpersonal relationships of society members, with respect to a resource (Bromley, 
1992; Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2005; Giordano, 2003). This is a form of social 
standing, also known as a ‘pecking order’.  
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 As stated above, Commons problems are defined as the intersection of property rights 
domains with respect to the domain of a resource (Giordano, 2003). As water is part 
of the global hydrological cycle, this means that any boundary drawn below the global 
will be arbitrary. Since the definition of any Commons problem is dependent upon the 
scale at which it is analysed, in light of the multiple scales, dimensions, and values 
offered by water, it may therefore be suggested that the definition of a freshwater 
CCPR problem will be dependent upon the perspective from which it is viewed. This 
reinforces the surprisingly recent idea that governance of water is largely a matter of 
social choice (beyond defined ecological limits, which can also be contested), defined 
through political negotiation (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Hajer, 2003; McGinnis, 
1999a; Owens et al., 2004; Steins & Edwards, 1999; Steins et al., 2000; Weber & 
Khademian, 2005). Steins and Edwards (1999a p310) observe that because the prime 
interest here is the balancing (or coordination) of multiple interests, “…that collective 
action among the user groups is required to agree upon regulations about access to, 
allocation of, and control over the resource, since resource uses by the different user 
groups are interdependent”.  
 
4.3.2.1 Levels of Decision-Making for Freshwater Systems 
Decision-making for Common Pool Resources is an ongoing process that addresses 
the problems of provision and allocation of resource use benefits and costs, between 
competing users. This process has until recently been considered as occurring over 
three nested levels of decision-making, where each level is influenced by the 
decisions made at the level above (Anderies et al., 2004; Edwards & Steins, 1998; 
Giordano, 2003; Hooper et al., 1999; Memon & Selsky, 2001; Ostrom, 1990, 1999; 
Schlager & Ostrom, 1992).   
 
The levels of decision-making for CPRs typically described in the literature, and the 
rule-sets typically used, are shown in Figure 3. The decision-making levels described 
are: the constitutional-choice level; the collective-choice level, and the operational-
choice level. In short, the operational-choice level rules are designed through 
collective-choice level processes dictated by constitutional level choices, in order to 
constrain individual freedoms for the collective good. 
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The outcomes of freshwater decision-making are so heavily dependent upon the 
relationship between the collective-choice and operational levels that these two levels 
are now considered as a coupled system, shown by the broken line (Anderies et al., 
2004).  
 
The Operational level provides resource users with day-to-day rules controlling 
access to, allocation of, and control over the resource, and where individual entities 
make decisions about whether, and how, they will exercise their property rights 
bundles (Anderies et al., 2004; Bromley, 1988; Edwards & Steins, 1998; Giordano, 
2003; Margerum, 2008; Ostrom, 1990). 
 
The Collective-choice level determines the rules for interaction between management 
organisations and users or user-groups. This level bestows the right to manage (to 
regulate internal patterns of resource use and transform the resource by making 
improvements) which is for practicality coupled with the right of exclusion (the right 
to identify who has access to the resource). Hereafter, both rights are included in the 
term management. 
 
The Constitutional-choice level forms the legal framework within which the 
stakeholders (managers and users) must operate, and where decisions as to how the 
resource should be managed are dependent upon social and environmental contexts. 
Outcomes of constitutional-choice level decisions are the property rights regimes. 
Although the constitutional level has generally been considered as external to the 
system (e.g., higher-scale legislation that should be ‘conducive’ to IWM) (Edwards & 
Steins, 1998; Margerum & Born, 2000; Ostrom, 1990), it is at the constitutional level 
that expressions of ‘ownership’ are decided. How a resource is perceived, and 
desirable uses are selected (Bakker, 2003), are processes that occur at this level of 
decision-making. 
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Figure 3: Rights, Processes, and rule-sets for CPR governance. Adapted from: Edwards and Steins, 1998; Memon and Selsky, 2001; Ostrom, 1990, 1999. 
Collective-choice Level 
 
Rights; Management and Exclusion 
Holders; Claimant and Proprietor 
Processes; Policy-making, Management, Adjudication 
 
Position and Authority rules: specify positions within the 
management system and which actions are assigned to these 
positions  
Information rules: specify how information will be collected and 
how it will be used in the collective-choice arena.  
Scope Rules: specify allowable action of and interaction between 
collective-choice organisations  
Aggregation rules: specify how joint decisions within the 
organisation might be aggregated to link different decisions together 
in complex situations  
Procedural rules: specify what paths must be taken before rules are 
changed 
Membership rules: specify membership, entry and exit to the 
collective-choice arena 
Operational-choice level 
 
Rights; Access and Withdrawal 
Holders; Authorised Users 
Processes; Appropriation, Provision, Monitoring, 
Enforcement 
 
Boundary rules: identify who has access to the resource system  
Input/Output rules: specify type and size of contributions from 
the users in the management of the CPR, and specify how 
benefits of use of the resource might be realised  
Allocation rules: specify where, when, and for how long users 
may have to access to certain parts of the CPR 
Penalty rules: specify sanctions and who will execute the rules 
 
Constitutional-choice Level (may be external to the community) 
 
Rights; Alienation  Holders; Owner 
Processes; Unclear, but will reflect the existing polity. 
 
GENERATES; Prevailing System of Property Rights, Collective-level Rules. 
GENERATES; patterns of interaction 
with the resource, cumulative levels of 
use, and outcomes 
GENERATES 
 The Plan, including 
Operational Rules
 
  
To summarise, managers of freshwater CCPRs can expect: 
• imbricated and often conflicting resource dimensions, normative and positive 
values, uses, and user-groups;  
• variances between formal and informal (or between new and old) rule-sets 
and/or property rights, and;  
• volatility in uses, institutions, institutional arrangements, resource domains, 
and rights domains over time and space (Giordano, 2003; Memon and Selsky, 
2001; Steins and Edwards, 1999).  
 
The previous two sections have introduced insights to the research problem from 
complexity thinking and Commons perspectives of decision-making for the 
generation and maintenance of sustainable freshwater outcomes. The next section will 
draw from these to propose a model of IWM, with particular reference to the 
collaborative IWM approach.  
 
4.4 A Proposed Model for IWM 
In this section, I will propose a model of IWM which I suggest is both more realistic, 
and more theoretically robust, than that which I have described from the specific 
IWM literature reviewed in Chapter Three. I will present the elements and processes 
of the proposed model for IWM in the following order.  
 
First, the management concept of integration is confirmed in subsection 4.4.1. This is 
followed in subsection 4.4.2, by a recap of the characteristics and adaptive phases of 
the complex adaptive systems being considered. In subsection 4.4.3, I offer a 
complexity thinking perspective of the IWM procedural developments (from coercive 
to cooperative to collaborative, and most recently polycentric, as described in Chapter 
Three), as cycles of social change and learning. This perspective can also offer a clear 
explanation for the repeated calls in the IWM literature for identification of 
procedural IWM elements, and for improved decision-making capacity.  
 
In subsection 4.4.4, I identify the IWM process as one among several key interacting 
complex adaptive processes that run concurrently in SES freshwater governance. In 
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 addition to the IWM process itself, are: the nested processes of institutional change 
and planning, and; the wider imbricated process of social change (and potentially 
social sustainability transformation). In conclusion to this section, subsection 4.4.4.3 
presents a theoretical convergence on institutional design for the collaborative and 
integrated planning process, derived from all three contributing conceptual 
perspectives (IWM, Commons Theory and complexity thinking).  
 
4.4.1 Integration 
The concept of integration, as a practical method of managing impossibly complex 
systems remains sound, but as noted above, complexity thinking has radically re-
drawn the systems perspective. In particular, complexity thinking has helped to clarify 
the nature and properties of, and the relationships between, the multiple complex 
adaptive systems through which freshwater benefits and costs are produced and 
allocated in an SES. This has provided the opportunity for a much richer, more 
realistic, and more robust understanding of the SESs under consideration and their 
critical component subsystems in need of integrated decision-making. These 
particularly include the resource, its dependent human communities, and their systems 
of governance. These are described below. 
 
4.4.2 A Complex Adaptive Systems Perspective for IWM 
From the perspective of complexity thinking, IWM can be re-framed as a complex 
adaptive process of social change. Furthermore, complexity thinking suggests that 
while the IWM process is critical to sustainable freshwater outcomes, it should also be 
considered as one aspect of a wider social development towards sustainability. As 
already discussed, cycles of complex adaptive change are comprised of front-loop and 
back-loop processes. In the case of the IWM process, the front-loop is the relatively 
steady (although sometimes very rapid) emergence of patterns of use, generated by 
the cumulative influence of many individual decisions, with respect to use of 
available freshwater benefits. Back-loop processes are: system disturbance such as 
drought, or detrimental effects of over-exploitation from front-loop patterns of 
interaction, and; response to that disturbance, as identified by a change in rules. As 
already discussed, in this study it is the influence of wider SES institutional 
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 arrangements on the front-loop phase of complex adaptive change in an SES 
(specifically, their influence or otherwise on emergent patterns of interaction expected 
from IWM institutions, which is of particular interest.   
 
Recapping from subsection 4.2.1, the complex adaptive characteristics of freshwater 
systems can compound difficulties of institutional design for IWM in several ways:  
• Freshwater systems are dependent on wider weather patterns, and their 
behaviour is therefore, to an extent, non-linear. 
• They exist in aggregations of multiple scales across different dimensions, 
including physical, hydrological, social, political and institutional.  
• They can offer different benefits within and across geographical scales (they 
show diversity). 
• They are fugitive, trans-boundary resources (they flow through more than two 
SESs) and are therefore subject to governance by multiple decision-making 
authorities (Gibson et al., 2000; Giordano, 2003; Mackenzie, 1996; Schlager et 
al., 1994; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). 
 
From the complexity thinking perspective, it becomes very clear that any attempt at 
governing such hugely complex, interdependent, poorly understood, and constantly 
changing self-organising systems as freshwater or SESs, contains an inherent 
likelihood of failure, especially over longer (generational) time-scales (Ostrom, 1999, 
2008). Thus, as noted above, the goal for freshwater governance has become 
increasingly accepted as the improvement of SES robustness, through improved 
robustness of the freshwater system. To recap, robustness is essentially the adaptive 
capacity of a complex adaptive system. For freshwater systems, this is the ability to 
continue the production of desired benefits such as potable water, in the face of 
system disturbance such as drought. From the perspective of institutional design, 
robustness of an SES may be considered in terms of the robustness (longevity or 
endurance) of the decision-making rules (Anderies et al., 2004; Edwards & Steins, 
1998; Ostrom, 2008; Schlager, 2005; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). As already noted, it 
is important to remember that robustness (or longevity) in institutions may be either a 
positive outcome for the SES, or where institutional robustness arises from the 
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Drawing from complexity thinking, the procedural shift in the IWM planning 
approaches from rational command and control, to cooperative, to collaborative 
normative deliberation (noted in section 3.3), can be viewed as a series of cycles of 
social learning and development (Table 2). This perspective can draw together and 
explain several of the reported IWM implementation challenges, particularly the 
ongoing criticisms of inadequate capacity, and the difficulties of identifying 
procedural attributes.  
4.4.3 A Perspective on Changes in Procedural Aspects of the IWM 
Process  
 
reification of inequitable redistribution of decision-making power, a perverse 
outcome. 
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Table 2: Complex Adaptive Cycles in IWM  
Complex 
Adaptive 
Change 
Front Loop Back Loop Front Loop Back Loop Front Loop Back Loop Front Loop Back Loop 
 { {  { { { { { { 
Freshwater 
Systems 
Single or multiple-use CPR Complex CPR 
Procedural 
IWM can be: 
Coercive 
(regulation) 
Cooperative 
(management) 
Collaborative 
(Management/ 
governance: 
emerging double 
dynamic)) 
Polycentric 
(iterative self- 
governance: 
double dynamic) 
IWM Decision-
making 
characterised 
as: 
Single scale, 
single 
authority 
Plan 
development 
and 
implementation 
Single scale, single 
authority 
Plan 
development 
and 
implementation 
Single scale, multiple 
authorities 
Plan 
development 
and 
implementation 
Multiple scales, 
multiple 
authorities 
Plan 
development 
and 
implementation 
Institutional 
change 
New Rules 
and emerging 
institutional 
void 
New Political 
Space  
New Rules and 
emerging 
institutional void 
New Political 
Space  
New Rules and 
emerging 
institutional void 
New Political 
Space: 
DOUBLE 
DYNAMIC 
New Rules and 
emerging 
institutional void 
New Political 
Space 
Social change 
or 
Sustainability 
transformation 
Front-loop 
Preparation: 
exploration, 
experience, 
and learning 
Window and 
Transition 
Front-loop 
Preparation: 
exploration, 
experience, and 
learning  
Window and 
Transition 
Front-loop 
Preparation: 
exploration, 
experience, and 
learning  
Window and 
Transition 
Front-loop 
Preparation: 
exploration, 
experience, and 
learning  
Window and 
Transition 
 
 
 Table 2 brings together several aspects of procedural IWM, as have been discussed in 
Chapter Three, and foregoing sections of this chapter. Broadly, freshwater systems 
have progressed from being considered as single or multiple-use common-pool 
resources, to being considered as complex common-pool resources. This changing 
common-pool-resource perspective has been matched by the steady rise in the number 
of governance scales and decision-making authorities involved in IWM.  
 
The perspective of IWM procedural development as a series of cycles of social 
learning explains the ongoing difficulty in identifying procedural elements, and the 
calls in the literature for better IWM decision-making capacity. These continue to 
periodically re-surface, because at the beginning of each new cycle of IWM 
procedural development, decision-making rule-sets will need to be re-considered in 
light of the new decision-making context, which in turn is relatively unknown, and 
must first be explored and information collected (Olsson et al., 2006). 
 
Table 2 also shows how the processes of institutional change (as will be discussed in 
subsection 4.4.4.1) and social change or sustainability transformation (as will be 
discussed in subsection 4.4.4.2), are associated with the cycles of IWM procedural 
development. 
 
4.4.4 Complex Adaptive IWM Processes 
The IWM model proposed in this section considers the widely-accepted ‘single’ or 
‘unified’ (Hooper, 2006) IWM process to be in fact comprised of several critical 
processes of complex adaptive change. Key processes of complex adaptive change in 
IWM, identified in this model, include the already widely addressed IWM plan 
development and implementation (culminating in the collaborative and integrated 
planning process), as a sub-process of IWM that generates rules. Also identified in the 
proposed model for IWM are the processes of institutional change (of which planning 
is a part), and the process of social sustainability transformation as one type of wider 
social change (subsection 4.4.4.2).  
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 4.4.4.1 The Process of Institutional Change in IWM 
Ongoing calls in the literature for greater capacity in decision-making authorities, and 
for clearer definition of procedural attributes, can be explained in terms of the process 
of institutional change in IWM. The front-loop phase of this process comprises firstly, 
a shortfall in institutional capacity – the identification of an institutional void. This is 
followed by the emergence of a new political space in which stakeholders explore 
alternatives to address that void. Back-loop processes of institutional change are the 
re-statement of the new IWM problemshed, and re-negotiation of rules and rights 
bundles (the planning process). 
 
An institutional void, or ‘preconditions for a good deliberation’ (Hajer, 2003), is filled 
by the emergence of new political spaces in which participants address governance 
issues. The term new political space “refers to the ensemble of mostly unstable 
practices that emerge in the struggle to address problems that the established 
institutions are - for a variety of reasons - unable to resolve in a manner that is 
perceived to be both legitimate and effective” (Hajer, 2003, p176). They represent the 
new conditions under which collective re-negotiation of property rights for freshwater 
systems must be undertaken. Thus, during every back-loop period of the IWM 
procedural cycles, the redesign of rules for decision-making structure and process 
must be undertaken.   
 
New political spaces in IWM emerge to address the questions relating to institutional 
change: who or what will pay? Who or what will benefit? Who will decide? How will 
decisions be made? And, how can the rules be changed? These questions can be 
distributed over the three levels of decision-making, with attendant rights and 
processes, as shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Relationships in Institutional Change  for IWM Decision-making 
Questions Governance Level and 
Rules 
Processes Rights 
Holders 
Rights 
Who or 
What 
Benefits? 
Who or 
What Pays? 
Operational-choice level 
rules for boundary, 
allocation,  
 
Input/output, penalty 
Appropriation 
Provision 
Monitoring 
Enforcement 
Authorised 
Users 
Access and 
Withdrawal 
Who or 
What 
Decides? 
Collective-choice level rules 
for structure: scope, 
membership, position 
How? Collective-choice level rules 
for process: authority, 
information, 
aggregation/decision 
Policy making 
Adjudication 
Management 
Proprietor/ 
Claimant/ 
Manager 
Management 
and 
Exclusion 
How Can 
Rules Be 
Changed? 
Constitutional-choice level 
processes 
Unclear- perhaps 
Leadership 
Capacity building 
‘Owner’ Alienation (sale) 
 
Who or what benefits, and who or what pays, are expressed as operational-choice 
level rules that are generated at the collective-choice level of decision-making. Who 
or what decides, and how, are expressed as collective-choice rules for structure and 
process, and are generated at the constitutional-choice level of decision-making. 
Finally, the rule-sets for the constitutional-choice level (How can rules be changed?) 
are unclear from the literature, although processes appear to include leadership and 
capacity building. 
 
4.4.4.2 Cycles of Social Change 
From the perspective of the process of social change, (and the potential social 
sustainability transformation), Olsson et al (2006) note that the front-loop phase in the 
process of social change (preparation) is also characterised by social learning, through 
exploration of new environments including potential benefits and problems, and 
identification of options for potential action. Therefore, as already noted, because at 
each point of change a new, more complex and wicked decision-making environment 
must be addressed, the SESs will obviously require increased capacity to address the 
more difficult problemshed. Connick and Innes (2003, p178) are of the opinion that 
the most important aspects of collaborative dialogues are “the way they reshape the 
policy content and instigate new forms of action”. Although each cycle of learning is 
necessarily preceded by IWM failure to achieve and maintain sustainable freshwater 
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For collaborative IWM, the following procedural elements of plan development and 
implementation over three levels of decision-making are recommended by the 
literature, as reported in subsection 3.3.2. These are: initiation; problemshed 
definition; resourcing for collaborative plan development and implementation, and; 
coordination of the collaborative planning process, outputs (the IWM policy, plan, or 
programme), and outcomes (Hooper, 2006; Hooper et al., 1999; Margerum, 1999b; 
Margerum & Born, 2000; Margerum & Hooper, 2001; Memon & Weber, 2008).  
4.4.4.3 The Collaborative IWM Planning Process and Rule-Sets 
 
However, although the front-loop phase of preparation can help to facilitate a social 
sustainability transformation, this particular and critical type of social change remains 
heavily dependent upon the vagaries of chance, as already noted.  
 
outcomes, there are a great many benefits to social capacity for future decision-
making that remain hidden from view when analysed from narrower, more ‘objective’ 
standpoints (Connick & Innes, 2003). These include increases in social capital, high 
quality agreements, clearer understandings, and more accurately articulated problems.  
The stages of collaborative planning, and their respective rights and rule-sets, are 
shown in Figure 4, and are drawn from three closely convergent works in particular, 
which are: Margerum and Born, 2000 (IWM); Edwards and Steins, 1998 (Commons 
Theory) and; Ostrom, 1999 (complexity thinking and polycentric systems). Firstly, 
the model for the collaborative IWM planning process recognises that no SES stands 
alone. Collaborative plan development for IWM is typically embedded within larger 
SESs with greater decision-making influence and/or autonomy. The larger SES as 
represented in Figure 4 acknowledges that decision-making in collaborative IWM will 
be subject to influence from this external SES, particularly in relation to prevailing 
systems of property rights, and existing collective-choice level decision-making rules 
for scope, structure and process. Further, as already suggested, description and 
comprehension of the historical context to the extant IWM institutions, and the 
problemshed at hand, is vital to the crafting of effective IWM institutions, plans, and 
policies for future outcomes.   
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Figure 4: Elements and Rule-sets for the Collaborative IWM Planning Process (adapted from Edwards and Steins, 1998; Margerum and Born, 2000; Ostrom, 
1999) 
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Resourcing; can include a renegotiation of property rights 
Coupled Collective-choice and Operational-choice levels: Coordination of the Collaborative Planning Process 
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Rights:  Management & exclusion      Access & Withdrawal 
Holders:  Management Authority  (together, ‘stakeholders’)  Authorised Users 
 
Processes of:  Adjudication   Policy-making, Management,  Appropriation 
Monitoring, Enforcement 
 
Process Rules for the Coordination of the Collaborative Planning Process:  
Authority, Information, Decision 
Desired Outputs 
The Plan 
Including rules for 
Boundary 
Allocation 
Input/Output 
Penalty 
FUTURE 
COLLECTIVE-
CHOICE 
RULES
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
t
e
x
t
 
 However, since collaborative IWM predicates on a single autonomous decision-
making authority, it is important to highlight and make specific the constitutional-
level decision-making processes that occur in collaborative IWM. The constitutional-
choice level of the collaborative IWM planning process is composed of initiation of 
collaborative planning, problemshed definition, and resourcing of plan development 
and implementation. These suggest themselves as constitutional level elements 
because of their need for leadership, their responsibility for boundary drawing and 
resourcing, and their involvement with the definition of collective-choice rule-sets. 
These include rules that define the scope of the decision-making, the decision-making 
structure (membership and position), and the decision-making process (authority, 
information, and decision/aggregation). 
 
The coordination of collaborative planning processes involves the coupled collective-
choice and operational-choice levels of an SES. Key rule-sets for this element are 
process rules of authority, information, and decision/aggregation rule-sets, with which 
to undertake plan development. Amongst other things, such as time-scales for 
implementation, the IWM plan thus developed will detail operational-choice level 
rule-sets for boundary, allocation, input/output, and penalty. These are typically 
expressed as bundles of individual property rights to freshwater benefits. The 
operational-choice level rules are intended to shape the individual user or user-group 
decisions on whether, and how, to exercise their freshwater property rights. These 
decisions then generate new patterns of interaction and cumulative effects for the 
freshwater system and the SES.  
 
However, it should be noted that the model for collaborative and integrated planning 
as presented here does not address the influence of institutional arrangements on IWM 
outcomes. This is an issue that will be addressed in Chapter Five.  
 
Where the SESs in question have undergone the shift from management to 
governance, a double dynamic is identified from the literature. Under such conditions, 
there is widespread agreement (Hajer, 2003; Margerum, 2008; Margerum & Born, 
2000; Margerum & Hooper, 2001; Ostrom, 2001; Steins & Edwards, 1999) that 
participants in collaborative processes: 
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 “not only deliberate to get to favourable solutions for particular problems, but while 
deliberating they also negotiate new institutional rules, develop new norms of 
appropriate behaviour and devise new conceptions of legitimate political 
intervention” (Hajer, 2003, p175/176).  
 
The shift from management to governance is increasingly common in collaborative 
IWM enterprises. This means that stakeholders are now deliberating not only on 
current operational-choice level rules for allocation, etc., but are also crafting the 
collective-choice rules by which future decision-making will be undertaken. This is a 
constitutional-choice level process, and further underpins the hitherto under-
appreciated importance of constitutional-choice level attributes such as leadership, 
capacity-building, vision, and a willingness to set potentially unpalatable or unpopular 
limits to use, in collaborative IWM.  
 
The key elements of the proposed model for IWM include the following: 
• Integration;  
• A complex adaptive systems perspective, where systems learn and change 
through experience, and can generate new, larger-scale systems; 
• Three key inter-related processes of complex adaptive change (integrated water 
management, coupled processes of planning and institutional change, and 
sustainability transformation);  
• Rule-sets for decision-making processes (at the collective-choice level, for 
scope, membership, position, authority, information, 
decision/procedure/aggregation; at the operational-choice level, for boundary, 
allocation, input/output, and penalty), and;  
• A collaborative planning process (initiation, problemshed definition, resourcing, 
coordination of collaborative plan development and implementation, outputs as 
the management plan, and outcomes). 
 
Thus comprised, the IWM model may be used as a ‘building-block’ (Ostrom, 1999) 
for the consideration of more realistic and holistic perspectives of IWM. This means 
that the proposed model for IWM can be used as described, but can also be used as a 
way of “breaking down complex processes into small chunks that can be used in 
multiple ways and can be combined and recombined repeatedly and at diverse levels” 
(Ostrom, 1999, p. 523).  
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4.5  Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have introduced key concepts, characteristics, and processes, related 
to freshwater’s status as both a complex adaptive system, and a complex common-
pool resource. I have identified a theoretical convergence in the IWM, Commons 
Theory, and complexity thinking perspectives on collaborative planning for 
freshwater governance. Further, I have described a complex adaptive perspective of 
IWM procedural development, which explains ongoing calls in the literature for 
procedural clarification and greater decision-making capacity. A model for IWM as a 
process of social change that focuses on the management and/or governance of 
complex, adaptive, common-pool freshwater resources is proposed. To recap, the 
proposed IWM model elements as described in this chapter are: the management 
concept of integration; the complex adaptive systems perspective, and; the complex 
adaptive processes of integrated water management, coupled institutional change and 
planning processes, and social change (and potentially social sustainability 
transformation). The rule-sets for planning in IWM are identified as: at the collective-
choice level, structural rules concerning scope, membership, and position, and 
procedural rules concerning authority, information, and decision/aggregation, and; at 
the operational-choice level, rules for boundary, allocation, input/output, and penalty. 
 
The collaborative planning process has been identified as comprising the elements of: 
initiation; problemshed definition; resourcing of plan development and 
implementation; coordination of the collaborative planning process, and; outputs (the 
plan) and outcomes.  
 
The process of institutional change has been identified as implicit within IWM cycles, 
and comprises front-loop emergence of firstly, an institutional void, and secondly, a 
new political space in which the re-negotiation of issues pertaining to the allocation of 
resource benefits and their costs, and of decision-making power, are addressed. 
Lastly, the process of social change, which contains the potential for social 
sustainability transformation with respect to freshwater, has been described in terms 
of the front-loop phase of preparation for change, and the heavily chance-dependent 
back-loop phases of windows of opportunity and transition.  
 58
  
Finally, it is important to remember that three main misconceptions about integration, 
identified by Hooper et al., (1999), persist as barriers that can undermine the IWM 
process and outcomes. These are supported by a wide range of other authors, as noted 
below: 
• The first misconception about IWM is that it is always possible to obtain 
cooperation and consensus requiring “respect, trust and goodwill, and a 
willingness to voluntarily participate…when the reality is one of competition, 
scepticism and distrust” (also noted by Ascher, 2001; Memon & Weber, 2008; 
Ostrom, 1999; Singleton, 2002; Weber & Khademian, 2005).  
 
• The second is that volunteers with minimal resources can achieve and maintain 
results that government-resourced agencies have been unable to produce, 
without support from some basic capacity-building (financial and human) (also 
noted by Ericksen et al., 2003; Herbert, 2005; Koontz & Johnson, 2004). 
 
• The third common misconception about IWM is that community groups should 
only be advisory, especially when “…there are growing expectations in 
community-based groups that in a partnership there will be genuine delegation 
of power to them from state agencies” (also noted by Blomquist & Schlager, 
2005; Connick & Innes, 2003; Healy, 2005; Margerum & Hooper, 2001).  
 
Although arguably more theoretically robust, the proposed model for IWM, and 
collaborative IWM, remains inadequate for the ‘effective and legitimate’ (Hajer, 
2003) resolution of emerging polycentric IWM problemsheds, as reported in the 
literature, and noted in Chapter Three. From the complex common-pool resource and 
complex adaptive systems characteristics identified in the foregoing sections, 
problems for polycentric IWM can be identified as those that are inherent in the more 
robust appreciation of freshwater as a complex, adaptive, common-pool freshwater 
system. Clearly, as noted in the literature, attempts to resolve polycentric IWM 
problemsheds through the exclusive application of rational decision-making, or 
indeed any single decision-making approach, or at any single scale, will be inadequate 
to the task (Blomquist, 1992; Gibson et al., 2000; Lovell et al., 2002; Margerum, 
1999a; Ostrom, 1999).  
 
The last two chapters have demonstrated that understanding of the IWM process has 
developed remarkably quickly over the last four decades, from its centralised, ‘top-
down’ hierarchical command and control approach. Why, then, does the 
implementation gap remain so large? The following Chapter Five extends the IWM 
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 model presented in this chapter. In Chapter Five, I will identify social sustainability 
transformation, increasingly normative decision-making, and multi-scale (structural) 
challenges to institutional design, as key polycentric IWM challenges, and will 
address these key challenges through a conceptual synthesis. 
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5 Addressing Polycentric IWM Challenges: Towards a 
Conceptual Synthesis  
5.1 Introduction 
As observed in the foregoing chapters, the sustainable freshwater governance 
problematique has seen four decades of IWM procedural development, aimed at 
closing the IWM implementation gap. These have been only partially successful, and 
IWM now needs to address emergent polycentric challenges, the current area of most 
acute difficulty for institutional design in freshwater governance (Ostrom, 1999; 
Scholz & Stiftel, 2005; Steins et al., 2000). In the following sections, I will argue for a 
conceptual perspective that defines polycentric IWM as: an emergent product of 
‘failed’ collaborative IWM attempts; presenting Hajer’s (2003) five ‘preconditions for 
a good deliberation’; comprising multiple SESs at multiple scales, employing multiple 
decision-making processes; critically, this means that there will be no single decision-
making authority; it will operate at the aggregate collective-choice level of decision-
making, and; polycentric IWM will therefore be self-generating, self-organising, and 
subject to change in unpredictable ways. In other words, it will be uncontrollable from 
‘above’ (a higher scale of SES).  
 
Since polycentric challenges exceed the capacity of current approaches to address, 
there is an urgent requirement for new institutional designs to decide and implement 
contested reductions in total levels of freshwater system use(s) over imbricated SESs 
(Abernethy, 2005; Healy, 2005; Hooper, 2006; Lovell et al., 2002; Margerum & 
Whithall, 2004; Medema et al., 2008; Schlager, 2005; Singleton, 2002).  
 
In this chapter, I will address two key challenges inherent within polycentric IWM. 
Broadly, the two challenges are identified as: the difficulties of increasingly 
normative decision-making in IWM, and; structural challenges for institutional design 
across multiple jurisdictional scales. Underpinning these two IWM challenges is the 
question of why sustainable IWM freshwater outcomes have been so elusive. In the 
following section 5.2, I will propose a theoretical perspective to explain why this has 
been the case, particularly in SESs with IWM advantages, such as New Zealand. I 
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 will argue that the sustainability transformation process, and the increasingly 
normative decision-making challenges in IWM are interdependent. Moreover, certain 
types of sustainability transformation failure in an SES will result in an increased 
degree of normative difficulty in the following cycles of IWM decision-making. I 
propose that emerging polycentric IWM problemsheds in places such as New Zealand 
are the outcomes of a hundred and fifty years of social sustainability avoidance 
tactics, enabled by the particular resource, society, and institutional characteristics of 
those SESs. Arising from this conceptual perspective is a proposed typology of IWM 
contexts.  
 
The second challenge for the design of IWM institutions in polycentric problemsheds, 
addressed in section 5.3, is the structural difficulty inherent within multi-scale 
decision-making. In this section I will consider polycentric IWM problemsheds from 
the perspective of complex adaptive system characteristics, particularly aggregation. 
Here, I will argue that the emergent aggregate collective-choice level of decision-
making is the key to polycentric challenges, and their resolution. I propose that 
polycentric IWM problems cannot be addressed by institutional designs over three 
levels of decision-making. The emergent aggregate collective-choice level of 
decision-making is identified in subsection 5.3.2 as central to understanding the 
nature and properties of polycentric IWM. Section 5.4 provides an overview of the 
extended model for IWM developed in this chapter.  
 
5.2 Increasingly Normative Decision-Making 
In Chapter One, I made the point that IWM is not the same thing as sustainable 
freshwater governance. However, IWM is the recommended approach to the 
attainment of that social end goal. In this section, I will first seek a theoretical 
explanation as to why sustainable freshwater outcomes have been so elusive, and why 
polycentric IWM problemsheds are so particularly acute in IWM advantaged 
jurisdictions. I will then identify a typology of IWM contexts arising (subsection 
5.2.2).  
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 5.2.1 An Essential, Non-Substitutable Driver for ‘Successful’ IWM 
Why has it been so difficult to translate IWM into sustainable freshwater outcomes? 
The theoretical perspective developed below suggests that the emergence of 
polycentric IWM problemsheds in countries like New Zealand has come about 
because of a particular random confluence of technology, resource abundance, and 
social world-view. The theory further proposes that the way a society has managed to 
translate IWM institutional intentions into perverse freshwater system outcomes in the 
past, is central to understanding these issues in the present (Healy, 2005; Medema et 
al., 2008). 
 
I propose that the reason why these IWM attempts have ‘failed’ is because they have 
in fact been operating under a necessary, but incorrect, presumption. The presumption 
is that the society employing an IWM approach has either already undergone a social 
sustainability transformation, or the political will for a sustainability transformation 
exists. The perspective that this presumption is incorrect emerges because in spite of 
all the difficulties and challenges to IWM cited above, some societies do manage to 
translate IWM rule-sets into sustainable freshwater outcomes (Bakker, 2003; Olsson 
et al., 2006; Ostrom, 1999; Singleton, 2002). Arising from this fact, and supported by 
the increasingly reported frustration of many IWM participants with ‘politics’ 
(Blomquist & Schlager, 2005), is the perspective that the single key driver to 
sustainable patterns of freshwater use is constitutional-choice level will.  
 
Constitutional-choice level will is defined in this study as the combination of social 
capital and political will, which drives the freshwater governance of a given SES. 
Until the sustainability transformation occurs, no approach will generate sustainable 
freshwater outcomes. However, where this critical element is present, virtually any 
governance approach will succeed. In other words, where there is a will to be 
sustainable, a procedural approach will be found, and broadly adhered to. However, 
this non-substitutable IWM driver is the outcome of a different, wider complex 
adaptive process of social change, and potentially sustainability transformation, as 
described in section 4.2.2.  
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 5.2.1.1 The Challenge of Increasingly Normative Decision-Making 
The Sustainability problematique is arguably a post-technological re-statement of the 
Malthusian Tragedy. Questions of why a sustainability transformation has not yet 
occurred in certain IWM advantaged SESs can be explained through a broadly 
Malthusian analysis of resource limits against socio-economic pressures (Figure 5). 
Analysis of the development of IWM problemsheds from this perspective does 
suggest that in spite of legislative evidence, the underpinning social transformations 
that can acknowledge, accept, and implement essentially unpalatable or unwelcome 
reductions in use (the willingness to constrain individual freedoms for collective 
benefit), have not yet been made in the type of SESs that are of interest to this study, 
such as New Zealand.  
 
 
Figure 5: A Broadly Malthusian Perspective of Polycentric IWM Problemshed Development. 
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Instead, the peculiar confluence of influences in these SESs (context, rules, 
worldview, technology, freshwater availability, and physical infrastructure for storage 
and transport), have conspired to generate a series of avoidance tactics at each stage 
of IWM development instead of sustainable transformation, as discussed by Olsson et 
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 al, (2006). Avoidance tactics are described in this study as comprising symbolic 
policies, coupled with economies of technology and/or coordination (effectively 
raising the freshwater system limit through more efficient use). 
 
Successful or preferred tactics for the resolution of collective choice freshwater 
governance problems (such as the reliable provision of a sufficient quantity of potable 
freshwater to a given society), endure as ‘institutional sediments’ (Healy, 2005), and 
become embedded into the institutional arrangements of that society. This gives rise 
to a series of institutional designs that are crafted to make greater use of fewer per 
capita resources, rather than questioning why more intensive levels of resource use 
are needed.  
 
Figure 5 suggests one route by which IWM problemsheds can develop in normative 
decision-making difficulty over time. From the ‘origin’, or ‘natural’ freshwater 
system limits, the steady rise in socio-economic pressures of an SES generates a 
freshwater overshoot. In the first instance, the resource limits can be extended 
through, for example, ‘command and control’ enforced use of more efficient, or 
remedial, technologies, with no change in the patterns of use within the SES. The 
‘new’ resources are then exploited until the next overshoot occurs, when under a 
cooperative approach to IWM users may, for example, coordinate the timing of their 
uses to effectively raise the freshwater system limits once more. Again there is no 
need to change existing patterns of use, beyond their timing. Finally, even ongoing 
technological advances and better coordination are unable to contain the effects of 
overshoot in the freshwater system, and a reduction of socio-economic pressures 
through a reduction in levels of use must be undergone. Unfortunately, by that stage 
the SES in question has undergone several reifications of its unsustainable freshwater 
appreciation, and livelihoods have been built on the availability of water which no 
longer exists. Furthermore, by this stage the system is so intensively exploited over so 
many multi-dimensional uses, that any benefit in one area will necessarily mean a 
‘loss’ for another, as described in subsection 4.2.1.2.  
 
Because the underlying issues that generate overexploitation are not being addressed, 
problems of freshwater overshoot repeatedly return to the forefront of policy-making. 
If they had been sustainably addressed they would be much less likely to re-arise, 
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 despite SES contextual changes over time. And with a socially embedded freshwater 
sustainability limit, even when questions of overshoot did arise for whatever reason, 
they would be significantly less challenging, and less contested.  
 
The sustainable governance of freshwater systems, as with any shared, limited 
resource, can be considered as a continuous battle to prevent individual expressions of 
human ingenuity from causing a collective harm. Where IWM has ‘failed’ and a 
collective harm is experienced, the cause is often cited as a lack of political will. But 
in the meantime, due to the perennial nature of IWM, avoidance tactics have created 
three main outcomes. Firstly, the sustainability gap is now larger, and therefore more 
costly to close. Secondly, the unsustainable social appreciation of the freshwater 
system has been reinforced, and more deeply embedded in the society, making it more 
difficult to change. Thirdly, the ‘easy’ remedies (the low lying institutional fruit, such 
as point-source pollution control, physical infrastructure for storage, or economies of 
coordination) have already been used as avoidance tactics. What remain to be 
addressed are the difficult, corrective, contested measures of reduction which are 
required for sustainable freshwater outcomes. Thus, with every cycle of IWM 
‘failure’, the decisions and challenges become more and more normatively wicked. 
 
5.2.2 A Typology of IWM Contexts 
Arising from the point of view described above is the following tentative global 
typology of IWM contexts, presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: A Broad Global Typology of IWM Contexts, Developed from Hooper, 2006; Salmon, 
2007; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005.  
 Scarce freshwater Plentiful freshwater  
Undeveloped 
Type 1 
Low-tech, local/small scales, e.g., 
central Africa 
Type 2 
Low-tech, local/small scales, e.g., 
upstream Amazon basin, or parts of 
Indonesia  
European 
Pioneer 
‘Western’ 
jurisdictions 
Type 3 
High-tech, multiple scales and 
values, e.g., American West, 
South-East Australia 
Type 4 
High-tech, multiple scales and values, 
e.g., New Zealand, Pacific North-West, 
American East  
Environmentally 
Mature 
‘Western’ 
jurisdictions 
Type 6 
Unclear so far. 
Type 5 
High-tech, multiple scales and values, 
e.g., Nordic countries 
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 This typology includes: the developed-undeveloped nations divide described by 
Hooper (2006); the freshwater availability differences in the American East and West 
as noted by Scholz & Stiftel (2005), and; insights derived through the empirical study 
of New Zealand in this research. These particularly relate to the Pioneer background 
of New Zealand in relation to the more ‘mature,’ ecologically conservationist (or, 
where necessary, preservationist) societies such as those in the Nordic countries (this 
social difference is also noted by Olsson et al., 2006). These latter jurisdictions are 
currently much under observation in New Zealand, largely due to the efforts of the 
Ecologic Foundation, and its publications (Salmon, 2007), and the uptake of their 
perspective by the currently governing National Party (see, for instance, the 
Sustainable Land and Water Forum, 2009). I will return to this topic in later chapters. 
 
Type 4 contexts are defined in this research as comprising developed, ‘Western’ 
societies, with abundant although unevenly distributed freshwater resources, the 
technological capacity to have secured essential potable supplies, and extant 
collaborative IWM policies, plans, and programmes (as derived from Hooper, 2006; 
Scholz & Stiftel, 2005). The focus of this study is on type 4 IWM contexts, because it 
is argued here that it is in these SESs that the availability of potable water, coupled 
with technological availability and a pioneer background, have conspired to prevent a 
sustainability transformation through a series of highly successful avoidance tactics. 
 
Unfortunately, this ongoing avoidance has resulted in a growing sustainability gap, 
because the underlying necessity for sustainable transformation (i.e., freshwater 
overshoot), while it may have been articulated, has not yet been embraced, or even 
fully accepted in type 4 societies. The shift from pioneer (expansion through 
exploitation) to a conservation-based paradigm is one which has yet to occur, a 
century and a quarter since the closing of the American Frontier.  
 
Specifically, the theoretical perspective proposed in this subsection, is that SESs in 
type 4 IWM contexts have not yet come to terms with the closing of their water-
resource quantity frontier. Particularly in the case study nation, New Zealand, the 
strategies that have been employed since 1840, through a series of developmental 
cycles (for instance, small-scale coordination; abstractive and point-source pollution 
control technologies; larger-scale collaborative integration and continuing 
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 technological advancements) have allowed the underlying problem - the unsustainable 
trajectory of emergent patterns of use in freshwater resource systems - to be 
consistently avoided.  
 
Following on from the theoretical perspective proposed above, I argue that that the 
complex adaptive social process of IWM is in fact working relatively well, 
particularly with reference to the huge improvements in the planning process 
(decision-makers are ‘failing’ at increasingly wicked problemsheds). However, as 
already suggested, IWM must operate and be evaluated under a necessary, but usually 
incorrect, presumption of sufficient SES ‘constitutional will’. ‘Constitutional will’ is 
defined in this thesis as the product of political will and social capital, with respect to 
the constitutional-choice level of freshwater appreciation held by that society (e.g., 
freshwater as an economic, cultural, spiritual or recreational ‘good’). Thus, it is 
‘constitutional will’ that enables changes to socially accepted rule-sets of a society to 
be made and successfully implemented with respect to the ways in which that society 
will approach the attainment and maintenance of sustainable freshwater outcomes. In 
other words, I argue for the perspective of perverse IWM outcomes as firstly, one 
necessary part of an ongoing social development, and secondly, indicative of the fact 
that SES development has not yet attained the necessary level of social appreciation 
(as the combination of perspectives and understandings) of the freshwater system. In 
order to ‘succeed’, IWM must first be operating in social contexts that have 
undergone, or are realistically willing to undergo, a social freshwater sustainability 
transformation (e.g., Type 5). This raises the key question of how to persuade the SES 
in question to accept corrective reductions in individual freedoms (permissible types 
and intensities of freshwater system use) in order to address a collective harm (an 
identified freshwater overshoot).  
 
From this perspective, and remembering that IWM is an approach used for wicked 
problems which have already exceeded the capacity of simpler approaches to resolve, 
the following conceptual explanation for the normative wickedness of polycentric 
IWM problemsheds is proposed. Polycentric IWM problems are only now emerging 
in type 4 IWM contexts. Combined with the theoretical perspective that the 
underlying reason for collaborative IWM failure in type 4 IWM contexts is a lack of 
SES ‘constitutional will’, this suggests that the reason that polycentric IWM 
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 problemsheds are so normatively wicked is that they must finally address the 
underlying social tensions within a society, with respect to the use of the freshwater 
system. These core issues include conflicting worldviews, cosmologies, systems of 
property rights, or inequity of power or representation, and have been successfully 
avoided over multiple cycles of institutional change.  
 
In other words, the easier avoidance tactics derived from technological advancement, 
physical infrastructure for freshwater storage and transport, or the economies of 
coordination, have already been used. Socially detrimental consequences of 
freshwater overshoot cannot now be addressed in any way other than through the 
collaboratively negotiated, but unpalatable reduction of socio-economic pressures on 
the resource system. Furthermore, because the essential potable supplies have already 
been secured in these SESs, identification of overshoot in freshwater patterns of use, 
and of methods to correct it, becomes a very subjective issue. Thus, as the complex 
adaptive IWM cycles of an SES proceed through time, the unresolved underlying 
causes of freshwater overshoot become increasingly embedded, contested, and more 
difficult to change (Healy, 2005). From the above, the reason that polycentric 
challenges are so wicked is that they are the ‘core’ difficulties: the most difficult, 
contested aspects that have remained unresolved over long timescales. The normative 
wickedness of polycentric IWM is thus the accumulation of long histories of 
avoidance tactics - complex adaptive change, rather than social sustainability 
transformations.  
 
This section has developed a theoretical perspective of the interdependent polycentric 
IWM challenge of increasingly normative decision-making, and the wider social 
sustainability transformation. The theory proposed explains the emergence of 
polycentric IWM in type 4 IWM contexts, such as New Zealand. In the following 
section 5.3, I will address the structural difficulties for institutional design present 
within polycentric IWM problemsheds.  
 
5.3 The Structural Challenges of Polycentric IWM  
As already noted, the emergent polycentric IWM problemsheds reported in type 4 
IWM contexts, already exceed the capacity of collaborative IWM institutional designs 
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 to address them in ways that are considered to be both effective (efficient and 
equitable), and legitimate (Hajer, 2003).  
 
This challenge is here addressed in terms of the complex adaptive system 
characteristic of aggregation. To recap from subsection 4.2.1, aggregation is the 
tendency of complex adaptive systems to coalesce into constitutional hierarchies. 
Constitutional hierarchies generate emergent properties and processes at a scale 
higher than those at which they were generated (Lovell et al., 2002; Ostrom, 1999). 
The emergence of polycentric IWM problemsheds is therefore here identified as the 
self-organising product of multiple SESs, interacting over multiple scales and time, to 
generate a more complex level of decision-making. In this study I term this the 
emergent aggregate collective-choice level. The difficulty here is that this is a fourth 
level of decision-making in a process that is typically considered to contain three: the 
constitutional, the collective-choice, and the operational-choice.  
 
The insights into the underpinning concepts and processes of IWM presented above 
re-enforce calls for new institutional designs to address this emergent level of 
freshwater decision-making. Further, the literature as reviewed so far, suggests that 
the governance of water, particularly in type 4 SESs, is entering a period of 
“constitutional politics” (Ackerman, 1992, c.f. Hajer, 2003, p175/6). The search for 
new ways to approach perennially unresolved IWM problems involves “renegotiating 
the institutional rules of the game” (Ibid). This section introduces the still little-
studied phenomenon of polycentric governance structures which may help to resolve 
multi-scale IWM institutional design difficulties at the emergent aggregate collective-
choice level.  
 
Multi-scale governance has proved a significant barrier to the generation and 
maintenance of sustainable freshwater outcomes from IWM, for two main reasons. 
Firstly, multi-scale decision-making for freshwater systems requires a complexity 
thinking perspective to understand its properties and processes (Blomquist & 
Schlager, 2005; Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Holling, 2004; Janssen & Anderies, 
2007; McGinnis, 1999; Olsson et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2001, 2008; Scholz & Stiftel, 
2005). This is why multi-scale systems of freshwater governance that demonstrate 
polycentric decision-making, such as those in the arid American West, have until very 
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 recently been considered as ‘institutional artefacts’. Secondly, a key difficulty for 
institutional design, recognised in varying degrees by all three convergent 
management perspectives, is the necessity for a fourth level of decision-making in 
multi-scale problemsheds. The emergent aggregate collective-choice level of 
decision-making (Ostrom, 1999, 2001; Steins et al., 2000) is identified in this study as 
the product of a constitutional hierarchy: a fourth level in a process which has been 
analysed from the perspective of only three (constitutional-choice, collective-choice, 
and operational-choice levels). The emergent aggregate-choice level of decision-
making is here termed the fourth level, because it is the outcome of complex adaptive 
aggregation, and therefore by definition will operate at a level, and a scale, higher 
than that of its constituents. McNeill (2008, p12) suggests that “with this diffusion in 
multi-level systems there may well be no centre of accumulated authority, but rather 
variable combinations of governments on multiple layers of authority with 
relationships built on mutual trust”. 
 
5.3.1 A Theoretical Perspective of Polycentric IWM Problemsheds 
Polycentric decision-making systems have been described above in terms of emergent 
governance practices at a level higher than that of their constituent members. A 
polycentric system of decision-making in IWM is the product of a constitutional 
hierarchy, and as such can be considered as an emergent property of inadequate 
(failed, or absent) institutional arrangements. It is this emergent characteristic that 
differentiates polycentric decision-making from networks in this research. Ostrom 
(1999, p521) envisions polycentric governance as “a system where citizens are able to 
organise not just one but multiple governing authorities at differing scales”. 
Polycentric decision-making structures address problems of vertical and horizontal 
integration in multi-scale decision-making through combinations of general purpose 
and special purpose SESs. These structures also provide civil equity and criminal 
courts (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; McNeill, 2008; Ostrom, 1999). 
 
As already noted, polycentric systems of governance are certainly not a new idea. But 
until very recently, they have been discounted as too costly (especially in terms of 
redundancy), contested, and uncontrollable to have been considered as viable options, 
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 despite their persistence (Blomquist, 1992; McGinnis, 1999a; Ostrom, 2001). 
Importantly, Ostrom (1999, p528) states that  
“…, there is no guarantee that such systems will find combinations of rules at diverse 
levels that are optimal for any particular environment. In fact, one should expect that 
all governance systems will be operating at less than optimal levels, given the 
immense difficulty of fine-tuning any very complex, multi-tiered system”. 
 
Accepting that decision-making in IWM will be iterative through time and political 
jurisdiction, then a more boundedly rational approach is more applicable to the 
strategic planning process than rationality however defined, (ecological or economic, 
for instance). A boundedly rational approach to iterative decision-making describes 
the essence of a polycentric system. The idea of boundedly rational polycentric IWM 
is also excellently described by the phrase “distributed action by distributed 
intelligence” (Connick and Innes, 2003, p193).  
  
The tenets of bounded rationality as defined by Jones (2002) and applied in 
polycentric IWM can be described through four underlying principles: 
• The tenet of intended rationality (the implementation gap),  
• The principle of adaptation (learning by doing) 
• The principle of uncertainty (difficulty in specifying outcomes), and  
• The principle of trade-offs (trade-offs between goals is difficult).  
 
In polycentric IWM, the locus of decision-making will be dispersed over multiple 
levels of intervention. In such cases, “trust suddenly pops up as a key variable” 
(Hajer, 2003, p184). The reality is that polycentric IWM will require, rather than 
render redundant, the support of authorities at all levels above and below that at which 
it operates (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Hajer, 2003), and it seems that the role of 
government agencies as ‘classical-modern’ institutions in the governance of complex 
adaptive common-pool freshwater resources, and their dependent SESs, is indeed 
more needed, richer, and more complex than had previously been envisioned (Ryan, 
2001; Schlager et al., 1994; Steins & Edwards, 1999).  
 
The wickedness of polycentric IWM is explained above from a complexity thinking 
perspective of the cycles of development and institutional change in the IWM process. 
As already noted, from this perspective, ongoing calls for more collaborative capacity, 
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 for clearer definitions and procedural attributes, can be explained in terms of the 
process of institutional change in IWM (subsection 4.2.1). In light of the insights 
above, Connick and Innes (2003, p180) note that “collaborative policy dialogue can 
best be understood as part of a complex evolving system”.  
 
Adopting the perspective that institutional design (planning) is a sub-process of IWM 
in an evolving system, the following outcomes may still be produced by ‘failed’ 
collaborative IWM efforts (i.e. those that fail to achieve and maintain sustainable 
freshwater outcomes). The ‘hidden’ outcomes are: 1) increases in social and political 
capital, 2) agreed-on information, 3) an end to stalemates, 4) high-quality agreements, 
5) learning and change, and 6) innovation and new practices of networks and 
flexibility (Connick and Innes, 2003). These often disregarded outcomes have quietly 
contributed to IWM participant capacity to respond to emerging polycentric 
problemsheds.  
 
The complex adaptive phases of the process of institutional change in IWM are: a 
shortfall in institutional capacity – the identification of an institutional void, and 
emerging new political spaces in which stakeholders explore new ways to fill the void 
(front-loop), and; the re-statement of the changing IWM problemshed, and re-
negotiation of rules (back loop) (Hajer, 2003; Olsson et al., 2006). Particularly with 
reference to the questions addressed through collective-choice level rule-sets in Table 
3, there are five challenges to the decision-making status quo (Hajer, 2003) which will 
need to be re-considered for every stage of IWM procedural development. These 
challenges are identified in a range of literatures (Abernethy, 2005; Blomquist & 
Schlager, 2005; Connick & Innes, 2003; Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Hajer, 2003; 
Healy, 2005; Medema et al., 2008; Ostrom, 2001; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005; Steins & 
Edwards, 1999; Steins et al., 2000; Valentine et al., 2007; Weber & Khademian, 
2005; Yorque et al., 2002). The challenges that must be addressed are reported in 
various forms of the following five ‘preconditions for a good deliberation’ (Hajer, 
2003):  
• the new order of decision-making is dispersed (the locus of power has become 
unclear);  
• There is a new spatiality of policy making and politics (where ‘scale jumping’ is 
the art of putting in each intervention at the appropriate level);  
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 • The standard view of participation and democratic governance might have to be 
rethought (perhaps the very design of citizen-involvement should be 
reconsidered);  
• The authority of classical (scientific) expertise has been undermined; 
• The context of policy-making is expansive. 
 
From a complexity thinking perspective, these polycentric IWM challenges represent 
back-loop re-organisation as part of social learning and change. They are so 
challenging because they are the accretions of many cycles of adaptive change 
(avoidance tactics, rather than sustainable transformation), and all the low-hanging 
institutional fruit has now been picked. What remains are the issues that have so far 
remained avoided and unresolved. This back loop happens at every stage of 
development between coercive, cooperative, collaborative, and polycentric IWM 
because these questions (who pays? Who benefits? Who decides? How? And how 
may rules be changed?), are fundamental to institutional change- to the collective-
choice re-negotiation of bundles of property rights. 
 
Viewing the development of freshwater governance as a series of ‘steps towards’ a 
more robust ‘balance’ also underlines the more boundedly rational approach of 
polycentric structures. As the number of participant SESs grows, so does the range of 
capacity, experiences, and stages of SES development. Complexity thinking and the 
perspective of cycles of adaptive change also explains the reiterated calls for capacity 
in various forms - at the beginning of every new developmental cycle, the parameters 
are investigated, defined, and then there must be a period of capacity building in order 
to lift the performance ceiling of IWM institutions to the next level of difficulty. It is 
not that previous approaches have not worked: it is that they were necessary 
developmental stages that have been ‘failing’ at successively more difficult and 
complex tasks. However, development of institutional designs for sustainable 
freshwater governance from a ‘pure’ property rights perspective is now at a point 
where if it was subject to evolutionary forces, it would be stuck. But because 
institutions are a human creation, it is possible, when that point is reached, to go back 
to the drawing board and re-design, using both long-term experience, and new 
information that has been collected along the way.  
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 5.3.2 Polycentric IWM and the Aggregate Collective-Choice Level of 
Decision-Making 
The key difficulty for institutional design from multi-scale problems identified by all 
approaches in the literature is here interpreted as the necessity for a fourth level of 
decision-making. A complexity thinking perspective can contribute to this 
interpretation by providing a more realistic appreciation of the systems involved 
(hydrological, social, ecological, or institutional). Further, it can help by defining 
polycentric IWM as the outcome of previous cycles of ‘failure’. Polycentric IWM will 
operate as an emergent, self-organising product of a constitutional hierarchy, at the 
emergent aggregate collective-choice level. The problems currently defying IWM are 
the outcomes of a particular kind of SES experience. In order to become polycentric 
IWM challenges, a problemshed must first of all be addressed by collaborative IWM. 
Where this fails to close the sustainability gap, but succeeds in developing social 
capital and all kinds of learning (policy, institutional, social, scientific, etc), then 
polycentric IWM may emerge. 
 
Hajer (2003) considers that polycentric systems of decision-making are required 
because classical-modernist institutions are no longer able to cope with the challenges 
of emerging IWM problemsheds. These challenges are shown in Table 5. Compared 
with the challenges to adaptive governance from what Scholz & Stiftel (2005) call 
‘second order’ collaborative governance, shown alongside, there is a strong 
correlation, although not a perfect fit. This seems more than reasonable, given the 
widely varying theoretical perspectives and purposes, and real-world examples from 
which these characteristics were identified, and employed in the consideration of 
polycentric implications for institutional design.  
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Table 5: Two Perspectives of Polycentric Challenges to Decision-Making for Freshwater Systems 
Hajer (2003) 
Five Characteristics of new political spaces 
that challenge classical-modernist 
decision-making 
Scholz and Stiftel (2005) 
Characteristics of second order 
collaboration challenges to adaptive 
governance 
The locus of decision-making power is 
unclear 
Representation (who should be involved?) 
There is a new spatiality to decision-making , 
which requires the art of ‘scale-jumping’ 
Public Learning (how can resource users and 
the relevant public develop common 
understandings as a foundation for 
consensual policies and policy processes?) 
The nature of democratic governance and of 
citizen participation may have to be re-
thought 
Decision-process (how can authorities and 
involved stakeholders reach policy 
agreements that serve them well?) 
Scientific authority has been undermined Scientific learning (how can policy makers 
develop and use knowledge effectively?) 
The context of policy-making is unclear Problem responsiveness (how well do 
decisions achieve natural resource 
management goals, including sustainability, 
equity, and efficiency?) 
 
As with the convergent model of collaborative IWM described in Chapter Three, the 
broad correlation of challenges to both the ‘old’ (classical modernist) paradigm 
identified by Hajer (2003), and the ‘new’ adaptive governance, as required by ‘second 
order’ collaboration problems (Scholz & Stiftel, 2005) suggests that these are 
difficulties inherent to something other than either of the ‘old’ or ‘new’ decision-
making paradigms. These characteristics are also noted in various forms from a wide 
range of sustainable freshwater governance perspectives (Connick & Innes, 2003; 
Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Gunningham, 2008; Healy, 2005; Olsson et al., 2006; 
Ostrom, 2008; Steins et al., 2000; Valentine et al., 2007). This suggests that it is the 
emergent aggregate collective-choice level of decision-making that requires 
polycentric decision-making structures and processes, not adaptive governance, as 
suggested by Scholz & Stiftel (2005). 
 
In this study, I propose that the challenges which link the old and the new decision-
making paradigms as described above are representative of the emergent aggregate 
collective-choice level of decision-making. Thus, it is the new political spaces 
developing from an institutional void in collaborative IWM, which generate 
polycentric IWM problemsheds (as described by the characteristics above) at the 
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 emergent aggregate collective-choice level of an SES. Further, the emergent 
aggregate collective-choice level of decision-making can only be identified and 
understood from the perspective of complex adaptive systems, their process of 
change, and their characteristics, particularly that of aggregation. 
 
At the emergent aggregate collective-choice level, each SES involved will need to 
make SES-specific decisions over all three (constitutional-choice, collective-choice, 
and operational-choice) levels of decision-making. What is being considered is a re-
negotiation of the five institutional change questions (who pays, benefits, decides, etc) 
from a range of SES developmental stages (e.g., coercive, cooperative, collaborative). 
Therefore, collaborative IWM institutions for structure and process at the coupled 
collective-operational choice levels (Figure 4) are hereby proposed as the decision-
making considerations that Giordano (2003) has suggested will need to be made in 
every SES. To recap, Giordano (2003) has pointed out that for Complex Commons 
problems, certain decisions will have to be iterated for every scale of authority at 
which there exist two or more competing or conflicting intersections of property 
rights domains, with respect to the domain of the resource. 
 
From the above, polycentric IWM is the necessary structural response to the 
emergent aggregate collective-choice level of decision-making, which in turn is the 
result of a collaborative IWM failure that has triggered a period of institutional 
change, addressing Hajer’s (2003) five ‘preconditions for a good deliberation’. 
Institutional outcomes are dependent upon the outcomes of the other two systems 
(social and freshwater/ecological). Because IWM rules are difficult, time-consuming, 
contested, and costly to design and change, this process is typically undertaken in 
response to a very clear actual or predicted threat of freshwater overshoot and social 
disadvantage. An IWM outcome of institutional change is therefore a clear indicator 
of overall IWM ‘failure’, and marks the progress of the IWM complex adaptive cycle 
into the back-loop (system disturbance or collapse, and re-organisation) phase. 
Furthermore, the type of challenges identified as problematic to the re-negotiation of 
IWM rules will indicate whether the IWM problemshed under analysis has become 
polycentric, since this will influence the type of institutional change required.  
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 The developmental processes of complex adaptive systems generate emergent 
properties from decisions that are repeated through time, spatial scale, and sectoral 
interest of SES (Berkes, 2002; Carter et al., 2005; Connick & Innes, 2003; Gibson et 
al., 2000; Giordano, 2003; Hajer, 2003; Healy, 2005; Lovell et al., 2002). This 
iterative element of decision-making invokes a more boundedly rational approach to 
collaborative IWM than has been apparent in the preceding coercive and cooperative 
approaches (Janssen & Anderies, 2007; Jones, 2002; Ostrom, 1999, 2008; Owens et 
al., 2004; Steins et al., 2000). Acknowledgement of the need for iterative, boundedly 
rational decision-making is a significant shift in the underpinning decision-making 
perception, which again brings the constitutional-choice level of decision-making (as 
political will) to the fore across all scales of jurisdiction (Giordano, 2003; Hajer, 
2003).  
 
The iterative nature of decision-making at the emergent aggregate collective-choice 
level means that “it is the continuity and coherence of the constitution that has 
become an empirical question again” (Hajer, 2003, p184). From the foregoing 
discussions, the following attributes of emergent aggregate collective-choice decision-
making, and their relationship with polycentric IWM problemshed characteristics 
have been identified: 
Firstly, polycentric IWM is an emergent property of a particular type of collaborative 
IWM failure, which nonetheless has facilitated social learning and leadership. 
Polycentric IWM problemsheds are characterised by Hajer’s (2003) five 
‘preconditions for a good deliberation’, and are the result of a collaborative IWM 
institutional void, resulting in the generation of the emergent aggregate collective-
choice level of decision-making.  
Secondly, the emergent aggregate collective-choice level of decision-making will 
include multiple decision-making autonomies (SESs) from various jurisdictional 
scales, and sectoral or social perspectives. As the complex adaptive product of a 
constitutional hierarchy, the decision-making process at this level will firstly have no 
single decision-making authority, and secondly, will be prone to change without 
central direction. Indeed, this level cannot be understood from the perspective of a 
centrally directed organisation (Ostrom, 1999).  
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 Effective, parsimonious freshwater management paradoxically requires redundancy 
from imbricated decision-making structures. Polycentric approaches address this 
through a more boundedly rational approach to iterative decision-making. This 
system involves much higher levels of redundancy, but this is arguably a pre-
requisite for increased SES robustness.  
 
Difficulties with emerging polycentric IWM problemsheds have been identified in 
this section as the characteristics of emergent aggregate collective-choice level 
decision-making. How can collaborative IWM institutions be adapted for polycentric 
IWM (aggregate collective-choice level) problems? The answer lies in the iterative 
nature of polycentric IWM decision-making. All three levels of governance 
(constitutional, collective, and operational) must be employed in every SES that is a 
part of the problemshed. Further, boundedly rational iterative decision-making from 
multiple SESs reinforces the observed shift from management to governance (i.e., 
from collective-choice to constitutional-choice processes), highlighting the hitherto 
under-considered constitutional-choice level as critical to polycentric IWM.  
 
However, it remains important to note that social transformation in freshwater 
decision-making from collective-choice to constitutional-choice processes will not 
necessarily ensure sustainable freshwater outcomes. For that, a sustainability 
transformation, rather than a decision-making one, is required.  
 
5.4 A Synthesis for Polycentric IWM 
The foregoing sections of this chapter have identified key challenges of polycentric 
IWM as being broadly either structural or normative (Table 6). These are underpinned 
by ongoing failure of an SES to achieve a sustainability transformation with respect to 
its freshwater systems. Perennial problems, multiple scales, and multiple normative 
contestations all indicate that IWM is best approached as a boundedly rational, 
iterative process of property rights re-negotiation over multiple dimensions (Jones, 
2002; Margerum & Born, 2000; Margerum & Hooper, 2001; Margerum & Whithall, 
2004; Ostrom, 1999, 2008; Ryan, 2001; Singleton, 2002).  
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Table 6: Challenges and Attributes of Polycentric IWM 
Polycentric IWM Challenges Polycentric IWM Attributes 
Elusive sustainable freshwater outcomes A requirement for a social sustainability 
transformation 
Normative challenges to decision-making A willingness to address deeper social 
problems or inequities  
Structural challenges of institutional design 
for multi-scale decision-making 
Identifies the emergent aggregate collective-
choice level as a fourth level of decision-
making 
 
Applies a boundedly rational perspective to 
iterative decision-making   
 
One challenge presented by iterative decision-making in freshwater governance is that 
because the focus so far has been on the coordination of the collective and operational 
levels as a coupled system (Anderies et al., 2004), the constitutional level of 
governance has not been the focus of attention, beyond the observation that legislative 
rules should support (or at least not undermine) collaborative enterprises (Edwards & 
Steins, 1998a; Margerum, 1999b; Ostrom, 1999). However, in light of the iterative, 
and imbricated, nature of decision-making for freshwater as argued for above, the 
constitutional-choice level emerges as an increasingly important and influential level 
that must be addressed at every governance scale. This is because it is at the 
constitutional-choice level that decisions are made about the way that water is viewed 
(as a public, community, or private good, for instance), and the type of society in 
which people wish to live. Examples of the latter include the degree of autonomy 
available for individual decision-making, the kind of responsibilities and duties that 
go with that autonomy, and the kinds of punishments for rule-breaking (Bakker, 2003; 
Bruns & Meinzen-Dick, 2005; Giordano, 2003; Margerum & Born, 2000; Ostrom, 
1999).  
 
The attributes of polycentric IWM identified in this chapter include:  
• an ongoing requirement for social sustainability transformation;  
• a willingness to address deeper social problems or inequities;  
• Imbricated SESs, generating the emergent aggregate collective-choice level of 
decision-making through the complex adaptive system characteristic of 
aggregation, and;  
• A boundedly rational perspective to iterative decision-making. 
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The IWM process is essentially one approach to informing and directing the design 
and re-design of IWM institutions over time, sectoral interest, and jurisdictional scale. 
In Chapter Four, I proposed a re-drawn model of IWM that included: 
The concept of integration; A complex adaptive systems perspective; Procedural 
approaches which may be coercive, cooperative, collaborative, or polycentric; 
Complex Adaptive Processes that include IWM, coupled institutional 
change/planning sub-processes, and the imbricated social sustainability process.  
 
Collaborative IWM Planning Process and Rules-sets are defined as comprising: 
Constitutional-choice level elements of initiation, problemshed definition, and 
resourcing. These elements are closely associated with the design of structural rule-
sets for collective-choice decision-making: scope, membership, and position. 
Collective-choice level procedure rules for the coordination of the collaborative 
planning process: authority, information, and decision/procedure/aggregation. 
Coordinated collaborative planning will design operational-level rules (the output, or 
management plan), which are boundary, allocation, input/output, and penalty. The 
way that these rules are interpreted through the wider SES institutional arrangements, 
will influence the sustainability of otherwise of the IWM outcome.   
 
The model for IWM thus described in Chapter Four and recapped above, remains 
unable to address polycentric problemsheds. Therefore, in this chapter, I have 
proposed a theoretical perspective that extends the model to address key polycentric 
challenges. This perspective suggests that polycentric IWM is a terminology that 
refers primarily to structure, rather than process. In polycentric IWM, all other 
decision-making approaches (coercive, cooperative, and collaborative) are to be 
expected, reflecting the diverse range of SESs and their degree of sustainability 
development. This is accommodated by the employment of a more boundedly 
rational, iterative approach to decision-making, which nonetheless will employ the 
rule-sets identified above to address the issues pertaining to institutional voids and 
resulting new political spaces, to re-negotiate individual bundles of property rights.  
 
Finally, Polycentric IWM, as a complex adaptive response to the emergent aggregate 
collective-choice level of decision-making, will have no single decision-making 
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 authority. It will be self-generating, and self-ordering, and thus demonstrate a capacity 
to change in unpredictable ways. Further, boundedly rational, iterative decision-
making implies a degree of decision-making redundancy which will be costly to 
maintain, and also implies a degree of decision-making devolution.  
 
5.5 Summary 
Polycentric problemsheds challenge institutional design for IWM in two broad areas. 
Firstly, in their normative, procedural difficulties, and secondly, in the structural 
requirements of imbricated SESs, operating over more than three levels of decision-
making. These two main challenges need to be addressed from a perspective of 
ongoing social change through iterative, and therefore boundedly rational decision-
making (Jones, 2002; Ostrom, 1999). In order for this type of system to be robust, 
there must also be redundancy of decision-making, authority, and leadership (Janssen 
& Anderies, 2007; Olsson et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2008). Redundancy is also implied by 
the necessity of iterative decision-making in complex common-pool resources, as 
noted by Giordano (2003).  
 
Further, institutional design for IWM must operate within the parameters of the wider 
institutional arrangements through which they are generated, interpreted, and 
implemented, to outcomes sustainable or perverse. The vast number of possible 
institutional permutations drives the need for frameworks and models based on the 
identification of generic institutional patterns, and patterns of institutional change 
(Edwards & Steins, 1998, 1998a; Oakerson, 1992; Ostrom, 1999). What are required 
are sufficiently complex system models for decision-making in freshwater SESs that 
can accommodate the emergent properties of constitutional hierarchies (Adger, 2000; 
Anderies et al., 2004; Biswas, 2004; Connick & Innes, 2003; Gibson et al., 2000; 
Giordano, 2003; Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Janssen & Anderies, 2007; Yorque et 
al., 2002). As complex adaptive systems, institutional arrangements should therefore 
be expected to demonstrate diversity across scales, non-linear (abrupt) periods of 
change, or punctuations of constitutional change, and the critical attribute of 
aggregation, whereby institutional arrangements may generate emergent properties 
and processes at a scale higher than those from which it emerged. Evaluative 
frameworks for these attributes in SESs undertaking IWM are urgently needed. The 
 82
 following Chapter (Six) reports on the development of an evaluative framework for 
the model of IWM proposed in this study. 
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6 An Evaluative Framework for a Re-Drawn IWM 
Process 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
The previous two chapters have re-drawn IWM as a complex adaptive process of 
social change. Integrated water management has developed its procedural attributes 
through experience of coercive, cooperative, and collaborative approaches to the 
renegotiation of IWM institutions, with the intention of achieving and maintaining 
sustainable freshwater outcomes. In type 4 contexts, such as New Zealand, the IWM 
process must now deal with polycentric decision-making accommodating the 
emergent aggregate collective-choice level. Further, the role of wider socio-economic, 
cultural and political institutional arrangements in the achievement or compromise of 
the IWM sustainability intentions has been suggested as a key, under-considered 
aspect of IWM outcomes. 
 
As I have argued in the previous chapters, the IWM process should be considered in 
terms of three interacting or interdependent complex adaptive processes. Besides 
IWM, prime amongst these is the social sustainability transformation as a wider, 
imbricated process and a non-substitutable driver for sustainable IWM freshwater 
system outcomes.  
 
Institutional change is a sub-process of complex adaptive IWM and includes the sub-
process of plan development as its back-loop. Plan development, in turn, addresses 
the employment and/or renegotiation of collective-choice rules for crafting 
operational-choice rules, which are expressed as property rights. The collaborative 
IWM planning process is thus the outcome of previously failed attempts at coercion, 
cooperation, or collaboration. However, in some situations, collaborative failure in 
one SES can coincide with failures in other SESs. These multiple decision-making 
authorities, representing a range of scales, stages of IWM development, or sectoral 
interest then coalesce into a constitutional hierarchy, to address problems beyond their 
individual capacity to resolve. The outcome is polycentric IWM, operating at the 
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 emergent aggregate collective-choice level of decision-making. The key points of 
polycentric IWM as proposed above are that it will be an emergent property of 
(potentially several) collaborative failures; it will be developed in response to 
decision-making challenges at the emergent, aggregate collective-choice level; it will 
operate without the presence of a single decision-making or directing authority; it will 
include SESs at all stages of IWM procedural development, and; polycentric IWM 
will be largely uncontrollable and prone to self-organising change.  
 
One of the major challenges for analysis of IWM reported in the literature has been 
the difficulty of developing a method of identifying subjectively important data-sets, 
collecting normative data, and comparing results across multiple SESs. This is 
because of the interrelatedness, hidden contexts and contextual dependency of every 
individual enterprise (Ascher, 2001; Connick & Innes, 2003; Edwards & Steins, 
1998a; Ferreyra & Beard, 2007; Healy, 2005; Hedelin, 2007; Steins & Edwards, 
1999a; Steins et al., 2000). In order to evaluate the re-drawn IWM, and to undertake 
the empirical evaluation of institutional arrangements for IMW in New Zealand, an 
evaluative framework is needed.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to propose a framework to evaluate the re-drawn IWM 
process, and to describe the framework development. This is achieved as follows. The 
evaluative framework developed in this chapter originates from the well-known 
institutional analysis and design framework published by Oakerson (1992), presented 
in section 6.2. The Oakerson framework was further developed by Edwards and 
Steins (1998), specifically in order to analyse multiple-use Commons, and the 
associated process of institutional change in multiple-use common-pool resources 
(section 6.3).  
 
In section 6.4, I will adapt the Edwards and Steins framework to the evaluation of re-
drawn IWM as cycles of social change and learning, comprised of imbricated and 
nested processes of complex adaptive change. Section 6.5 provides a summary, 
including a brief discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed 
evaluative framework for re-drawn IWM.  
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 6.2 The Oakerson (1992) Framework 
As mentioned above, the framework developed in this chapter has its origins in that of 
Oakerson’s (1992) framework, presented in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6: Oakerson's (1992) Framework for Analysis of Institutional Change 
Physical 
attributes of the 
resource, and 
technology 
Decision-making 
arrangements 
Patterns of interaction Outcomes 
Possible changes in the resource
What is possible or 
feasible
What is allowed 
 
The original framework from Oakerson shows how the context - what is possible, and 
what is allowed, shown on the left of the diagram, will directly influence the use of a 
resource, resulting in an action or outcome, on the right. This outcome may be 
directly influenced at any time by changes in the resource, for instance an unexpected 
or prolonged drought. However, the repeated single use of a renewable resource over 
time accumulates into patterns of interaction, generating feedback loops (the dashed 
lines) that influence future availability, rules, use, and outcomes. These feedback 
loops are one of the reasons that IWM is wicked. Another reason, already discussed, 
is the common-pool-resource nature of water resource systems and their benefits. The 
next framework has been specifically developed from Oakerson’s by Edwards and 
Steins (1998), to analyse changes in institutional arrangements for multiple-use (i.e. 
single scale and/or single system of property rights) common-pool resources such as 
water. 
 
6.3 The Edwards and Steins (1998) Framework 
The framework for analysis of multiple-use common-pool resources, as presented by 
Edwards and Steins (1998), is shown in Figure 7. As presented, the framework 
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This framework follows the basic process of context, patterns of interaction, and 
outcome. But common-pool resource governance must include a jurisdictional or 
resource boundary, represented at the top of the diagram by the presence of external 
contextual factors. Freshwater governance has generally been considered at the 
catchment scale, although as I have discussed, this is increasingly contested. The 
definition of jurisdictional boundaries is necessary in order to distinguish between the 
influence on outcomes from variables that are external to the SES, and over which the 
local users may have very little control, and those on the left of the diagram (the 
natural resource characteristics and available technologies, the institutional 
arrangements, and the user-groups’ characteristics), which are internal to the system 
and which influence outcomes directly through patterns of interaction with the 
resource.  
 
comprises: contextual factors external to the system; contextual factors internal to the 
system (resource characteristics and technological capacity, decision-making rules, 
and social characteristics of user-groups); the individual selection of action strategy 
from multiple available choices; emerging cumulative patterns of interaction, and; 
outcomes (for the resource, the institutions, and the users). 
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Figure 7: Framework for Analysis of Multiple-Use CPRs, Edwards and Steins, (1998, p368). 
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b = type of decision-making rules adopted 
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d = influence of user-groups on outcomes through decision-making arrangements 
 
e = effect of user-groups on individual action strategies 
 
f = patterns of interaction 
External Contextual Factors
  
Furthermore, it is important that the characteristics of the users themselves are 
represented, since they influence the decision-making process through their two-way 
relationship with the decision-making arrangements. The inclusion of user group 
characteristics also shows how the selection by individuals of one particular action 
strategy from several available, is influenced in three ways. Firstly, the range of 
options available to users is influenced by what is practical, in terms of potential costs 
and benefits of competing water uses and markets. Secondly, it is influenced by what 
is legal, or permitted, as typically represented by the prevailing freshwater governance 
institutions and property rights system, and lastly, individual strategy selection is 
influenced by what is desirable, in term of user-group worldview and preference. 
Once an action strategy has been selected, patterns of interaction begin to emerge as 
before, but the subtractability of common-pool resources means that it is critical to 
address the cumulative effects of multiple patterns of interaction, which should result 
in institutional change if they exceed resource system limits. Lastly, this framework 
gives a very clear sense of multiple-use common-pool resource governance as a 
process happening over time.  
 
Institutional change as an IWM outcome is thus demonstrated as the product of 
interactions between all the contextual variables over time. It is important to note that 
Margerum (1999) and Edwards and Steins (1998) observe that because of the strongly 
contextual nature of decision-making in such situations, desired outcomes of the 
planning process should be identified by the participants from the context of the 
problemshed. However, this viewpoint does need to be underpinned by a clearly 
defined set of quantifiable ecological goals, including freshwater system limits to use. 
As I have argued above, the identification and acceptance of ecological limits to use 
seems to be more closely associated with social sustainability transformation than 
IWM.  
 
6.3.1 A Visual Metaphor 
Swaffield (1998) reports on the importance of metaphor in integrated management 
situations, as a method of conveying a great deal of information quickly and reliably, 
and Gunderson and Holling (2002) encourage the development of new ‘myths’ for the 
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 same purpose. In this study, a great deal of information is conveyed through the visual 
‘metaphors’ of figures and tables. In order to properly demonstrate the complex 
interrelatedness, the multiple scales, and multiple perspectives that may be brought to 
bear on an IWM problem, the framework above must be reduced to a visual metaphor. 
This simplified representation, based on Figure 7 from Edwards and Steins (1998), 
and shown in Figure 8, will be built upon during the following subsections, as the 
evaluative framework for IWM is developed.   
 
 
Figure 8: A Visual Metaphor for the IWM Process 
Resource 
Rules 
Users 
Patterns Outcomes Choices 
 
This visual metaphor, representing one cycle of single-scale complex adaptive change 
in IWM from context to outcome, becomes a different kind of building block from 
that already cited in subsection 4.4.4.3 from the perspective of collaborative 
institutional design. As with the identification of rule-sets for decision-making, the 
figure above can be used as a way of “breaking down complex processes into small 
chunks that can be used in multiple ways and can be combined and recombined 
repeatedly and at diverse levels” (Ostrom, 1999, p. 523).  
 
6.4 A Proposed Framework for Evaluation of a Re-drawn 
IWM Process  
Because the framework as developed above has been designed to analyse a process, it 
is particularly suited for use as a basis for evaluation of re-drawn IWM. However, in 
order to specify the framework to re-drawn IWM, the following main steps were 
undertaken and are reported in detail in the following subsections.  
 
In subsection 6.4.1, I align the framework above with the stages of the complex 
adaptive process of IWM procedural development, identifying front and back-loop 
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 IWM processes. Next, in subsection 6.4.2, I specify the multiple-use common-pool 
resource framework for the evaluation of re-drawn IWM, including the capacity to 
analyse the role of institutional arrangements, particularly in front-loop IWM 
processes, as identified in the previous subsection. The focus here is on the transition 
from collaborative to polycentric IWM, as of particular interest to this study. Lastly, I 
incorporate the processes of social sustainability transformation and institutional 
change into the framework (subsection 6.4.3). Subsection 6.4.4 provides a brief 
overview of how the framework directs lines of enquiry during evaluation of 
institutional arrangements for IWM.  
 
6.4.1 The Development of Procedural IWM as a Complex Adaptive 
Process 
Accepting the multiple-use framework above as a broadly robust representation of the 
governance process in multiple-use common-pool resources such as freshwater, the 
first task was to align the framework with the stages of the complex adaptive process 
over the developmental cycles of IWM, as one approach to the governance of 
freshwater systems (Figure 9). Drawing from the framework above, the context and 
outcome, at either end of each individual cycle, represent the back-loop. Individual 
strategy selection, and the emerging patterns of interaction thus represent the front-
loop processes of IWM which are of particular interest to this study.  
 
 
IWM Cycles Coercive Cooperative Collaborative Polycentric 
Complex 
Adaptive 
Change in 
IWM 
Back 
Loop,  
Ω, α   
Front 
Loop 
R, K 
Back 
Loop 
Ω, α   
Front 
Loop 
R, K 
Back 
Loop 
Ω, α   
Front 
Loop 
R, K 
Back 
Loop 
Ω, α   
Front Loop 
R, K 
Figure 9: IWM Procedural Development as Cycles of Complex Adaptive Change 
 
The alignment of these two processes also highlights the need to evaluate IWM as an 
ongoing process whereby the system does not re-set to the original starting point (as 
implied by the feedback loops of the previous frameworks), but generates a ‘new’ 
context, however deeply rooted in the past, with every cycle. As already noted, the 
transition of most interest to this study is that between collaborative and polycentric 
IWM.  
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The next task was to specify the multiple-use common-pool resource framework to 
the re-drawn model of IWM. In particular, the resulting framework for evaluation will 
require the capacity to analyse the influence of institutional arrangements, and 
multiple scales of governance. The framework for the evaluation of the IWM process, 
as adapted from Edwards and Steins (1998) to accommodate re-drawn IWM, is 
proposed in Figure 10 and described below. Subsection 6.4.3 then incorporates the 
associated complex adaptive processes. 
6.4.2 Evaluating the Role of Institutional Arrangements in IWM 
 
 
The key framework elements are now: contextual factors (external, historical, and 
internal); institutional arrangements; operational rules in use that influence individual 
action strategies; patterns of interaction; sustainability range; triggers for institutional 
change, and; resource, institutional, and social outcomes. The processes and elemental 
interactions represented by framework in Fig 10 show that as before, the external 
context continues to influence IWM outcomes. However, so does the historical 
perspective, the ‘institutional sediments’, now included as background to in the 
internal context. Considerations of technologically and economically practical uses 
(markets), existing IWM rules (that which is legal), and user-group appreciations of 
the resource (what are considered desirable uses) are now filtered through the wider 
social systems of institutional arrangements, creating a group of socially accepted 
‘rules in use’, which influence individual decisions as to whether and how individual 
bundles of property rights will be exercised. Social characteristics and world-views of 
user-groups can now also influence the outcomes of IWM directly, reflecting this 
capacity in the resource system itself.  
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Figure 10: A Framework for Analysis of Re-Drawn IWM
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 Once decisions regarding the execution or otherwise of individual bundles of property 
rights have been made, these then generate cumulative patterns of interaction over 
time. The cumulative patterns of interaction generate cumulative levels of multi-
dimensional resource use. The sustainability ‘triangles’ shown in Fig 10 reflect two 
key concepts embedded within this framework. The first is that institutional 
arrangements, through their influence on the operational rules in use of an SES, can 
direct, or ‘aim’ cumulative levels of use to within sustainable limits, or to a 
sustainability overshoot. This is represented by the extent to which the sustainability 
triangles intersect with the ‘traffic lights’ of the social and resource outcomes. 
Institutional outcomes do not have traffic lights, since institutional change is 
expensive and contested, and triggered by cumulative levels of use (socio-economic 
pressures, or sustainability triangles) exceeding sustainability levels in the social or 
resource outcomes. In either social or resource outcomes, sustainability triangles that 
intersect with green portions will not trigger institutional re-design. Where they 
intersect at yellow portions, institutional change should be considered, as indicated by 
the trigger points. Where red portions are broached, overshoot and unsustainable 
outcomes have occurred.  
 
The main changes made to the Edwards and Steins (1998) framework in order to 
evaluate the re-drawn IWM process as proposed above are:  
• the explicitly multi-scale nature of the framework;  
• the inclusion of the element of institutional sediments (although the authors do 
suggest the possibility of evaluating historical contexts);  
• the inclusion of a direct line of influence on outcomes from changing social 
appreciations of the freshwater system;  
• institutional arrangements arising from the external, historical, and internal 
contextual factors, which filter IWM institutions and create a set of 
‘operational rules in use’; 
• a variable element for patterns of interaction;  
• a range of sustainable socio-economic pressures on the resource, as identified by 
the social and ecological trigger-points, which when crossed will initiate the 
back-loop processes of institutional change (the sub-process of plan 
development), and; 
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 • An ‘onward’ cycles perspective, rather than a feedback loop. 
 
Thus, the elements and interactions of the framework proposed inFigure 10 are as 
follows.  
Contextual factors external to the SES are external to the SES problemshed, but 
nonetheless can influence the institutional arrangements of that SES, and may disturb 
the system at any time. Examples of external contextual factors include, inter alia, 
wider weather patterns (inducing drought or floods, for example), new technologies, 
changes to markets, higher-scale legislation, or wider world-views of water. Further, 
there may be several scales of SES operating above that being evaluated, as well as 
below. Multi-scale SESs and decision-making are therefore added to the visual 
metaphor (Figure 11), shown in bold as multiple lines above and below.  
 
 
Figure 11: Representing Contextual Factors External to the SES in Multi-Scale IWM 
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This may, for instance, represent a New Zealand regional SES, with national and 
international SESs at scales above, and catchment or sub-catchment-scale SESs, and 
SESs associated with individual stream-reaches or even an individual property, below. 
 
Institutional sediments are the historical underpinnings of enduring formal and 
informal decision-making outcomes (typically avoidance tactics), that have accreted 
over the society’s long-term (intergenerational) relationship with the resource. As 
suggested in previous chapters, these can be an important source of strongly 
influential institutional arrangements that are difficult to change. Therefore, 
understanding the historical embeddedness of current challenges to sustainable 
freshwater outcomes is critical to their resolution. This element is added to the 
metaphor in bold, and feeds into the current internal context to give Figure 12.  
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Figure 12: Representing Institutional Sediments in IWM 
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Internal contextual factors: As in the previous framework, there are three main 
factors to the internal problemshed context. These are: 
1) The multi-scale freshwater resource characteristics and the available 
(including cost-effective) technology for exploitation. In effect, these generate 
probable uses over multiple sectors, through physical and cost constraints on the 
availability of multi-dimensional benefits. Constraints on availability also directly 
influence the institutional design. As with the original framework, the possibility 
of system disruption from unpredictable environmental systems (droughts, flood, 
or earthquakes, for example), means that the freshwater system may directly 
influence the SES and trigger institutional change at any time. In the framework 
(Figure 10) this is shown as ‘ecological uncertainty’.  
2) The IWM institutions are the outputs of the IWM planning process, and 
are designed to adjust cumulative socio-economic pressure on the resource 
through systems of property rights to multi-dimensional resource benefits. The 
framework considers the institutions and the users to be a coupled system, as 
recommended by Anderies et al (2004). Further, there is the double dynamic of 
governance to be considered, reinforcing the need to view these two elements as a 
coupled system, since the users are now directly involved in designing rules for 
future decision-making. 
3) The social characteristics and worldviews of competing individuals, or 
individual user-groups at multiple scales. In addition to the (potentially 
unequal) influence that various groups may exert within the collaborative planning 
process, the social characteristics of the users will influence types and levels of 
resource use through their social appreciation of the freshwater system and its 
benefits. Further, changing social appreciation of the freshwater system benefits 
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 and costs through experience and learning, or in response to external change, can, 
like the freshwater system, affect the SES outcomes at any time. In the 
framework, this is labelled as the ‘changing social appreciation of the freshwater 
system’. 
 
Institutional arrangements are key elements of the framework, and are represented 
by the curved bold line in Figure 13. Institutional arrangements derive from the 
external, historical, and internal contexts to the IWM problemshed. It is here argued 
that it is institutional arrangements (as wider complex adaptive systems of formal and 
informal rules, market forces, cultures, customs, etc) that are used by individuals to 
interpret, judge legitimate, or reject the letter and the intention of the IWM 
institutions. Therefore, it is this element that can be considered to be the strongest 
influence on the social selection of formal and informal rules, which comprise the 
‘operational rules-in-use’.  
 
 
Figure 13: Representing Institutional Arrangements and Operational Rules-in-Use That Frame 
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From the IWM process framework (Figure 10), in the analysis of institutional 
arrangements what is under scrutiny is the way that the internal contextual factors, 
(the specific combinations of market forces, property rights, and social appreciations 
of the resource system, for example) affect IWM outcomes through their influence on 
individual (operational-choice level) decision-making, with respect to the intention of 
IWM institutions. Application of IWM institutions is considered to be the 
combination of the implementation style (coercive, cooperative, or collaborative), 
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 implementation efficiency (how well were the rules implemented?), and the degree of 
legitimacy awarded to the IWM rules by the users. 
 
Emergent operational rules in use and individual selection of action strategy 
The term ‘operational rules in use’ is thus used in this framework to represent not just 
the IWM institutions, but the IWM institutions as they have been filtered through the 
wider institutional arrangements. This is represented by the oval element in Figure 13 
above. Operational rules in use are therefore a socially selected combination of IWM 
rules, and wider customs, worldviews, market forces, or systems of property rights, 
etc. This is a key area of interest for this study, since it is this element that influences 
the individual selection of action strategies with respect to whether, and how, an 
individual user, or user group, will choose to make use of their property rights, and 
thus generate emergent patterns of interaction or use.  
 
Operational rules in use that derive from markets, worldviews, institutional sediments, 
property rights, and IWM institutions, for example, will together influence the 
trajectory of emergent patterns of use. This happens through the interpretation, 
legitimisation, and implementation of the sustainability intent of IWM institutions by 
individuals, or individual groups. If the relative weighting of markets and demand 
generates patterns of use that remain in the ‘safe’ zone, then there is no reason to 
change the rules in use. If the social demand is not kept in check by the rules, 
however, then overshoot occurs, and triggers a period of institutional change. Since 
the institutional arrangements are derived from the internal, external, and historical 
contexts under which IWM is operating, these are reinforced as critical to a 
sufficiently complex and realistic understanding of IWM problemsheds.  
 
The emergent patterns of interaction are the cumulative outcome of individual 
action strategies, or socio-economic pressure on the resource. Operational rules in use, 
individual selection of action strategies, and patterns of interaction together comprise 
the front-loop of an IWM cycle. The variable extent of the emergent patterns of 
interaction is represented in the visual metaphor as the triangle which links the 
operational rules in use to the outcomes, as shown in bold in Figure 14.     
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 The sustainability range makes explicit the need for limits to be identified, or 
recognised, and is bounded at either side by the ecological and social trigger points for 
institutional change (also Figure 14, in bold).  
 
 
Figure 14: The Visual Metaphor for IWM 
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Outcomes are recognised more explicitly than in the original framework as 
ecological, social (including cultural and economic) and institutional, and 
sustainability ranges for the ecological and social systems are graded from green 
(sustainable ecological or social system costs), through yellow (nearing limits of 
sustainable ecological or social system costs), to red (unsustainable ecological or 
social system costs that trigger institutional change). 3
 
Interestingly, the completed visual metaphor for IWM shown above (Figure 14) 
clearly highlights institutional arrangements and operational rules in use as the pivot 
point of the IWM process whole. However, as I have argued, the IWM process does 
not operate alone. It remains to incorporate the associated processes of complex 
adaptive change into the framework. This is the task addressed in the following 
subsection. 
 
                                                 
3 This grading in Figure 10 has been adopted from the Environment Canterbury (Canterbury’s Regional 
Council) approach to allocation from groundwater systems, where a red zone is over-allocated, a 
yellow zone is allocated to 80%, and a white zone, in their case, represents a groundwater system 
which is less than 80% allocated (www.ecan.govt.nz accessed 13th Nov, 2009). 
 99
 100
The process of IWM has already been identified as comprising many different 
complex adaptive systems and their processes of change. As already noted, the 
underpinning objective of the framework is to evaluate process. The framework is 
therefore adaptable to any IWM processes, including those of institutional change and 
sustainability transformation, of particular interest to this research, as shown Table 7.  
6.4.3 Incorporating Associated Processes of Complex Adaptive 
Change  
 
From Table 7, it can be seen that cycles of IWM and institutional change run 
concurrently. This is to be expected, given that institutional change is a sub-process of 
IWM. However, the important point here is that the type of institutional change 
required, i.e., the IWM challenges to be addressed, will indicate which cycle of IWM 
procedural development is being evaluated. However, as argued in Chapter Five, it 
may require several IWM/institutional change cycles to generate a social 
sustainability transformation. Therefore, although a single transformation process is 
shown above, it is also noted that this process will only generate the potential for 
transition.   
 
InTable 7 the focus is on the collaborative/polycentric IWM transition, as being of 
greatest interest to this study. However, the framework can be applied to any IWM 
enterprise; coercive, cooperative, collaborative, or polycentric. 
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Table 7: Complex Adaptive Phases of IWM and Associated Processes 
The Framework 
 
 Back Loop Front Loop Back Loop 
Complex Adaptive Change System re-
organisation (α) 
Exploitation ( r) System growth (K) System 
collapse/disturbance (Ω) 
System re-organisation (α) 
Social Freshwater Sustainability 
Transformation: May run over 
several IWM cycles 
Transition Preparation Window of opportunity: 
ecological crisis, social 
change, political or 
economic disturbance 
Potential for Transition 
IWM New collaborative 
IWM context and rules 
Individual selection 
of strategies for use 
Emerging cumulative 
patterns of interaction 
Freshwater 
system/ecological 
outcomes,  
institutional outcomes,  
social outcomes 
New  polycentric IWM context 
and rules 
Institutional change New Political Spaces 
and re-negotiation of  
rules and rights (plan 
development) 
New rules are 
interpreted, accepted 
or rejected, and 
applied 
Emerging institutional 
void 
New Political Spaces and 
re-negotiation of Hajer’s 5 
polycentric challenges (plan 
development)  
New rules are interpreted, 
accepted or rejected, and 
applied  
 
Patterns of 
interaction
Resource
Users 
Rules 
Social outcome 
Institutional 
outcome 
Resource 
outcome
Operational 
rules in use, 
Choices 
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The main area of interest to this study is the role of institutional arrangements in front-loop 
IWM processes which shape IWM outcomes, particularly as they relate to the 
collaborative/polycentric IWM transition. The idea of coordinating multiple IWM processes 
towards a ‘tipping point’ where positive transformation may occur in an SES is thus 
demonstrated as a hugely complex and problematical task, relying heavily on chance to bring 
all the necessary elements together in the right place at the right time for the right problem. 
Chance, of course, can be helped along considerably by preparation. IWM is concerned with 
bringing together different key perspectives about an SES, so that sustainability trade-offs to 
enhance the robustness of the whole can be identified, and addressed (made). This is a 
supremely normative social process, although as decision-makers converge on unanimity it 
can often be perceived as more objective than it actually is. Even the overarching 
sustainability driver is, finally, a matter of choice. Societies, whose decision-makers wish to 
avoid the tragedy of open access, think that sustainable governance is the ‘right’ thing to do. 
Therefore, they use the elements and strategies that are most widely recommended as a point 
of departure (e.g., collaborative planning for IWM). But this is still a choice. However, having 
made that choice, further decisions need to be made. As already stated, these decisions will 
relate to five questions, regardless of context (who benefits? Who pays? etc.). It is the answers 
to these questions that are so inextricably context-dependent and normative. 
 
6.4.4 Employing the Framework 
The multi-scale, multi-process, evaluative framework for re-drawn IWM developed above 
directs the evaluation of institutional arrangements for IWM as follows.  
 
First, the IWM framework is applied to the selected SES to collect data on outcomes for the 
resource, IWM institutions, and society. As a sub-process, where the institutional outcome is 
change, then the type of institutional re-design questions or issues being addressed will 
indicate which IWM procedural development transition is being analysed. Then, working 
backwards through the framework, analysis considers how the patterns of interaction have 
generated cumulative effects, triggering institutional change. Returning to the process of 
institutional change, the framework directs lines of enquiry to consider the ways in which the 
institutional void has failed to contain cumulative levels of system use(s).  
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 Having characterised the institutional void, the next step is to identify the problematic 
institutional arrangements implicated, and the mechanisms by which they have compromised 
or supported the sustainability intentions of the IWM institutions.  
 
Central to the theoretical perspective of polycentric IWM as an adaptive outcome of the 
emerging aggregate collective-choice level of decision-making, is the argument that 
polycentric IWM in type 4 contexts is the product of many, many, reifications of 
unsustainable social appreciations of freshwater systems. Therefore, the final step in the 
evaluation is to trace the historical origins of the implicated problematic institutional 
arrangements. This is a vital part of understanding how polycentric IWM in an SES has come 
about, and thus how to most beneficially address it through re-negotiation of collective-choice 
decision-making rules and operational-choice level rules, expressed as individual bundles of 
property rights.  
 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I have addressed the need for new frameworks for analysis of IWM reported 
in the literature, and cited in section 6.1. I have developed a framework for the evaluation of 
institutional arrangements in re-drawn IWM from the work of Oakerson (1992), and Edwards 
and Steins (1998). The main developments and adaptations made to the framework since its 
inception are summarised in Table 8. 
 
 103
  
 
Table 8: The Development of an Evaluative Framework for IWM 
Oakerson, 1992 
 
Edwards and Steins, 1998 
 
This Study, 2010 
 
Single Scale Single scale Multiple scales 
Single process Single process  Multiple complex adaptive processes; 
IWM; social sustainability transformation, 
and; institutional change/planning 
 External Contextual Factors External Contextual Factors, including 
institutional sediments 
 Internal Contextual Factors, 
Including: 
Physical 
attributes of the 
resource, and 
technology 
Physical attributes of the resource, 
and technology: the available 
markets for benefits 
Decision-
making 
arrangements 
Decision-making rules over three 
levels, defining which actions are 
legal 
 User-group Characteristics that 
define desired resource benefit uses 
 
These internal contextual factors are now 
considered in terms of broader institutional 
arrangements that filter IWM institutions to 
generate a set of rules-in-use. 
 
Further, a direct line of influence 
representing changing social appreciation 
of freshwater is now included  
 Selection by individuals of  one 
action strategy from many 
possibilities 
This element now shows how the rules in 
use can influence the trajectory of patterns 
of interaction 
Patterns of 
interaction 
Patterns of interaction Patterns of interaction now shows variable 
trajectories for cumulative levels of use 
  Sustainability limits for the resource and 
the society, that will trigger institutional re-
design 
Outcomes Resource outcomes 
Institutional outcomes 
Social outcomes 
The particular type of decision-making 
challenges for which IWM institutions 
need to be re-designed, indicates the type 
of transition being undergone (e.g., 
collaborative to polycentric) 
Feedback Loop Feedback Loop Onward Cycle 
 
To recap, the elements of the IWM process evaluative  framework as proposed are: external 
contextual factors; institutional sediments; internal contextual factors (comprised of natural 
resource characteristics and technological availability; IWM institutions, and; user-group 
characteristics); institutional arrangements arising, which shape operational rules-in-use and 
thus influence individual strategy selection; emergent patterns of interaction; system limits, 
and; ecological, social (including cultural and economic), and institutional outcomes.  
 
This IWM process framework also includes the complex adaptive stages of associated cycles 
of institutional change/planning, and social sustainability transformation, to more richly 
inform the IWM evaluation. 
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 6.5.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Proposed Evaluative Framework 
Any framework for evaluation of such a complex and challenging process as IWM will be 
more robust in some areas than in others. Furthermore, this is a novel development, which is 
yet to be tested in the field. From the above, it is expected that the empirical results will show 
that the main strengths and weaknesses of the framework that I have developed in the 
preceding sections are as follows. The underpinnings of an evaluative framework for IWM as 
re-drawn, like the foundations of a house, need to be sturdy. Although the framework as 
developed above incorporates many new ideas and evaluative perspectives, Oakerson’s 
(1992) original framework is now well known, well regarded, and widely cited. The 
framework for analysis of multiple-use common-pool resources from Edwards and Steins 
(1998) has been recommended by Agrawal (2002) for its identification of key elements and 
processes, facilitating cross-case comparative analysis in the search for a ‘unified theory’ of 
sustainable Commons Governance. It has also been noted by Laerhoven & Ostrom (2007) as 
a useful approach to the analysis of complexity and complex adaptive change in SESs. This 
lends support to the supposition that the basis of the framework as developed is robust.  
 
The strengths of the framework developed here are considered to include its ability to be 
relatively easily re-focused over multiple scales of governance. Further, as demonstrated 
above, the framework is very flexible and may be broken down or combined and recombined 
in various ways to provide both a big picture perspective, and a rich and complex overall 
analysis, with the capacity to narrow the focus of enquiry to further investigate a wide number 
of possible elements and processes. In particular, the ability to identify problematic 
institutional arrangements, their origins and their mechanisms of influence in front-loop IWM 
processes through Agrawal’s (2002) ‘causal chains’, offers the potential for a more realistic 
and robust analysis and understanding of IWM problemsheds. Lastly, the identification of the 
characteristics of new political spaces associated with the collaborative/polycentric IWM 
transition, and thus the ability to identify emergent polycentric problemsheds, is potentially a 
useful advancement to the field.   
 
However, as with other frameworks, this one should not be expected to provide ‘answers’ to 
IWM challenges. What it can do is direct various lines of enquiry to consider key 
interdependencies within complex adaptive IWM processes, and highlight areas of shortfall or 
merit in a given IWM enterprise. It will not be able to reveal hidden motives or agendas, or 
necessarily gain access to sensitive higher-level (e.g., Cabinet or ministerial) decisions in their 
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 entirety. However, the framework does at least identify the presence of such obscurities or 
gaps. Neither will it necessarily reduce the level of normative difficulty inherent within 
emergent polycentric problemsheds. These, almost by definition, will always be difficult, 
passionately contested decisions. Nonetheless, the framework can highlight which decisions 
or rules need to be re-negotiated, and provide a more realistic and robust context to inform 
deliberation. Further potential weaknesses of this framework are that it is complex, 
information-dense, may suffer from the semantic confusion in the literature, and may be 
conceptually challenging. Lastly, the need to ‘work backwards’ through the analysis from 
outcomes to contexts may become confusing during empirical analysis.  
 
This concludes the theoretical portion of this thesis, in fulfilment of the first two objectives of 
this study, which were:  
• To seek more realistic and conceptually robust theoretical underpinnings for IWM. 
• Based on this, the development of an evaluative framework for the re-drawn IWM 
process. 
 
The next chapter begins the empirical portion of this research, addressing the third research 
objective in this study, which is the employment of the evaluative framework in the multi-
scale case study analysis of the role of institutional arrangements in IWM outcomes in New 
Zealand. Chapter Seven (following) applies the evaluative framework to a national-scale 
analysis of the role of institutional arrangements in IWM outcomes in New Zealand under the 
RMA, during the period 1991-2009.  
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7  An Evaluation of the Role of Institutional Arrangements 
in IWM Outcomes: The New Zealand National-Scale SES 
under the Resource Management Act (1991) 
7.1 Introduction and Chapter Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the understanding of how and why the RMA, from 
a national-scale Social-Ecological-System perspective, has failed to deliver its sustainability 
intentions for freshwater systems. This will be achieved by analysing how and why the 
current freshwater governance difficulties have arisen in the New Zealand national-scale SES. 
Analysis is based on the application of the framework developed in Chapter Six, focusing in 
this chapter on the complex adaptive processes of IWM and institutional change. The chapter 
aim is achieved through the identification of key national-scale institutional arrangements, 
and the analysis of their roles in front-loop IWM processes. As explained in the previous 
chapter, these processes are: the emergence of operational rules in use and their influence on 
individual decisions, and; the resulting trajectory of cumulative patterns of interaction.  
 
Hence, to recap from section 6.4.2, emergent operational rules in use for an SES represent not 
only the intentionally designed IWM institutions, but the IWM institutions as they have been 
filtered through, and potentially amended or supplemented by, wider, socially constructed 
institutional arrangements over time. In other words, they are the ‘socially accepted’ group of 
rules, including but not limited to specifically designed IWM institutions, which frame 
individual decisions. These individual decisions then aggregate into cumulative patterns of 
interaction, constrained or otherwise by the IWM institutions. The front-loop elements of the 
re-drawn IWM process which are of particular interest in this chapter are shown in bold in 
Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Representing Front-Loop National-Scale RMA Processes for Evaluation 
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This chapter addresses two main questions in the attainment of its aim:  
1) Which (if any) of the broader institutional arrangements (customs, worldviews, 
markets, or systems of property rights, for example) in New Zealand, are identified as 
having influenced the outcomes of the RMA?  
2) In particular, what has been the influence of any broader institutional arrangements 
identified, on the front-loop elements of IWM and institutional change processes? In 
other words, what have been the mechanics of their role in the compromise or support 
of the RMA’s intentions, with respect to freshwater? 
 
The results of this evaluation are reported in the remaining chapter sections as follows. In 
section 7.2 I will begin reporting the evaluation results. In that section, I will characterise the 
internal contextual factors to the national-scale RMA cycle: the nation’s freshwater resources; 
the intentions of the RMA, and; the competing cosmologies and worldviews present in New 
Zealand society, as they pertain to this study. Then, in section 7.3, I will describe the 
outcomes of the national-scale RMA cycle. These are reported in order as the freshwater 
system outcomes, the social outcomes, and the institutional outcomes. The institutional 
outcome is of particular interest in this section, for two reasons already discussed. Firstly, 
because the study is concerned with the question of why rules for IWM, explicitly and 
expensively crafted with the intention, inter alia, of generating and maintaining sustainable 
freshwater outcomes, have not done so to the extent expected. Secondly, analysis of the 
institutional void and resulting new political space in the national SES can contribute to a 
more robust understanding in the wider literature of the emergence of a polycentric IWM 
problemshed at this scale of freshwater governance.  
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The evaluative frameworks employed in this chapter are shown in Figures 16 and 17. Figure 
16 reports the findings of the RMA process as analysed, while Figure 17 reports on all three 
associated complex adaptive processes of interest to this study.  
7.2 Evaluation Results: Internal Contextual Factors 
 
Having thus identified the intentions and the outcomes of the RMA at the national scale, the 
question becomes: how did one lead to the other? And more specifically, what may have been 
the role of institutional arrangements in what Agrawal (2002) has called a ‘causal chain’? In 
subsection 7.4, I will first describe the key problematic institutional arrangements identified 
for this scale of SES. Broadly, these relate to: market forces under a neoliberal agenda with 
very limited national policy guidance; tensions, overlaps, and misalignments across multiple 
systems of property rights, and; the bicultural cosmologies, and competing worldviews 
present within New Zealand society. I will consider the influence of these three broad areas of 
New Zealand’s complex adaptive system of institutional arrangements on the emerging 
operational rules in use, and thus on national-scale decision-making, in subsection 7.4.2. The 
resulting trajectory of cumulative patterns of use, and the coupled institutional void, will be 
discussed in 7.4.3. In section 7.5 I will reflect upon the extent to which the study findings fit 
with the theoretical expectations as discussed in the foregoing chapters, and will consider the 
implications of these findings for the current freshwater governance challenges in New 
Zealand. Lastly, in this section I will present some concluding comments on the role of 
institutional arrangements in the national-scale outcomes of the RMA.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 16: Evaluating the Role of Institutional Arrangements in National-Scale RMA Outcomes 
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 Back Loop 1991 Front Loop Back Loop 2009 
Complex 
Adaptive Change 
System re-organisation 
(α) 
Exploitation (r)   System growth (K) System collapse/disturbance (Ω) System re-
organisation (α) 
RMA 1991 Rational, technical 
economic analysis. New 
IWM context and rules: 
Neoliberal, free-market 
agenda; no limits to use 
set. 
Choices directed by rules in 
use encouraged neoliberal 
development of new markets. 
Increasing economic value of 
freshwater becomes a driving 
factor in the intensification of 
rates of abstraction.  
Global Dairy boom, system 
increasingly locked in to dairy 
revenues and associated 
irrigation practices. 
Unsustainable freshwater 
system/ecological outcomes (OECD 
2007; MfE 2008);  
Institutional re-negotiation;  
Changing social appreciations of 
freshwater systems, including 
influence of increasing Maori 
demographic. 
New polycentric 
IWM context and 
rules: 
The Land and 
Water Forum 
(2009). 
Interview Results Key problematic institutional arrangements identified by interviewees: 1) Market forces in a 
neoliberal paradigm; 2) Conflicting property rights domains; 3) Tension between 
predominant and competing worldviews and cosmologies 
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Figure 17: IWM Processes at the National-Scale New Zealand SES, RMA Cycle 
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The purpose of this section is to provide a characterisation of the three broad internal 
contextual factors to the RMA cycle, as it began in 1991. These are shown in bold in 
Figure 18.  
 
 
Figure 18: Representing Internal Contextual Factors for Evaluation 
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7.2.1 The Resource Characteristics and Uses 
As already mentioned in Chapter One, New Zealand as a whole enjoys plentiful 
rainfall, although this is unevenly distributed across the country and over annual 
cycles. New Zealand is ranked 12th out of 193 countries for its abundance of 
freshwater (MfE, Aug 2009). Freshwater in New Zealand is subject to a wide range of 
uses. Beyond the provision of domestic and municipal drinking water supplies and 
waste disposal, the most important of these include: the generation of hydroelectricity; 
irrigation of crops; the support of fisheries; as a resource input to primary production 
such as forestry or dairy; and Maori spiritual and cultural values (Jenkins, 2006; MfE, 
2008; OECD, 2007; Park, 1995; M. Williams, 2004). 
 
7.2.2 The Intentions of the RMA 
In this subsection, I will characterise the main intentions behind the RMA rule-sets, as 
they pertain to this study. This is represented in Figure 19 as the IWM rules, and the 
bold arrow running through the whole cycle to the intended outcomes. The intended 
outcomes are represented as aiming to generate ‘balanced’ patterns of interaction, 
within the sustainable range of socio-economic pressures on the resource. However, 
as already noted, this explicit intention to ‘promote sustainable management’, has not 
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 been fulfilled in the national scale SES. The remainder of this chapter seeks to analyse 
the role of institutional arrangements in this outcome. 
 
 
Figure 19: Representing the Sustainability Intentions of the RMA for Evaluation 
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The Resource Management Act, as part of a wider national-scale re-structuring of 
central and local government in New Zealand in the 1980s, brought together many of 
the scattered and often conflicting natural resource legislation and institutions. It 
simplified and clarified the statutory framework for natural resource management, and 
reduced over seventy pieces of legislation into a single Act (Memon, 1993; Wheen, 
1997). The substance of the RMA, and its origins in the New Zealand System Change 
of 1984-1991, and the wider neoliberal agenda, are well documented and have been 
extensively discussed from a range of scholarly and practical perspectives (Barton, 
2007; Berke et al., 1999; Bührs & Bartlett, 1993; Cocklin & Furuseth, 1994; 
Crawford, 2007; Davis & Threlfall, 2006; Deans, 2004; Ericksen, 1990; Ericksen et 
al., 2003; Frieder, 1997; Guerin, 2007; Gunningham, 2008; Harris, 2004; Heitzmann, 
2007; Hooper, 2006; Jackson & Dixon, 2007; King, 2003; Lange et al., 2008; 
Memon, 1996, 2000; Memon & Gleeson, 1995; Memon & Skelton, 2007; Oram, 
2007; Resource Management (Simplify and Streamline) Amendment Bill ", 2009; 
Selsky & Memon, 1995; Skelton & Memon, 2002; Wheen, 2002; D. Williams, 1997). 
The main points of the Act nowadays require little introduction, beyond the 
identification of key aspects particularly relevant to this study, presented below.  
 
Under the mandate of the RMA, Regional Councils in New Zealand are publicly 
elected bodies, whose duties include “the establishment, implementation, and review 
of objectives, policies, and methods to achieve integrated management of the natural 
and physical resources of the region” ("Resource Management Act," 1991 Part 4, s. 
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 30 1(a)). The development of Regional Policy Statements is mandatory, but the 
preparation of regional plans for water and other natural resources is voluntary, with 
the exception of Coastal Plans which are also mandatory. It is important to note that 
the RMA is not concerned solely with freshwater, but is a wider mandate for the 
integrated management of natural and physical resources, as stated above. It is also 
important to note that the RMA was “… derived from a rational technical approach to 
resource management” (Memon, 1997, p309) in the face of impending national 
bankruptcy. Further, that in spite of its (then) novel public consultation process during 
development, the Act is “as much a product of a conventional, theoretical economic 
analysis of resource management issues as of political direction and negotiation” 
(Memon and Gleeson, 1995, p115). On the other hand, Wheen (2002, p271) notes that 
“…by adopting sustainability as its core purpose, the Act broke new ground”.  
 
The RMA replaced the 1967 Water &Soil Conservation Act system of water rights 
(the 1967 Act and its key points will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Nine), 
with three types of ‘consents’ (water permits) which must be obtained for: the 
diversion and use of waters; the discharge of effluents into surface waters, and; any 
water quantity or quality alterations affecting the coastal zone. The exceptions to this 
are: firstly, any use that is expressly permitted in a Regional Plan, or; secondly, the 
‘reasonable’ use of water for domestic use, stock watering, or fire-fighting ("Resource 
Management Act," 1991 s. 14). In spite of the Resource Management Law Reform 
Brief of 1984, which specifically considered issues relating to the ownership of and 
rights to a range of natural and physical resources, including freshwater (for in-depth 
discussion of this, see Bromley, 1988 ; Memon & Gleeson, 1995), the Act makes it 
very clear (s.122 (1)) that resource consents are “neither real nor personal property”. 
However, this is changing through Environment Court decisions, as will be discussed 
below.  
 
Underpinned as it is by a wider neoliberal agenda, it is not surprising to find a 
requirement in the legislation ("Resource Management Act," 1991Section 24 (h)), that 
the Minister for the Environment give consideration to, and investigate, “the use of 
economic instruments including charges, levies, other fiscal measures, and incentives 
to achieve the purpose of the Act”. However, concern has been voiced by many 
commentators, including Wheen (2002, p261), that despite this provision, the Act 
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 “…fails to provide any real checks against development and resource exploitation”. 
And as already stated, the RMA has not succeeded in its sustainability intentions, 
particularly with respect to freshwater systems (Creech et al., 2010; MfE, 2008; 
OECD, 2007; Resource Management (Simplify and Streamline) Amendment Bill ", 
2009).  
 
On the other hand, as I will discuss in section 7.5, the wider neoliberal intentions 
regarding economic development that are embodied in the RMA, have arguably been 
amply fulfilled. Arising from this tension is a period of institutional change, even 
‘constitutional politics’ (Ackerman, c.f. Hajer, 2003) regarding freshwater governance 
in New Zealand. Thus, the intentions of the RMA can be summarised as relating to 
two competing agendas: the promotion of devolved, regional-scale sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources, and; the neoliberal facilitation of 
market development for those same resources.  
 
7.2.3 Competing Cosmologies and Worldviews 
Social appreciations or worldviews of freshwater in New Zealand, as in other places 
worldwide, lie along a continuum from exploitation, through conservation (‘wise 
use’), to preservation. However, in New Zealand, there are two main cultures to be 
considered: indigenous Maori, and European ‘settlers’ (Pakeha). The key areas of 
difference between Maori and ‘Western’/European perspectives on the use and 
governance of freshwater that are of relevance at this point in the study, have their 
origins in the conflicting and/or competing cosmologies. While the Pakeha, ‘Western’ 
perspective is widely recognised and needs no characterisation here, the competing 
cosmological basis for Maori customary society in New Zealand gives rise to tensions 
between environmental worldviews and appreciations of freshwater systems, and 
systems of property rights, as reported below.  
 
7.2.3.1 Maori Cosmology and Worldview 
Maori cosmology and worldview links humans to the natural world around them, as 
well as their ancestors (the eldest and most important of which were gods). All 
Tangata Whenua (People of the Land, or Maori) trace their whakapapa (ancestral 
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 lineage) back to their deities (atua), from whence are derived all forms of living and 
inanimate entities. One’s whakapapa was, and remains, a strong source of mana 
(power, or standing): a rooting to one’s history, and a source of comfort and security 
(Ballara, 1998; Patterson, 1994; Stokes, 2002; J. Williams, 2006). Maori society 
remains structured around a kinship regime of three tiers: the Iwi, (tribe or clan); the 
Hapu (a largely autonomous satellite community based on kinship ties); and whanau, 
or extended family group (Ballara, 1998). The customary (pre-European contact in the 
1700s) society was based almost exclusively on kinship ties, but with reference to the 
group in which one lived, choices were available. Ballara (Ibid, p30) rather grandly 
characterises the societal framework as based around “…optative, cognatic bilateral 
descent (descent reckoned by choice through either or both males and females)”. Land 
and resources were held conditional to one’s kinship ties, and, perhaps more 
importantly, then as now, to the ability to defend them (Marsden, 1989; Stokes, 2002). 
 
But there is a fundamental tension between the current ‘Western’ right of 
management (the right to regulate internal patterns of use, and to transform the 
resource by making improvements), and the Maori environmental ethic which states 
that the essential nature of the resource must remain intact (Patterson, 1994; Pyle, 
1992; J. Williams, 2006). The Maori worldview identifies several states of water. As 
shown in Table 9, water may be fresh, brackish (estuarine) or sea-water. Within that, 
Mauri (life force) is the defining ‘element’, and Williams (2006) thinks of Mauri as 
the ‘moods’ of water. The Mauri of water dictated whether it was considered pure, 
ordinary, or dead. The categories for water are “Waiora, Waimaori, Waikino, 
Waimate, Waitai” as shown. One of the major issues arising from the Mauri (life-
force) of freshwater systems is the Maori resistance to the mixing of waters. This 
clearly holds potential for conflict in current management approaches (Tipa & Welch, 
2006). 
 
 116
  
 
Table 9: States and Mauri of Freshwater, to Tangata Whenua (Adapted from Ward and Scarf, 
1993; Williams, 2006) 
 Freshwater Estuarine/ 
Brackish  
Ocean/Seawater 
 Waimaori -  
Water that has come into 
contact with human 
beings. It has become 
ordinary and has no 
particularly sacred 
associations. 
Waimataiatai - 
This class of 
water is not given 
a wider 
description in the 
literature. 
Waitai - 
The term for the sea, the surf and 
the tide. It represents the end of the 
water cycle from its inception 
through all states to the sea. From 
the sea, it is lifted back into the 
heavens and is purified again to fall 
as Waiora. 
Waiora (water of life) - 
The purest form of water, like the rain. It has the potential to give life, to sustain the 
wellbeing of all things and counteract evil. Waiora is used in scared rituals to purify 
and to sanctify. It can remain pure only if contact with humans is protected by 
appropriate ritual prayers. 
Waikino (bad water) - 
This can be potentially harmful in that it conceals its intention and deceives a user by 
its habit. This category of water may hide boulders or snags that can cause damage. In 
a spiritual sense, this is water that has been polluted, debased, spoiled or corrupted. 
M
au
ri
 
Waimate (dead water) - 
Water that has lost its mauri or life force. The power to rejuvenate itself or any living 
thing has gone; it is so damaged as to be considered dead. 
 
However, as with so much else in Maori society, there was, and remains, a large 
degree of expediency involved in the designation of water resources as one or other of 
these types (J. Williams, 2006). Lest the picture of customary Maori resource use be 
painted too rosily, O’Regan (1984, p. 9) “…shudder[s] to think what my own tupuna 
would have done had they had bulldozers…If our old people had had the skills and 
greater power to destroy the landscape they would have played a full and vigorous 
part in doing it in proportion to their numbers”. It is worth while remembering that 
there are tensions within both the Maori and Pakeha (Western) cosmologies: the 
constitutional-choice level decisions over in-stream or abstractive uses pose exactly 
the same questions to decision-making from either cultural perspective. 
 
7.3 National-Scale RMA Outcomes 
This subsection will report the IWM outcomes of the RMA cycle in the national-scale 
New Zealand SES, as shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17. These figures are 
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 summarised for this section by the following Figure 20, indicating RMA outcomes for 
the national-scale resource, society and institutions, in bold. 
 
 
Figure 20:Reporting National-Scale RMA Outcomes for Evaluation 
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7.3.1.1 Freshwater System Outcomes 
As already stated, the RMA has not succeeded in its sustainability intentions with 
respect to freshwater systems (Creech et al., 2010; MfE, 2008; OECD, 2007; 
Resource Management (Simplify and Streamline) Amendment Bill ", 2009), and per 
capita water demand is now 2-3 times higher in New Zealand than other OECD 
countries (MfE, Aug 2009). At the time of writing, the latest data on freshwater 
available from New Zealand’s central government agencies remains the 2004 Physical 
Stock Accounts for Freshwater (Statistics New Zealand, 2004). This document states, 
on p13, that “the degree to which actual abstraction is monitored varies greatly 
between regional councils and there is insufficient coverage for compilation of 
national aggregates”. As may have been expected, therefore, the 1996 and 2007 
OECD Environmental reports for New Zealand (OECD, 1996 & 2007) were 
increasingly critical, especially of environmental reporting and freshwater governance 
respectively. The central government’s State of the Environment reporting did not 
begin until 1997, and was eventually followed-up in 2007 with a report that omitted 
the conclusions chapter. This was controversial, particularly as the chapter is now 
available from the Ministry for the Environment website, and is heavily critical of 
agricultural intensification of land-uses, particularly in the nationally economically 
vital dairy industry (MfE, 2007).  
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The increasingly extreme climate and micro-climates in New Zealand (National 
Institute for Water and Atmosphere (NIWA)NIWA, 2008) are an example of an 
external contextual factor for IWM, over which the SES or its members have very 
little control. That said, the question of water storage becomes of key concern, and 
this is currently a topic of particularly intense debate in parts of New Zealand, as I 
will discuss in later sections and chapters. Critical issues identified for New Zealand’s 
freshwater systems particularly include the quality and flow regimes of lowland 
waters, as a result of up-catchment over-allocation (MfE, 2007, 2008; OECD, 2007). 
The incoming National government of 2008 has been progressing the development of 
a national policy statement, and states that amongst other things,  
“The decline in fresh water quality needs to be addressed through improvements in 
land-use development planning and management, particularly for urban development 
and intensive farming practices. There is also a need to: 
• better protect outstanding freshwater resources and ecosystems 
• improve efficiencies in the use of water 
• increase resilience against future effects of a changing climate 
• enhance the involvement of tangata whenua in RMA decision-making 
• rectify the present underinvestment in infrastructure for supplying, storing and 
distributing fresh water” (MfE, 2008).  
These objectives, un-specified as they are, with the possible exception of the 
‘swimmability’ of systems, are to be achieved by 2035. Swimmability means suitable 
for contact recreation (MfE, 2008). Realistically, of all the above aims, this may be 
the most likely to gain agreement on specific limits, because of the obvious and 
tangible potential for public harm. It should be noted, however, that issues with 
freshwater quality have yet to be fully resolved in the forty years since the 
introduction of the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act, which I will discuss in 
greater depth in Chapter Nine. A Proposed National Freshwater Policy Statement has 
now been notified, submissions have been requested and made, and the Board of 
Inquiry reported its findings to the Minister of the Environment at the end of January 
2010 (MfE, 2008). It remains to be seen what the result will be.  
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 7.3.1.2 Social Outcomes 
The RMA is renowned for its experiment with a devolved, integrated mandate, and 
the attempt to address natural resources planning through regional expressions of 
individuality, and explicit inclusion of Maori (Burton & Cocklin, 1996; Memon, 
1997; Memon & Gleeson, 1995). Burton and Cocklin (1996, p91) state that “One of 
the RMA’s important underlying principles is that decisions relating to the use of 
resources should be placed in the hands of the communities most directly affected by 
those decisions”. What, then, have been the social outcomes of the RMA? 
 
Questions of increasing freshwater scarcity, and greater intensity of competition for 
these resources, have led not just to increasing legal costs and social contestation, but 
have also inevitably given rise to considerations of storage and physical infrastructure, 
as noted above. Questions of storage have in turn focused attention on property rights, 
and the misalignment of, and tensions between, different types of existing rights, 
considered in greater detail in subsection 7.4.1.2. This is particularly as they relate to 
the current situation, whereby private economic gain is legally available from the 
individual use of subtractable public benefits (and indeed, until very recently has been 
strongly encouraged) (Lange et al., 2008; Memon & Weber, 2008; MfE, 2009c).  
 
However, this situation is changing rapidly, and the public perception of New 
Zealand’s freshwater systems, and the role of agriculture (particularly dairy and 
associated irrigation practices) has changed dramatically since the Millennium, as has 
been demonstrated by the ‘Environmental Perceptions’ series of biennial surveys, 
undertaken since 2000 (Hughey et al., 2008). This change in social appreciation of 
freshwater and other natural resources has fuelled national-scale contestation of the 
status quo. It also reinforces the perception of the IWM process as one of fostering the 
potential for social learning and change. 
 
As with most ex-Colonial countries around the world, the indigenous population of 
New Zealand were effectively displaced in the 1800s by the flood of new settlers, 
diseases, extractive technologies, and social systems, including alien perspectives on 
property rights. The RMA, for the first time in one hundred and fifty years (the Treaty 
of Waitangi was signed in 1840), openly acknowledged the indigenous relationship 
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 between Tangata Whenua (‘People of the Land’, or Maori) as a matter of national 
importance (s.6 (e)). Further, the Act has integrated many of the Maori concepts of 
stewardship into its principles. There are five substantive provisions within the RMA 
related to Maori rights which must be addressed in plans, in the following descending 
order of influence: 
• Plans ‘shall recognise and provide for’ the relationship of Maori and their 
culture and traditions with ancestral lands, water, sites, wahi tapu and other 
taonga (treasures) as matters of national importance (s. 6(e)); 
• Plans are to ‘have particular regard to’ local Maori responsibility in the 
guardianship and stewardship of the land and resources (s. 7(a)); 
• Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi shall be ‘taken into account’ (s. 8); 
• Councils shall have regard to any ‘relevant planning document recognised by 
an iwi authority’ affected by a regional policy statement, regional or district 
plan (s. 61, 66 and 74); and 
• Councils shall consult with original people of the land (or Tangata Whenua) 
during plan preparation (Clause 3, First Schedule). 
 
Unfortunately, many Maori feel that these provisions have not been adhered to in the 
spirit with which they were intended, and there is an apparently increasing 
Maori/Pakeha (European New Zealander) divide (Burton & Cocklin, 1996; Cocklin & 
Blunden, 1998; Prystupa, 1998; Stokes, 2002; Tipa & Welch, 2006; J. Williams, 
2007). Particularly post the 1970s, the continued rise in neo-Polynesian (J. Williams, 
2007) population levels and the focus on land, language, and culture, has become 
increasingly recognised and influential in freshwater policymaking in New Zealand. 
This is particularly so in the current problemshed, where debates are now intensifying 
over suggestions of ‘parallel’, culturally distinct (Maori and European) management 
systems (Tipa & Tierney, 2003; Tipa & Welch, 2006; J. Williams, 2006, 2007). Thus, 
the cosmology, worldview, and customary practices of Tangata Whenua are an 
important thread in the fabric of past, present, and future freshwater decision-making 
in New Zealand. I will consider this critical facet of the IWM process in New Zealand 
in greater detail in later sections and chapters. 
 
7.3.1.3 Institutional Outcome: An Emergent Polycentric IWM 
Problemshed 
The national-scale IWM institutional outcome of the RMA cycle is identified in this 
section as a polycentric IWM problemshed. The country is experiencing a period of 
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 constitutional politics, including the potential for the collaborative re-negotiation of 
core rights to freshwater, and their distribution in the face of increasing scarcity (see, 
for example, the Proposed National Policy Statement, quoted in 7.3.1.1 above). The 
polycentric IWM challenges that have been identified in the New Zealand national-
scale SES are summarised below.   
 
The locus of decision-making power is unclear: Over the last two decades, the 
locus of decision-making power in New Zealand has become increasingly unclear, 
and social movements’ strategies have become more diverse. Questions persist, 
regarding who should decide on freshwater governance and allocation issues. A 
current example of this is the central government ‘call-in’4 by the Environment 
Minister, Nick Smith, of the decision facing Environment Canterbury (ECan), the 
Regional Council, over granting permits for effluent disposal from three large dairy 
units proposed for the Mackenzie Basin, in South Canterbury. The Minister stated that 
he had "called in these discharge consents as they are nationally significant due to 
their scale, the fragile and iconic nature of the Mackenzie Basin environment, the 
importance of freshwater quality to the Government and the high level of public 
interest" (ECan, 2010c; Smith, 2010).  
 
In addition to this national/regional decision-making tension, as I will demonstrate, 
legal rulings can contradict Regional Council decisions (see, for example, section 
7.2.2 below), and local communities challenge developers (see, for example, the 
hearings on the proposed Central Plains Water scheme in Central Canterbury, (ECan, 
2010b)). Central Government, Regional Councils, lawyers and Judges, developers, 
scientists, anglers, export industry sectors, Maori, and the general public all enjoy the 
capacity to influence different pieces of the decision-making whole in different ways, 
to different extents, and from different perspectives. However, whether or not the 
current de facto distribution of decision-making power is the most appropriate, 
remains debatable.  
 
Lastly, and critically both for this evaluation, and for the future of New Zealand’s 
freshwater systems, is the Creech Report (Creech et al., 2010). This report was 
                                                 
4  “Call in” is an example of national government assuming decision-making responsibility from the 
relevant local authority, in this case Canterbury Regional Council.  
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 published on the 19th of February 2010, and is an outstanding example of how a 
devolved collaborative decision-making approach can be undermined (indeed, 
potentially devastated). The Creech report, and its unfortunate implications for 
freshwater decision-making in New Zealand at all scales of decision-making, will be 
discussed in greater detail throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
 
There is a new spatiality of policy-making and politics: This is evident on the one 
hand at the international scale, where international influence weighs heavily on the 
vital export earnings of tourism and the dairy industry in particular ("Statistics New 
Zealand: National Accounts, Sustainable Development," 2010). In the other direction, 
there is an increasing groundswell of ‘flax-roots’ (grassroots) collaborative 
approaches to decision-making, and the importance of the collaborative approach was 
ostensibly recognised in the approach adopted by the Land and Water Forum 2009 
(MfE, 2009b). Unfortunately, this is another area where Creech et al., (2010) 
undermine decision-making innovation and progress. This report makes explicit the 
extent to which central government is willing to disregard developing social capital, 
in favour of the short-term need for the furtherance of economic development. 
 
The standard view of participation and democratic governance may have to be 
re-thought: Although advisory boards for decision-making are not new notions, 
either in the literature or in New Zealand, the Land and Water Forum, as mentioned 
above, has been welcomed as a new national-scale approach to this role. This is a 
multi-scale collaborative process for IWM in New Zealand, asked to “recommend 
reforms for freshwater management in New Zealand”. However, not unexpectedly, 
the Land and Water Forum recommendations will be “non-binding on the 
Government” (MfE, 2009b). Further, the current willingness of central government to 
undermine the potentially successful collaborative IWM initiative in Canterbury 
Region, through the “removal of regulatory roadblocks” (Key, 2010b) to further 
freshwater storage and irrigation, and to implement key institutional change 
recommendations from the Creech et al. (2010) report, must also seriously undermine 
the potential influence of this national-scale Forum. Moreover, key questions remain 
over potential Maori claims to freshwater, arising from ongoing Treaty of Waitangi 
settlement processes. 
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 The authority of classical scientific expertise has been undermined: Again, 
Creech et al. (2010, p26, 27) demonstrate that conflicting views of decision-making as 
science led (bad) or science informed (good), from the perspective of ‘timely’ consent 
processing remain an issue in New Zealand, particularly where the ‘science’ remains 
contested. The challenge has now become one of identifying, generating, 
acknowledging and integrating different or competing information, or ways of 
knowing, effectively. This is particularly with respect to changing scientific 
understandings (as evidenced by, for example, the emergence of the perspective of 
complex adaptive cycles of change), inadequate applied science and/or technology for 
legal rulings (see subsection 7.4.3.2 below), and the Maori cosmological conflict with 
Pakeha (Western) science. As already noted, this issue is especially acute where the 
clashes involve the Maori perspective on the mixing of waters, and the Maori 
interpretation of management responsibilities which demands that the ‘essential 
character’ or essence (Mauri) of a place be retained (Patterson, 1994; Polack, 1840; 
Tipa & Tierney, 2003; J. Williams, 2006). This is in direct contradiction to the Pakeha 
perspective of management which includes the right to change the resource by making 
‘improvements’ (subsection 4.3.2), which may include storage dams, for example.  
 
The context of policy-making is expansive: Climate change, carbon credits, tourism 
and export markets, environmental and ecological overshoot, public property and 
private economic gain, and the potential for economically crippling Maori, dairy and 
irrigation compensation claims: there is little in the current round of policy 
renegotiations that does not impact upon a wide range of underpinning social issues 
(CAB min 09 10/4; CAB min 10 20/12).  
 
From the examples given above, it is clear that the current IWM problemshed facing 
the national-scale New Zealand SES is polycentric. How did this come about? The 
following subsection identifies key problematic institutional arrangements in New 
Zealand, and considers their role in the front-loop elements of the national-scale RMA 
cycle. 
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 7.4 Institutional Arrangements and Front-Loop Elements 
of IWM 
The foregoing two sections have characterised the internal contextual factors to the 
national-scale RMA cycle, and its outcomes. Arguably, while the wider neoliberal 
aspirations of the ‘System Change’ of the 1980s have been well met, the sustainability 
intentions as specified in the RMA have not. In this section, I will first identify key 
problematic institutional arrangements. Then, I will analyse their role in: the social 
selection of the emerging operational rules in use, and the individual decisions arising, 
and; the resulting cumulative patterns of interaction, and coupled institutional void. 
 
7.4.1 Institutional Arrangements 
The focus of this subsection is on the identification of key institutional arrangements, 
as shown in bold in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21: Representing Key Institutional Arrangement in the National-Scale RMA Cycle for 
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Institutional arrangements identified in this study as particularly problematic to the 
sustainability intentions of the RMA follow three broad themes, described in the 
subsections below. In the order addressed, these are:  
 
1) The freshwater resource availability, and the wider neo-liberal agenda under which 
the RMA was designed, and (not) implemented (Berke et al., 1999; Cullen et al., 
2006; Davies et al., 2007; Ericksen et al., 2003; Jay & Morad, 2007; MfE, 1997, 
2007; OECD, 2007; M. Williams, 2004);  
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2) Issues with competing and conflicting (or potentially conflicting) systems of 
property rights, and the question of allocation and economic instruments, which is 
one that is looming large in New Zealand (and particularly in Canterbury, as will be 
discussed in the following Chapter Eight) at the time of writing (Jenkins, 2006; 
Lange et al., 2008; Memon & Weber, 2008);  
 
3) Competing and conflicting world-views and cosmologies, identified in this study as 
presenting significant present and future challenges to successful IWM in New 
Zealand (MfE, 2008; Prystupa, 1998; Tipa & Welch, 2006; J. Williams, 2006). 
Central amongst these is the enduring pioneer perspective of ‘plenty’ where 
freshwater systems are concerned.  
 
7.4.1.1 The Neoliberal Agenda and Market Development 
As already stated, the RMA was designed with the intention of achieving two broad 
goals. The first was to promote sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources. The second was to facilitate the development of those natural and physical 
resources for the national-scale economic advancement, through that of the individual. 
The neoliberal paradigm was adopted at the time of System Change, and 
wholeheartedly applied in the two decades following. Unfortunately, while this was 
the dominant perspective of the time, there is an increasing amount of criticism of the 
neoliberal ecological modernisation paradigm as a management approach 
internationally, and in New Zealand (Barton, 2007; Connick & Innes, 2003; Healy, 
2005; Higgins & Lockie, 2002; Jackson & Dixon, 2007; Jay & Morad, 2007; 
Valentine et al., 2007).  
 
The restructuring of all levels of government during the 1984-1991 System Change 
was focused on the aim of “getting government out of business, and business into 
government” (Ericksen, 1990, p78). Given national-level government’s appalling 
record in environmental protection (culminating in the Lake Manapouri/Clyde Dam 
debacle of the early 1980s which almost brought down the Muldoon Government), 
and the impending national bankruptcy (Bührs & Bartlett, 1993; Memon, 1993), this 
attitude is certainly understandable, even a laudable ideal. Unfortunately, integration 
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 of business considerations (as essentially the furtherance of individual rights and 
benefits) with governments whose remit is the furtherance of public rights and 
benefits, does not typically enable sustainable outcomes (see, for example, Scrase & 
Sheate, 2002). It seems clear from the outcomes that neither the Labour nor the 
National governments involved in the development of the RMA properly understood 
the implications of ‘getting business into government’ from a sustainable management 
perspective. This is particularly in relation to the worldviews or decision-making 
perspectives, limitations, requirements (particularly including ‘up front’ investment in 
research, development, and capacity-building), and mechanics of entrepreneurial 
market development. All of these, along with leadership, have been conspicuous by 
their absence over the last two decades. 
 
That said, two markets in particular have been highly successful, but are now 
beginning to encroach upon each other’s future development. In 2007, tourism, based 
on the ‘Clean, Green New Zealand’ branding, accounted for almost 20% of New 
Zealand’s export earnings, ("New Zealand Tourism Strategy, 2015," 2010). 
Meanwhile, research from Statistics New Zealand, commissioned by Fonterra, the 
country’s largest dairy cooperative, who also trade on the “Clean, Green New 
Zealand’ brand, claims that this cooperative contributes 25% of the country’s export 
earnings (Fonterra, 2008). These outcomes are testament to the natural resource base, 
as well as the human ingenuity and imagination in the development of these market 
sectors, and technological advancements (such as large-scale centre-pivot irrigation), 
which have been involved. However, particularly in the matter of freshwater quality 
and quantity, these two industries can now arguably be viewed as holding 
diametrically opposed positions as to the more beneficial use of water at the national 
scale. It will be most interesting to observe the responses of these two key New 
Zealand industries to the Creech report (Creech et al., 2010). 
 
It is important to remember that notwithstanding technological advancements in 
storage and transport, freshwater remains a limited, if renewable, complex common 
pool resource, and the perceptions of ‘plenty’ on which some markets appear to have 
been developed, may not in fact be accurate. This has become particularly apparent as 
the growth in dairy in New Zealand continues, hand in hand with the growing 
realisation that whilst the first in first served approach to freshwater allocation may be 
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 cheap and straightforward where supply is no issue, more sophisticated approaches 
are required during actual or expected scarcity. Paramount to all of these is the 
growing realisation and acceptance by the New Zealand public of the fact that there 
are limits to use, and to expansion and intensification, and that these urgently need to 
be identified. Unfortunately, central government currently appears determined to side-
step the necessary debate regarding the clarification and re-negotiation of freshwater 
property rights, in favour of its plans to ensure that “less of the water that currently 
pours out to sea does so” (Key, 2010a). 
 
7.4.1.2 Property Rights 
The situation in New Zealand with respect to water allocation and water rights has 
become progressively more complex and contested over the last two decades of the 
RMA. Water, and the benefits of freshwater systems including instream, cultural, 
social, and economic values, are now ‘owned’ in several different ways over several 
different dimensions. Under the RMA, water remains a publicly (Crown) owned 
resource. Barton (2007, p. 240/241) suggests that:  
“The Act was drafted to stay out of ownership questions – it tries to ignore ownership, 
property, and distribution of wealth… On the more specific question of property 
rights emerging from the RMA in the form of water permits… we find a set of 
questions that the RMA never addressed in 1991. The nature of these rights, their 
allocation, and their transferability, present themselves as the agenda for change that 
the RMA clearly needs”.  
 
Did the RMA ‘studiously avoid’ the issue of property rights? It was very clear in the 
reports from the Resource Management Law Reform (1987-1989) (RMLR), during 
the drafting of the Act, that consideration was being given to various governmental 
options relating to ownership and rights to use water amongst other natural and 
physical resources, specifically:  
• “the characteristics of the resource and its markets 
• the implications of these characteristics for defining rights to the resources and 
the options for ownership or management of the resource 
• the costs and benefits of the different ownership or management options 
identified and the costs of altering existing rights 
• the role of the government with respect to  
? third party spill-over effects and  
? public goods 
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 • the appropriate level (that is, national, regional, or local) of government 
involvement where a role for government is identified” (RMLR, 1988, c.f. 
Memon and Gleeson, 1995, Note 3, p115). 
 
Yet the RMA has left unresolved the Commons question of, and tension between, 
individual property rights and community benefits, and some commentators observe 
that “this unresolved conflict lies at the heart of the legislation” (Oram, 2007, p. 12). 
This conflict has been avoided by successive governments through two main avenues. 
The first is the ongoing absence of any national-level leadership in the freshwater 
field, as evidenced by the lack of National Freshwater Policy Statements or guidance 
(a National Policy Statement was finally proposed in 2008, but has yet to be 
confirmed, MfE, 2008). The second is the ongoing national-scale failure to ensure 
capacity (as capability and commitment) at the regional scale, or provide funding to 
develop capacity where it is lacking (Ericksen et al., 2003; Memon & Skelton, 2007). 
Finally, it should be remembered that as already stated, the dominant first-in-first-
served approach to the allocation of freshwater and its benefits, particularly with 
regard to abstractive use, is not mandatory, merely inherited from previous 
governance regimes. 
 
7.4.1.3 Competing Cosmologies and Worldviews 
As already noted, Maori enjoy a cosmology completely independent of the dominant 
Pakeha one. Maori environmental perspectives to freshwater governance in New 
Zealand are arguably becoming increasingly influential, and the projected Maori 
demographic certainly suggests that the Maori culture may have re-established social 
dominance by the middle of this century (J. Williams, 2007). This of course holds 
significant challenges for the current institutional re-design and property rights re-
negotiation processes (Tipa & Welch, 2006). Further, as I have already noted, there is 
a full spectrum of worldviews and appreciations present in New Zealand society, from 
conservation perspectives through to the apparently dominant perspective that every 
drop of water reaching the sea is ‘wasted’ (see subsection 7.4.1.1 above).  
 
This subsection has briefly described the key problematic institutional arrangements 
in the national-scale SES. How have they influenced the social selection of emergent 
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 operational rules in use, and thus framed decision-making at this scale? This question 
is addressed in the following subsection.  
 
7.4.2 Emergent Operational Rules in Use that Frame Choices 
The purpose of this subsection is to identify the key emergent operational rules in use 
which have been socially selected (or, as in the case of allocation approaches, merely 
inherited and accepted), as an SES-specific ‘frame of reference’ (Swaffield, 1998). 
The operational rules in use, as already described, are the socially selected outcome 
from the way that IWM institutions have been filtered through, and/or supplemented 
by, key institutional arrangements as identified above. It is the emergent operational 
rules in use which will thus influence the factors considered by individuals in the 
selection of their action strategies, with respect to use of multi-dimensional freshwater 
system benefits. This is shown in bold in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22: Representing the RMA Cycle’s National-Scale Operational Rules in Use for 
Evaluation 
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While there exists capacity for the generation and maintenance of sustainable 
freshwater outcomes within the design of the RMA rule-sets, the emergent operational 
rules in use are few and far between. In particular, the lack of political and social will 
to accept and implement the intention, or spirit, of the passionately debated section 5 
provision of the RMA for:  
“managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a 
way, or at a rate, which enables people and committees to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while-  
a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future 
generations, and; 
b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems, and; 
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 c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on 
the environment” ("Resource Management Act," 1991, s.5 (2)), 
 
has remained an ongoing area of sometimes heated and ad hominem debate (Skelton 
& Memon, 2002; Upton et al., 2002). The widespread resistance to curtailment of 
individual freedoms to use and develop freshwater for economic wellbeing (as 
selectively interpreted from RMA s. 5), has been coupled with the ‘cognitive 
blindness’ (Memon, 2008b) of decision-makers, the lack of data and monitoring of 
abstractive use, and the rapidly increasing economic value of freshwater. This has 
meant that there have been, as Wheen (2002, p261) predicted, few “…real checks 
against development and resource exploitation” (as already noted in section 7.2). This 
has particularly been the case in dry-land areas considered ‘suitable’ for the expansion 
of the dairy industry and associated irrigation practices. These industries have been 
very successfully developed in response to the free-market opportunities, arising from 
the wider neo-liberal agenda. 
 
In the face of the effective abandonment of Regional and District Councils by central 
government in the 1990s (Ericksen et al., 2003), the status quo allocation approach of 
first in first served was perpetuated, along with the unsustainable perception of 
plentiful freshwater. This situation was particularly noticeable in regions which had 
not already developed their freshwater system use to its limits, such as Canterbury, 
and remained broadly the case up until the Millennium. Further, the effects-based 
facilitatory mandate of the RMA, coupled with the lack of measurement technologies, 
available abstractive use data, and monitoring, has meant that in effect, those of New 
Zealand’s freshwater systems not protected by Water Conservation Orders have 
remained ‘fair game’ to those who wish to appropriate them, under the free-market 
economy. Water Conservation Orders were inherited from the 1981 ‘Wild and Scenic 
Rivers’ amendment to the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act. Their purpose is to:  
“Recognise and sustain- 
a) Outstanding amenity or intrinsic values which are afforded by waters in their 
natural state: 
b) Where waters are no longer in their natural state, the amenity of intrinsic values of 
those waters which in themselves warrant protection because they are considered 
outstanding” ("Resource Management Act," 1991 Part 9 s. 199 (1) (a, b)). 
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 These institutions have proved themselves robust and enduring, and offer the 
advantage of having already identified limits to use, and/or parameters for 
management. Unfortunately, these critical and generally well-regarded IWM 
institutions in New Zealand are currently under threat from the ongoing RMA 
‘streamlining’, and approach to economic maximisation. This was instigated by the 
incoming National Party in 2008, and further implied by Prime Minister John Key in 
a speech given on the 18th of January, 2010, where he stated that the government was 
seeking ways to remove ‘”regulatory roadblocks to water storage and irrigation”, 
particularly in Canterbury Region (Key, 2010a).  
 
7.4.3 Unsustainable Patterns of Use and the Institutional Void 
This subsection characterises the emerging IWM institutional void in New Zealand 
over the last two decades - the ‘policy lacuna’ (Skelton & Memon, 2002), as 
demonstrated by the unsustainable trajectory of patterns of interaction, the adverse 
effects of over-abstraction, and the new rules crafted to redirect or constrain the 
trajectory. These new rules were designed between 1991 and 2009, in order to address 
the RMA’s main perceived or actual shortcomings as it began to ‘play out on the 
ground’ (Memon & Selsky, 2001), and emergent problems were identified.  
 
The IWM and institutional change processes must at this point be considered as a 
coupled system. This is because it is by analysing the intention of new rules or 
legislative accretions, that the nature of the institutional void, and thus the patterns of 
interaction which have outstripped the institutional capacity, may be identified. 
Similarly, in a complex and subtle world of political negotiation, with commercial 
sensitivities, hidden agendas, and political expedience implicit, it can be just as 
informative to consider which institutional gaps have remained open, and why. The 
focus of this subsection is shown in bold in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23: Emerging Patterns of Use and Institutional Void in the National-Scale RMA Cycle 
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How have the key, problematic institutional arrangements identified in 7.4.1 directed 
emerging patterns of freshwater system use into unsustainable trajectories? The 
following subsections will consider the way that the remarkably few constraints on 
individual freedoms, and the resistance to those constraints by a predominantly rural 
and strongly influential section of the population, have generated the ongoing gap in 
implementation capacity and national leadership, reported above, and in Figures 16 
and 17. Three main strands of action are considered: national-scale legislation and 
amendments, legal rulings, and informal social actions to address the emerging 
institutional void and associated freshwater overshoot. 
 
7.4.3.1 Key Legislation, 1991-2009 
Because there has been little or no central vision, leadership, or guidance from central 
government (Crawford, 2007; Ericksen et al., 2003; Memon & Skelton, 2007; MfE, 
2008; OECD, 2007), decisions have been made as issues have come to a head in 
various arenas. Several key pieces of legislation of particular interest to this study 
have been introduced to supplement the perceived or real deficiencies of the RMA 
1991. These are the Local Government Act 2002, and the RMA amendments of 2003 
and 2005, briefly reviewed below. 
 
Local Government Act, 2002: The RMA divided ‘local’ governance between land-
use at the district scale and freshwater (and other natural resources, including soils) at 
the regional scale. However, this proved to be a significant barrier to integrated 
freshwater decision-making in regions across the country. This was addressed through 
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 efforts of the Local Government Act (2002) to bind these two levels of decision-
making more tightly together. Part 1, section 3: Purpose of the Act, states that: 
“The purpose of this Act is to provide for democratic and effective local government 
that recognises the diversity of New Zealand communities; and, to that end, this Act- 
(a) states the purpose of local government; and 
(b) provides a framework and powers for local authorities to decide which 
activities they undertake and the manner in which they will undertake them; and 
(c) promotes the accountability of local authorities to their communities; and 
(d) provides for local authorities to play a broad role in promoting the social, 
economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of their communities, taking a 
sustainable development approach.” 
 
The key issue here is the provision for a sustainable development approach (as 
compared to the promotion of sustainable management in the RMA), and the explicit 
inclusion of four ‘well-beings’: social, economic, environmental, and cultural. 
Balancing ‘well-beings’ is of course central to the trade-offs inherent in IWM, as 
already discussed. Further, the inclusion of economic or business interests does not 
typically enhance the sustainability of freshwater outcomes (Scrase & Sheate, 2002). 
However, the Local Government Act 2002, and its required structures and time-
frames for policy and/or plan development between District and Regional Councils 
for the development and reporting of Long-Term Community Council Plans ("Local 
Government Act," 2002 Part 6, s. 93) has achieved some potentially significant 
changes to perspectives and processes. Key amongst these are the unavoidable need to 
coordinate district and regional planning, and the potential for Regional Councils to 
contribute to the shaping of future land uses and intensities, as identified in the 
District Plans. Indeed, it has been lately noted that ”the drive to tie the Regional 
Policy Statements more tightly in to local plans and management could have far-
reaching consequences, perhaps even to the point of enabling the RMA to deliver 
fully integrated resource management” (Beyond the RMA, Beyond the RMA, 2007, p. 
18). However, it is also interesting to note that Local Government Act (2002) retains 
the use of the term ‘consultation’, rather than ‘collaboration’.  
 
The RMA amendments, 2003: The principle of subsidiarity, and the precautionary 
principle, are both provided for in the RMA and its amendments of 2003. The 
application of the precautionary principle has, however, been remarkably slow in the 
area of freshwater. One reason for this is the effects-based approach, coupled with 
inadequate data and monitoring (MfE, 2007; OECD, 2007). As I will show in the 
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 following subsection, this means that even where an attempt to set limits is made, the 
effects cannot be measured accurately enough to support the refusal of a water 
resource application. This is not addressing cumulative effects. 
 
The RMA amendments, 2005: In the face of increasing conflict, and calls to central 
government for guidance, the perception that allocation between uses was not a 
function of the regional councils was corrected with the RMA amendments of 2005. 
These were aimed at improving freshwater governance practices in New Zealand in 
several ways, but particularly with reference to the authority of Regional Councils to 
allocate freshwater benefits between uses, and with respect to the dire need for 
leadership. The 2005 amendments, (30 (i), (fa), (fb), subsection 30 (4)) state that 
“rules in Regional Plans may allocate the resource among competing types of 
‘activities’”.  
 
For the purposes of this evaluation, these are the key legislative changes introduced to 
New Zealand during the RMA cycle to address the emerging institutional void. They 
have dealt with issues of: leadership; local (regional and district) development of 
medium and long-term visions, and; Regional Council authority to allocate freshwater 
benefits, particularly between competing ’activities’. As I have already noted in 
section 7.2, the Environment Minister is tasked with the investigation of methods of 
allocation, including the use of economic instruments. It is therefore important to 
remember that the prevalent allocation approach of first in first served, as I will 
discuss in the following section, is not mandatory. It is merely inherited, and 
reflective of the institutional inertia that has surrounded the implementation of the 
RMA. 
 
7.4.3.2 Key Legal Rulings 
The ‘Balancing Act’ (the RMA1991) followed the ‘wise use’ approach of the 
preceding 1967/81 legislation. Judicial feathers were ruffled at the idea of 
subservience to an environmental ‘dictator’ (Skelton, 2008; Research interviews), 
many of whose properties, processes, and principles of management were (and in 
some cases remain) poorly understood or hotly debated, or both (see, for example, 
Creech et al., 2010). The cases reviewed below are key examples of this decision-
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 making confusion. In the already noted absence of any direction from central 
government, the absent or poor quality regional plans, and the lack of political will to 
remedy this, it was inevitable that the ‘policy and political lacuna’ (Skelton & 
Memon, 2002) present under the RMA would be filled by the courts. There are three 
legal rulings that have been particularly detrimental to the sustainability intentions of 
the RMA. These have re-enforced perverse IWM outcomes in various facets of the 
problem of allocation of costs and benefits between competing uses and users. They 
relate specifically to: firstly, the process of allocation as ‘first in first served’; 
secondly, security of tenure in water resource permits that brings them closer to de 
facto property rights, and; thirdly, the failure to invoke the precautionary principle as 
provided for in the Act’s 2003 amendments, due to technical shortcomings in the 
demonstration of cumulative effects. These are briefly introduced in order below.  
 
The first is the ruling in the case of Fleetwing Farms v Marlborough District Council 
in 19975. This was the ruling that opened the ‘floodgates’ to the ‘gold-rush’ of 
freshwater resource consent applications, and reified the ‘first–in-first-served’ 
approach to allocation, albeit in terms of the first correctly completed application 
received. Unfortunately, while arguably a socially equitable approach since anyone 
may apply as their need arises, first-in-line-first-in-right is also arguably neither 
economically effective, nor an allocation method that works well under scarcity, or 
under strategic planning constraints for cumulative effects ("Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy," 2009; Creech et al., 2010; MfE, 2009b).  
 
Tenure of freshwater consents as de facto private property rights is highlighted by the 
case of Aoraki Water Trust vs Meridian Energy Ltd, heard in the High Court in 2005. 
Here, the ruling states that consent holders have the right to expect that their 
allocation will be durable enough to justify capital investment for long-term pay-back, 
for instance. Essentially, this ruling exacerbates the conflict between the public 
property designation of freshwater as part of what is called in New Zealand the Crown 
Estate, and the private property nature of the consents to use, and generate private 
economic benefit from, water. The issue here is not that tenure of consents should not 
be supported. Indeed, tenure is critical to capital investment. However, this ruling 
                                                 
5 ("Fleetwing Farms v Marlborough District Council (3 NZLR 257 (CA))," 1997) 
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 gives support to the increasing misalignment between extant rights (particularly with 
respect to Maori customary rights, for instance), and emerging, increasingly de facto 
private ones. This remains to be properly addressed, and is central to the current 
problemshed.  
 
The final legal ruling of particular relevance to this study comes from the 
Environment Court decision regarding the Lynton Dairies appeal over its unsuccessful 
application for water from Environment Canterbury ("Lynton Dairies v Canterbury 
Regional Council, Decision No. C108/2005," 2005). This case considered the issue of 
cumulative effects. The Regional Council had declined Lynton’s application for water 
on the grounds that the resource was already fully allocated. However, the Court ruled 
that the Council could not prove cumulative effects, because of a measurement issue. 
The problem was that the Court required proof to within 2% of total flow, and the 
management data cannot discern below 5%. Cumulative effects in these contexts 
cannot, therefore, currently be legally proved in New Zealand. Unfortunate as this 
decision was for the freshwater resource systems, it was pivotal in bringing the long-
ignored issues of definition of cumulative effects, and strategic planning for them, to 
the forefront of the freshwater policy debate.  
 
7.4.3.3 Informal Social Action to Address the Institutional Void 
It is important to remember that while formal legislation is critical to IWM, so are 
informal actions, contestations, and/or agreements, which can sometimes wield more 
influence than formal approaches. One prime example of informal, non-government 
organisation attempts to highlight and rectify the growing institutional void in New 
Zealand’s freshwater governance, is the Fish and Game New Zealand ‘Dirty Dairy’ 
campaign that was run in 2001 (Dirty Dairying, 2001). This campaign addressed the 
levels of pollution in streams from livestock. This was followed two years later by the 
Dairy and Clean Streams Accord (MfE, 2003), and agreements on the exclusion of 
stock from surface waters, and the fencing of riparian strips. Outcomes of this effort 
were arguably mixed. Certainly, there is greater public awareness of the issue now, 
and better riparian fencing and stock control, but the campaign was seen by many 
farmers as unhelpful and created a significant amount of resentment against Fish and 
Game (Fish and Game Respondent, Research Interviews, 2008; Davies et al., 2007).  
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This subsection has described key examples of legislation, legal rulings, and informal 
action, which reflect the unsustainable trajectory of cumulative patterns of use 
through identification of the perceived areas of institutional shortfall. The remaining 
sections discuss the role of the identified institutional arrangements in RMA outcomes 
at the national scale, and draw some conclusions regarding the fulfilment or otherwise 
of the RMA’s intentions.  
 
7.5 Discussion and Concluding Comments 
This chapter has interrogated the key intentions of the RMA, and the IWM outcomes 
of the RMA cycle at the national-scale (including an emergent polycentric IWM 
problemshed). It has examined the main aspects of the coupled institutional void and 
emerging patterns of unsustainable interaction, through consideration of selected 
legislation and legal rulings. These were used as indicators of real or perceived 
weaknesses within the RMA’s performance ‘on the ground’, with respect to 
freshwater. Based on the above analysis, this section will now consider the extent to 
which the study findings support or contradict the theoretical expectations described 
in Chapters Four and Five. 
 
The institutional gaps and unsustainable trajectory of patterns of freshwater use 
described above could have been adequately addressed under the RMA, and indeed, 
arguably some regions, such as Otago and Manawatu-Wanganui (Horizons), may 
have done so (Davis & Threlfall, 2006; Hooper, 2006). Why was the Act not 
implemented more widely with respect to its sustainability intention? In this chapter, I 
have argued that the ongoing central government reluctance to involve itself with 
decision-making in respect to setting limits to freshwater use and freshwater 
allocation, combined with increasing economic value and competition for resources, 
has generated a ‘gold-rush’ for consents. Freshwater resource consents have come to 
represent an opportunity for private financial gain from increasingly scarce, and 
therefore correspondingly valuable, public property.  
 
The specified purpose of the RMA is to promote sustainable management. It could 
have done this on the national scale, but the combination of relatively generous 
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 system limits at the national level, a neo-liberal agenda, and a remarkable absence of 
‘constitutional will’ has meant that what it has promoted instead is a trajectory of 
freshwater overshoot. From Jones (2002), this is the tenet of intended rationality, or 
implementation gap. In particular, unsustainable IWM freshwater outcomes from the 
RMA have been largely driven by the combination of a neoliberal agenda and a heavy 
national-scale dependence upon primary production: agriculture, particularly 
irrigation and dairy farming which has been intensified, and extended into dry-land 
areas, such as the Canterbury Plains. The increased generation of hydroelectricity is 
also high on the agenda, with hydroelectricity already contributing 56% of New 
Zealand’s electricity. New Zealand must finally close its freshwater quantity frontier: 
the quality frontier was arguably reached with the 1967 Water & Soil Conservation 
Act, discussed in greater detail in Chapter Nine. However, as already noted, over forty 
years later the ‘swimmability’, or suitability for contact recreation, remains a central 
concern (MfE, 2008).The Manawatu River in North Island, for example, was cited as 
one of the most heavily polluted rivers in the Western World in November 2009, 
rating 107 on a scale where 0-4 is regarded as ‘healthy’. A national-scale vision, and 
national-scale limits to freshwater system use are long overdue, the Water 
Conservation Orders notwithstanding, and the freshwater sustainability overshoot that 
has occurred in the meantime will be difficult and expensive to remediate.  
 
Current contestations are based on issues of property rights to freshwater system 
benefits. This was a clear issue in the brief to the RMLR group in 1984, and therefore 
it is arguable that this approach to allocation was ignored in the perspective of plenty, 
along with the economic approaches to allocation that are available but have remained 
largely unused. However, current debates are not about the reliable provision of 
potable supplies as such. Given the per capita availability of freshwater and the 
physical infrastructure available for its storage and transport, this issue has essentially 
been settled. Debates are now about how to spend the country’s ‘disposable 
freshwater income’, and have become a contestation between and across a wide 
continuum of Maori and Pakeha environmental perspectives: intensive agriculture 
(especially dairy and associated irrigation); rural and urban values; hydro-electricity 
generation; ecological values, and in-stream uses including, inter alia, spiritual, 
aesthetic and biodiversity values, fisheries, tourism, and recreation. This is now an 
extremely wicked constitutional-choice level contestation between cultures, 
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 worldviews, markets, abstractive and in-stream property rights, and ultimately, 
conflicting social appreciations.  
 
On the other hand, some IWM institutions in New Zealand have proved themselves 
both robust, enduring, and a route to informal collaborative progress in decision-
making (I will discuss this aspect in greater detail in the following Chapter Eight). As 
already noted, Water Conservation Orders were inherited from the 1981 ‘Wild and 
Scenic Rivers’ amendment to the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act. However, 
also as already noted, these are now under threat from the ‘streamlining’ of the RMA, 
and the governing National Party coalition’s determination to enable further 
economically-driven freshwater systems development through water storage and 
irrigation (Key, 2010b). 
 
There is also an argument for the further devolution of decision-making authority as 
part of a more boundedly rational approach to freshwater governance, particularly in 
emerging polycentric situations. Further devolution to Maori management under s. 33 
of the RMA is possible, although this has not been widely employed. On the other 
hand, as already noted, the ‘neo-Polynesian’ (J. Williams, 2007) demographic in New 
Zealand is showing very rapid growth, and the Tainui (local Iwi) co-management of 
the Waikato River, and the implications of their claims to the river as summarised in 
their submission to the Proposed National Water Policy Statement (MfE, 2008), may 
become much more common-place in the future. Alternatively, degrees of self-
governance may be awarded to designated community groups, as is happening in 
South Canterbury, with the Opuha Water Partnership (www.scfis.co.nz) 
(Gunningham, 2008; Lange et al., 2008), and with the catchment-based Canterbury 
Water Management Strategy announced in 2009 (www.canterburywater.org.nz), now 
potentially undermined by the Creech report (Creech et al., 2010), and current central 
government ambitions. These will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapters.  
 
The RMA is thus identified in this chapter as a symbolic policy in terms of 
freshwater. It has not been implemented as intended with respect to its sustainability 
intentions for freshwater, and this has led to an institutional void Figure 17. The new 
political space associated with this void has been identified as a polycentric IWM 
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 problemshed. The problematic institutional arrangements were identified as relating to 
the interacting and interdependent social aspects of: markets in the form of the 
neoliberal agenda and global dairy boom; property rights tensions, and judicial 
decisions on matters of cumulative effects, allocation, and tenure and; competing 
and/or conflicting world-views and cosmologies, dominant amongst which remains 
the ‘pioneer’ perspective of plenty for exploitation. Yet in spite of the ongoing 
accretion of institutions, vital national policy statements or guidelines to limits of use 
have remained absent, although these are finally being discussed.  
 
This is clearly a hugely complex issue with no ‘right’ answers, approaches, or scales 
for governance, although plenty of ‘wrong’ ones, and a great many very wicked 
challenges to be worked through. These will have to include firstly, methods of 
allocation. These will always be less important than the setting of allocation limits. 
Setting of limits is ostensibly an objective exercise, but is in reality the most difficult, 
normative, constitutional-choice level choice level challenge, yet to be faced by New 
Zealand’s central government decision-makers. Once limits are set and accepted, 
methods of allocation will eventually resolve themselves. However, the fact that these 
limits remain to be drawn supports the theory that in spite of the RMA sustainability 
intentions, New Zealand has yet to make its social sustainability transformation with 
respect to its freshwater systems. I will return to this subject in Chapter Nine.  
 
Secondly, issues of compensation will need to be addressed. Maori and the Treaty 
Settlement Process are still working through the Maori reparation negotiations, and 
until these can be settled with respect to freshwater, little real progress is likely to be 
made in the crafting of property rights or allocation methods. Further, while eminently 
understandable, increasingly vocal Maori calls for separate systems of self-
governance of their customary resources usage (Tipa & Welch, 2006; J. Williams, 
2006, 2007) would appear to present significant challenges for implementation alone, 
never mind social cohesion. Along with issues of freshwater property rights and 
compensation being negotiated by Maori, the question of potential compensation for 
dairy and associated irrigation agriculture also arises. These industries are ultimately 
no more to blame for the extant freshwater allocation approaches, or the allocation 
overshoot, than anyone else. Moreover, memories in farming are as long as those of 
any other ‘injured’ party, and the way in which the industry and its individual 
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 members were exposed to economic hardship during and immediately after the free-
market neoliberal shift, is still resented by many. Further, it appears highly unlikely 
that the dairy industry, in its current position of strength in the country’s export 
ratings (as noted, generating 25% of national export earnings, as of 2008), would be 
willing to accept uncompensated reductions of freshwater allocation (particularly 
through review of live permits), without a passionate and vociferous struggle. 
 
Arising from the current national-scale legislative reform process instigated by the 
incoming National government, is the Land and Water Forum as noted above, which 
has now been critically undermined by the Creech et al., (2010) report on 
Environment Canterbury. As I have discussed, the Land and Water Forum is a 
collaborative system of decision-making at the national scale. It has emerged from a 
policy vacuum, a political change, an economic crisis, and changing social 
appreciations of the nation’s freshwater systems: in other words, all three of the 
precursors to a potential sustainability transformation. This is as well as the increasing 
levels of costly, legally ‘settled’ contestation and conflict, failure of ‘simple’ 
collaborations to attain their goals, an increasing Tangata Whenua influence and 
potential for future influence, and new and emerging leadership.  
 
New Zealand is effectively exporting its freshwater resources. In fact, New Zealand is 
currently surviving on the export income derived from its freshwater resources. From 
this analysis, it seems that the RMA has done almost everything that it was designed 
to do, except to promote sustainable management of the nation’s freshwater systems. 
The fault for this can hardly be said to lie with the RMA, but one conclusion I have 
reached in this chapter is in agreement with Wheen (1997): the RMA may have done 
a great deal for environmental legislation in New Zealand; it has done very little for 
water management legislation. Meanwhile the threatened Water Conservation Orders 
remain the more effective, robust, and enduring legislative approach by virtue of their 
willingness to identify and enforce limits to use. 
 
I will now present some conclusions regarding the role of institutional arrangements 
in the fulfilment or otherwise of the RMA intentions at the national scale. As 
discussed above, the particular focus for this analysis has been on the role of 
institutional arrangements in the individual selection of action strategies for resource 
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 benefit use (i.e., the dominant perspectives/social appreciation of freshwater systems), 
and the emerging unsustainable trajectory of cumulative patterns of use that have 
triggered the current period of institutional renegotiation. This is particularly focused 
on the necessary renegotiation of property rights, and the reconsideration of 
constitutional-choice level perspectives.  
 
7.5.1 Key Chapter Findings 
The evaluation as reported above has generated the following key findings: 
• As predicted in Chapter Five, the RMA is here identified as a symbolic policy 
- ‘a good Act not implemented’.  
• Arising from a cognitive blindness of freshwater system limitations (the 
pioneer perspective of plenty), New Zealand has become increasingly locked in to 
agriculture and export markets for primary produce, particularly milk powder.  
• Successive central Governments have been unwilling to be seen as restricting 
personal freedoms: sustainable management has not been ‘politically expedient’.  
• This situation has been exacerbated by damaging, or contrary, Environment 
Court rulings, whereby the mechanisms through which the unsustainable freshwater 
trajectory has emerged were reified instead of corrected.  
• The first in first served allocation approach is no longer appropriate for the 
New Zealand conditions, while the ongoing accumulation of new, corrective 
legislation and rulings arguably demonstrates increasing system brittleness. However, 
major re-structuring will be hampered by remaining uncertainty over the outcomes of 
ongoing Treaty of Waitangi settlement processes.  
 
In summary, it is clear that the wider institutional arrangements present in New 
Zealand have exerted a strongly detrimental influence in relation to the sustainability 
intentions of the RMA. As I have discussed, this has been as much through sins of 
omission as it has been through sins of commission, although this situation may now 
change very rapidly. This chapter has particularly highlighted the role of institutional 
arrangements related to the broad themes of social freshwater appreciations 
(particularly in respect of the perspective of plenty and the unwillingness to define 
limits to use), competing cosmologies, and increasingly misaligned systems of 
property rights. Further, it has indicated some areas where the recent report on 
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 Canterbury freshwater management (Creech et al., 2010) will undermine what might 
have been a genuine opportunity for a social sustainability transformation, and real 
decision-making progress, in the shape of the Land and Water Forum.  
 
One reason for the RMA failure is clearly the combination of the wider neoliberal 
agenda, coupled with the absence of national-scale vision, and clear limits to 
freshwater system use. Another is that there was no political will (or recognition of 
need) to draw limits over the next two decades. But why did the country choose the 
free market neoliberal approach? Why were there no limits already drawn? And why, 
given the stated purpose of the Act, was there still no will to draw them? I will return 
to these questions in Chapter Nine, where I will analyse the origins of the problematic 
institutional arrangements identified in this chapter. Before that, the following 
Chapter Eight refocuses the evaluative framework to consider the regional/local scale 
exemplar, Canterbury Region, and Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora. 
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8 An Evaluation of the Role of Institutional 
Arrangements in IWM Outcomes for Canterbury 
Region and Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, 1991-2009  
8.1 Introduction and Chapter Overview 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that through the detrimental influence of 
problematic institutional arrangements on national-scale front-loop IWM processes in 
New Zealand, the RMA has become a symbolic policy with respect to its 
sustainability intentions.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to build upon the findings of Chapter Seven, through 
evaluation of the role of these problematic institutional arrangements in IWM 
outcomes of coupled regional and local scale IWM processes. The purposively 
selected region for this study is Canterbury, on the east coast of South Island, (Figure 
24). The local-scale IWM exemplar, also purposively selected, is Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere. This is a lowland lake at the foot of the Canterbury Plains, and the Selwyn 
River catchment (Figure 25). The Banks Peninsula ‘bump’ that protrudes from the 
east coast of Canterbury, makes a useful point of reference across the two 
geographical scales represented. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: North and South Islands, and Canterbury Region, New Zealand (DeptofConservation, 
2010) 
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Figure 25: Positioning Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere within Selwyn District Council boundaries. 
Source: Selwyn District Council website, (www.selwyn.govt.nz accessed 26th Feb 2010). 
 
Because the focus of this chapter is on the role of broader institutional arrangements 
in the coupled regional and local front-loop elements of IWM processes, the 
evaluative framework metaphor for this chapter includes both scales of IWM process, 
as shown in bold in Figure 26.  
 
Figure 26: Representing Front-Loop Regional/Local-Scale RMA Processes for Evaluation 
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As in Chapter Seven, this chapter addresses two main questions in the attainment of 
its aim: 
1) Which (if any), of the broader institutional arrangements discussed in the 
previous chapter, are identified by the study respondents, and supported by secondary 
data, as having influenced the outcomes of the RMA for Canterbury, and Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere?  
2) In particular, how have any broader institutional arrangements identified, 
influenced the front-loop elements of IWM and institutional change processes in these 
SESs? In other words, what have been the mechanics of their role in the compromise 
or support of the RMA’s intentions, with respect to freshwater?  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will address the two research questions as follows. 
The national-scale contextual factors having already been analysed in the foregoing 
chapter, in section 8.2.1 I will characterise in broad terms the key internal contextual 
factors to IWM under the RMA in Canterbury Region, and for Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere. These are: the freshwater resources and their markets; the regional and 
local-scale devolution of decision-making authority and sustainability intentions of 
the RMA, and; prominent user-group appreciations of the resource. Then, in 
subsection 8.3 I will consider the IWM outcomes of the RMA for these two SESs.  
 
Following this, in subsection 8.4 I will consider the regional and local expressions of 
the problematic institutional arrangements identified in the previous chapter, and their 
roles in the multi-scale front-loop elements of the IWM processes. Thus, in subsection 
8.4.2 I will analyse their role in shaping the emergent, multi-scale operational rules in 
use; and in subsection 8.4.3, I will address the emerging patterns of use and 
institutional voids. In section 8.5, I will reflect upon the extent to which the study 
findings support or contradict the theoretical perspective of IWM and institutional 
processes of complex adaptive change, as explained in Chapters Four and Five. In this 
section, I will also present some concluding comments on the role of institutional 
arrangements in RMA outcomes for the coupled Canterbury, and Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere, SESs.  
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The evaluative frameworks employed in this chapter are shown in Figures 27, 28, and 
29 following. Figure 27 outlines the key findings of the RMA process as analysed for 
Canterbury. Figure 28 outlines the key findings of the RMA process as analysed for 
Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, and Figure 29 reports on all three associated complex 
adaptive processes of interest to this study, in both scales of SES.  
8.2 Evaluation Results: Multi-Scale Internal Contextual 
Factors 
 
  
 
Figure 27: Evaluating the Role of Institutional Arrangements in IWM Outcomes in Canterbury 1991-2009 
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Figure 28: Evaluating the Role of Institutional Arrangements in IWM Outcomes for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 1991-2009 
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 Back Loop 1991 Front Loop Back Loop 2009 
Complex 
Adaptive Change 
System re-organisation (α) Exploitation (r) System growth (K) System collapse/disturbance 
(Ω) 
System re-
organisation (α) 
Canterbury IWM No capacity building from 
central government during 
RMA roll-out.  
Inherited bad feeling between 
ECan and Territorial 
Authorities.  
Cognitive blindness of the 
need for freshwater planning. 
Perception of ‘plenty’, poor 
resource consent decisions 
regarding volume and duration 
in the 1990s.  
Key Problematic Institutional 
Arrangements identified: 
Tension between predominant 
and competing worldviews and 
cosmologies; Conflicting 
property rights domains; Market 
forces in a neoliberal paradigm; 
first in first served allocation; 
Legal decisions.  
National dairy boom, ‘cheap’ 
land, and ‘available’ water 
drives overshoot. Increased 
social resistance to progressive 
loss of public benefits for 
private gain. 
Increasing abstractive and 
assimilative pressures on 
the resource from urban 
and rural land-use 
intensification.  
Dairy herd expanded by 
60% 2002 -2008.  
 
Impressive performance 
by ECan after 2003, but 
undermined by the 
Environment Court. 
The Mayoral Forum 
complaints to central 
government, Sept 2009;  
The launch of the CWMS in 
Nov 2009;  
Investigation into ECan 
performance, Nov 2009;  
Prime Minister speaks of 
‘removing regulatory 
roadblocks’ to increased water 
storage, irrigation and dairy in 
Canterbury, 18th Feb 2010; 
Creech report (Creech et al.,  
19th Feb 2010).  
Proposed ‘sacking’ of 
the Regional Council, 
to be replaced with an 
appointed Canterbury 
Regional Water 
Authority.  
 
 
Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere IWM 
The lake has been in ‘crisis’ 
for at least four decades, since 
the Wahine Storm. However, 
lake water quality and quantity 
declined sharply during late 
1990s, as inflows were 
reduced. 
Lake increasingly valued for 
multiple uses, including 
Mahinga Kkai, biodiversity 
commercial fishery, recreation. 
Increasing public support 
for better lake 
management, through 
WET; Living Streams 
programme.  
Here the system disturbance 
may be linked to improved 
outcomes for the lake.  
 Unknown. 
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Canterbury 
Institutional 
Change 
New rules for IWM, but 
regional plans not 
mandatory. 
 
Water Conservation Orders 
for the Rakaia and Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere. 
ECan did not undertake 
freshwater planning early on, 
and were unwilling to decline 
water consents.  
 
Natural Resources Regional 
Plan not produced until 2004. 
As cumulative effects 
reached overshoot, 
attempts to constrain them 
by ECan were resisted by 
applicants (typically rural 
development interests), 
and undermined by legal 
decisions. 
The system disturbance 
represented by the Canterbury 
Water Management Strategy 
was a positive one. However, 
the investigation into ECan 
performance by Creech et al., 
has seriously undermined the 
potential for success. 
Unclear at this time, but 
the challenge to elected 
decision-makers is 
critical. Polycentric IWM 
problemshed 
characteristics are 
identified. 
Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere 
Institutional 
Change 
Granting of Water 
Conservation Order in 
1990. 
New RMA structures and 
decision-making processes. 
Effectively no rules beyond 
the WCO, until 2004 and the 
Natural Resources Regional 
Plan. Ngai Tahu awarded part 
of Lake bed in 1998 in partial 
settlement of Treaty Claims. 
Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere increasingly 
used as a catchment ‘sink’ 
to its detriment, and loss 
of other values. 
The Statutory Agencies Group 
is formed to address the 
Resource Consent issues 
pertaining to lake openings 
under the WCO. 
Polycentric IWM 
problemshed 
characteristics identified.  
     
Canterbury Social 
Freshwater 
Sustainability 
Transformation 
Previous failure to undergo 
social sustainability 
transformation. 
Preparation: exploring new technologies for resource 
exploitation; experiencing detrimental effects of 
overshoot; learning. 
Window of opportunity open: 
freshwater ‘crisis’; political and 
economic change; social 
learning.  
Transformation now 
unlikely during this 
cycle. 
Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere Social 
Freshwater 
Sustainability 
Transformation 
Previous failure to undergo 
social sustainability 
transformation. 
Preparation: exploring new technologies for resource 
exploitation; experiencing detrimental effects of overshoot; 
learning. 
Window of opportunity: 
ecological crisis, social change, 
political or economic 
disturbance. 
Sustainability 
transformation possible 
for lake and immediate 
surrounds: Up-catchment 
influence remains 
potentially problematic. 
Figure 29: IWM Processes of Complex Adaptive Change in Canterbury and for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, 1991-2009   
 8.2.1 Characteristics of Freshwater Resources in Canterbury 
Chapter Seven has provided the national-scale analysis of the role of institutional 
arrangements in RMA outcomes. Thus, the previous chapter has also described the external 
contextual factors for this evaluation in terms of cosmologies, worldviews, markets, higher-
scale legislation etc. In this section, I will briefly describe the internal SES contextual factors 
to IWM in Canterbury, and for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere. These are shown in bold in 
Figure 30. As is already widely understood in environmental management, land and water 
resources should be primarily considered as a coupled system. Therefore, in this section I will 
briefly characterise the main freshwater systems in Canterbury, along with their environments 
and uses. 
 
Figure 30: Representing Multi-Scale Internal Contextual Factors for Evaluation 
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Canterbury is New Zealand’s largest region. It covers 45,239km2, encompassing a wide range 
of landscapes and freshwater systems. The region is hydrologically complex as it drains from 
‘Mountains to Sea’, with a large number of identified catchment groups (Figure 31). 
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Figure 31: Catchment Groups in Canterbury Region (ECan, 2010a)  
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 Landscapes in Canterbury range from the iconic Aoraki Mount Cook, Lakes Tekapo and 
Pukaki, and the Mackenzie Basin High Country in the South; the Canterbury Plains, Te 
Waihora/lake Ellesmere and the City of Christchurch in Central Canterbury; and; the 
geothermal hot springs at Hanmer, and the Kaikoura Coastline to the North (ECan, 2009a). 
The region includes approximately 70% of New Zealand’s irrigated land area (with the 
potential to double that) consuming approximately 55% of the country’s total allocated 
freshwater: Canterbury’s dairy herd is now the second largest of any region in the country, 
having increased by 60% between 2002 and 2008. The region also provides 65% of the 
nation’s hydro storage, generating almost 25% of the country’s hydro-electricity, and has a 
burgeoning wine industry. These factors obviously make the region highly significant from a 
national economic perspective (Creech et al., 2010; Dalziel & Saunders, 2009; Jenkins, 2006; 
Sage, 2008).  
 
New Zealand’s weather is famously unpredictable, but over the last two decades, the 
disparities between dry and wet areas have increased significantly (NIWA, 2008). This is of 
particular concern to the dry-land areas such as the Canterbury Plains, where the climate has 
become drier. Yet during the same period, the dairy industry and associated hectares of 
irrigated land have generated a ‘quantum’ (Memon & Weber, 2008) rate of increase in 
abstractive freshwater use, leading to over allocation of some groundwater resources and 
depleted lowland stream-flows and quality ("Canterbury Water Management Strategy," 2009; 
Creech et al., 2010; Hughey & Taylor, 2009; Jenkins, 2006).  
 
8.2.1.1 Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
Te Waihora has been selected for this case study for several reasons. As a lowland lake at the 
coast of a highly modified catchment, it contains many of the wicked challenges to, and trade-
offs inherent within, IWM, as described in the foregoing chapters. Declared ‘dead’ by 
Jeantette Fitzimmons of the Green Party in 2005, Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere and the Selwyn 
catchment are excellent examples of IWM challenges. The Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
catchment is approximately a quarter of a million hectares in area, and because of the 
hydrogeology and unconfined aquifers present beneath the Canterbury Plains, it runs from the 
Waimakariri in the north to the Rakaia in the south. These are two internationally recognised 
examples of braided river systems, with the Selwyn as the main lowland river in between 
(Department of Conservation, www.doc.govt.nz; ECan, www.ecan.govt.nz both accessed 27th 
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 Feb 2010). Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere itself is New Zealand’s fifth largest lake by area, 
being a brackish ‘bar lagoon’ of roughly 20,000 – 30,000 ha depending on depth. Depth is 
managed at between 1.1 – 1.3m depending on the time of year. When given depth triggers are 
reached, the lake is opened to the sea at Taumutu in order to prevent flooding. This is a 
remarkable sight. Since the early 2000s, lake openings have dropped in number from five to 
two or three openings annually, and it is suggested that this is related in particular to the 
combination of reduced rainfall on the Plains in recent years, and over allocation of the 
Selwyn-Rakaia groundwater zones up-catchment (Hughey & Taylor, 2009).  
 
From a conservation perspective, Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere is of “outstanding national and 
international importance for wildlife. Over 150 species of birds have been recorded here, 
including 133 indigenous species” (Department of Conservation, www.doc.govt.nz accessed 
2nd March 2010). Further, it is one of New Zealand's “most important wetland systems and 
one of Canterbury's most treasured biodiversity sites” (ibid). Although lake health, and the 
wellbeing of many dependent ecological communities, has improved significantly since 1995, 
the lake water quality remains low, and the lake is now also subject to potentially lethal algal 
blooms (ECan, www.ecan.govt.nz accessed 24  Feb 2010).th
 
8.2.2 The Intentions of the RMA for Regional Freshwater Governance 
The RMA has been characterised as an environmental effects-based, cooperative, facilitative 
planning mandate for regional-scale integrated environmental management (Ericksen et al., 
2003; Memon, 1993; Memon & Gleeson, 1995). The Regional Policy Statement is “…one of 
the most important instruments for achieving the Act’s purpose…an important vehicle for 
articulating the regional interpretation of the legislation” (Burton and Cocklin, 1996, p89), 
and “…highlights the significance of policy formulation as a means for making decisions 
within the public sector” (Memon and Gleeson, 1995, p114). In New Zealand, Regional 
Councils were neither envisaged, nor authorised, as regulatory bodies that implement 
nationally developed IWM policy and plans, as in the USA, for example. Indeed, as already 
noted, after two decades under the RMA there are none yet to implement, although a National 
Policy Statement has been proposed (MfE, 2008), and the Board of Enquiry’s 
recommendations on this document have very recently been made to the Minister (Jan 2010).  
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 Nonetheless, the RMA acknowledged that there would be resource management issues arising 
in the future, which because of their national implications, might require central government 
decision-making to address. Thus, the Minister for the Environment holds the right to ‘call in’ 
any such resource management issue for further consideration at the national scale, e.g., the 
current ‘call in’ of three large dairy proposals for the Mackenzie Basin in Canterbury. This 
has already been noted in Chapter Seven, and will be considered greater depth in following 
sections.  
 
The RMA’s regional and district intentions as they pertain to this study were to create a 
hierarchy of locally elected regional- and district–scale councils, which would promote 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources through integrated management. 
Section 30 of the RMA lays out the functions, powers and duties of regional authorities. 
Regional authorities are required to give effect to the purpose of the Act by “the 
establishment, implementation, and review of objectives, policies, and methods to achieve 
integrated management of the natural and physical resources of the region” (RMA 1991, 
s1(a)). As noted above, the key to this system is the regional plan. Unfortunately, while 
Regional Policy Statements and Coastal Plans are mandatory, the RMA chose to leave the 
Regional Natural Resources Plans as voluntary. Public representation in Regional Councils is 
through locally elected council members from constituencies within the region, which do not 
necessarily coincide with other (e.g., district) boundaries. In Canterbury, there are eight 
constituencies (four representing Christchurch), electing fourteen councillors on a three-year 
electoral cycle (ECan, 2007). Regional Council constituencies for Canterbury are shown in 
Figure 32, as re-drawn in 2007 under the Local Government Act (2002) requirements for 
equitable levels of public representation. Almost inevitably, these changes were strongly 
contested by some District Councils who felt that they had lost ‘turf’ ("Minutes of the 
Ordinary Meeting of the Waimate District Council, 15th August," 2006; Waimakriri District 
Council Agenda, 5th Nov 2006). 
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Figure 32: Regional Council Constituencies, Canterbury 2007 (ECan, 2007). 
 
The RMA also divided the focus of ‘local’ governance between the Regional and District 
Councils. The intention was that the District Councils, being more closely involved with 
economic development, would make decisions regarding land-use, while the regional councils 
would address the potential environmental effects of that land-use. However, two main issues 
arise. The first is that district boundaries were not always drawn to coincide with catchment 
boundaries (e.g., Selwyn District in Canterbury which only contains part of the Rakaia 
catchment), and districts often retained their historical river boundaries. This makes good 
social sense, but is contra-indicated in IWM, and inevitably complicates management issues 
considerably. Secondly, ongoing District Council resentment of Regional Councils, and 
resistance to regulation and resulting constraints on ‘individual’ freedoms from many District 
Councils (also called Territorial Authorities), has proved a significant institutional gap in the 
RMA. This has been a particularly problematic barrier to sustainable freshwater outcomes in 
New Zealand generally, but particularly in Canterbury, as I will discuss in later sections. 
There are ten districts in Canterbury, as shown in Figure 33.  
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Figure 33: District Councils within Canterbury Region (ECan www.ecan.govt.nz accessed 26th Feb 2010. 
 
These, then, were the broad sustainability intentions of the RMA as they applied to the 
hierarchical structure of decision-making in regions and districts. Unfortunately, this 
integrated decision-making intention has not yet been realised in Canterbury, to the general 
detriment of the freshwater resources. 
 
8.2.3 Competing Cosmologies and Worldviews 
As noted in Chapter Seven, there is a fundamental difference between the Maori and Pakeha 
cosmologies. Beyond this, there is also increasing competition between urban and rural 
appreciations of freshwater systems, and between hydro-electricity, dairy and agribusiness, 
biodiversity, and recreational perspectives, broadly representing the range of worldviews 
across the conservation – development continuum. However, there appears to have been a 
significant shift in social appreciations of the instream values of freshwater systems in 
Canterbury over the last ten years, although this may not yet represent a sufficient 
‘groundswell’ to tip the enduring balance of rural development influence in this IWM cycle.  
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 8.2.3.1 Ngai Tahu in Canterbury, and at Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
Ngai Tahu are the Tangata Whenua Iwi in Canterbury, and indeed, across most of the South 
Island (Figure 34). The distribution of Ngai Tahu Rünanga (councils) across south Island is 
shown in Figure 34.  
 
Figure 34: Ngai Tahu Runanga Map (NgaiTahu, 2010). 
 
At the time of the introduction of the RMA, Ngai Tahu were still fighting their case for 
reparation of their historical grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi. After one hundred and 
fifty years of struggle, Ngai Tahu were finally granted ownership of part of the lake bed in 
1998, as partial settlement through the Waitangi Tribunal settlement process. The Rünanga 
with responsibility for kaitiakitanga, or stewardship of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere is Te 
Taumutu Rünanga (the Council of Taumutu), described as: 
“The administrative council of the hapü. In this role, the Rünanga has a responsibility to 
protect the natural resources, mahinga kai, and other values of the takiwä for the benefit of 
those people of Ngäi Tahu descent who have customary interests in the area.” ("Te Taumutu 
Rünanga Natural Resource Management Plan," 2003, p. 11). 
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 Sites of particular importance to Ngai Tahu in Canterbury, as detailed in the Te Taumutu 
Rünanga Natural Resource Management Plan, 2003, are shown in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35: Ngai Tahu Runanga Map of Canterbury. Source: Te Taumutu Runanga Natural Resource 
Management Plan, 2003. 
 
 
In an example of the difference in worldviews between Maori and Pakeha, Te Taumutu 
Rünanga consider that there are three types of knowledge relevant to the management of their 
natural resources. These are:  
“Whänau based knowledge – This is the core knowledge, the stories, tikanga, history and 
spiritual knowledge that is kept within whänau and community. 
 
Hapü knowledge – This is the information and knowledge that is used by the Rünanga to 
guide interactions with the environment and other people. This kind of knowledge is primarily 
for internal use, but some of it is also shared externally. 
 
Knowledge that others need to understand – This is the information and knowledge that is 
important for others to understand, in order to meaningfully work alongside tängata whenua 
in natural resource management. ("Te Taumutu Rünanga Natural Resource Management 
Plan," 2003, p. 15). 
 
This section has briefly characterised the multi-scale contexts within which IWM in 
Canterbury and for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere has been operating, under the RMA 1991-
2009. This has included the resource systems’ key characteristics, uses, and markets: the 
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 intentions of the RMA, and; the competing cosmologies and worldviews of the user groups. 
The next section will report on the RMA outcomes for these coupled SESs. 
 
8.3 Multi-Scale RMA Outcomes for Canterbury, and Te Waihora 
/ Lake Ellesmere 
In this section, I will briefly describe the key outcomes of the RMA cycle for the resources, 
the rules, and the user-groups of Canterbury, and Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, shown in bold 
in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36: Representing Multi-Scale IWM Outcomes for Evaluation 
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8.3.1 Freshwater System Outcomes in Canterbury 
The outcomes of the RMA for Canterbury’s freshwater systems have been mixed. In general, 
the alpine and hill rivers remain relatively healthy, but lowland streams are coming under 
increasing strain from non-point source pollution and low flows from up-catchment 
abstractive overshoot ("Canterbury Water Management Strategy," 2009; Creech et al., 2010; 
Hughey & Taylor, 2009).  
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 Some water bodies have been protected by Water Conservation Orders (WCOs), for example 
the Rakaia River (1988) and Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere (1990). While the WCO on the 
Rakaia has been very successful in protecting the in-stream values of that river so far, it is 
now under threat from central government ambitions for water storage, dairy, and irrigation 
development in the region, as noted in the previous chapter. Given the ’health difficulties’ 
experienced in Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere as early as 1995, this WCO has arguably been less 
successful. However, it should be remembered that these are two quite different Orders. 
Indeed, the protection of the Rakaia’s environmental flow regime can be viewed as the 
opposite end of the spectrum from that found in the WCO for Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora, 
which is effectively a flood control measure intended to protect the wildlife habitat of the lake 
surrounds. Moreover, the resource consenting process relating to the Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere opening regime under the WCO became a key driver to the formation of the 
informal Statutory Agencies Group (SAG) in 2007. 
 
8.3.1.1 Outcomes for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
The volume of water abstracted from the Rakaia-Selwyn groundwater zone that feeds the 
lake, has increased almost five-fold since 1990 (Figure 37). The impact of increased 
abstraction up-catchment has meant that Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere has suffered from the 
combination of lower inflows and higher rates of pollution, particularly of nitrogen, and is 
subject to toxic algal blooms as noted in subsection 8.2.1.1.  
 
Figure 37: Annual Allocation Volume from Groundwater in the Rakaia-Selwyn Zone: 1990-2006. Source: 
(H. Williams, 2009) 
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On the other hand, the riparian plantings of the Living Streams Programme run by ECan: the 
education, research, and restoration work undertaken by the Waihora Ellesmere Trust; the 
implementation of the groundbreaking Joint Management Plan between Ngai Tahu and the 
Department of Conservation, and; the riparian fencing that has been undertaken through the 
Dairying and Clean Streams Accord in the Selwyn Catchment, have all contributed to the 
improved health of the lake. While Ngai Tahu Mahinga kai (customary Maori food and 
resources gathering) values are still heavily compromised (James, 1991, 1993; Te Taumutu 
Rünanga Natural Resource Management Plan," 2003; Tipa & Tierney, 2003; J. Williams, 
2007, p. 149), they are improving . Further, the recently completed review of groundwater 
consents in the over-allocated, ’red’ (i.e., over 80% allocated) Selwyn/Rakaia groundwater 
zone, should begin to show benefit in improved lowland spring flows given time.  
 
Lastly, there is a typically IWM paradox present in the current allocation difficulties facing 
the region, the Selwyn catchment, and the lake. Greater storage, and more irrigation on the 
Canterbury Plains is unlikely at this stage to improve environmental flow regimes for either 
the Rakaia or the Waimakariri rivers, from which the water will come. However, it may, quite 
by chance, result in gains to Lake in-flows, and lowland stream flows. Unfortunately, the 
question of non-point source pollution would remain, although with nutrient budgeting plans 
for farms and enhanced riparian management, this too may be addressed. Thus it comes about 
that the intensification of the dairy industry on the Canterbury Plains, if properly managed, 
may help rather than hinder the wellbeing of the Lake. This, however, was much debated by 
scientists during the Central Plains Water hearings and will likely be further debated in the 
future. 
 
8.3.2 Social Outcomes 
Social outcomes, like those for the freshwater systems in Canterbury, may be considered as 
mixed. Certainly, in some instances there has been an increase in social costs: financially (in 
fighting court cases and in foregone opportunities); between opposing development or 
conservation camps, or between Maori and Pakeha perspectives. One excellent example of 
fiercely conflicting opinions, and competing and potentially conflicting rights domains in the 
region, is that arising from the Hurunui River Water Conservation Order Application and 
process.  
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A recent (2007) WCO Application on behalf of the Hurunui River, lodged jointly by Fish and 
Game and the New Zealand Recreational Canoe Association, was only partially successful. 
Following the WCO decision to exclude the South Branch, proposals to dam it for hydro-
generation and irrigation of 42,000 ha were lodged almost immediately by the Hurunui Water 
Project. The four groups behind the project are the Hurunui Irrigation and Power Trust, the 
owner of Eskhead Station, MainPower, and Ngai Tahu Property ( Hurunui Water Project, 
www.hurunuiwater.co.nz; ECan www.ecan.govt.nz, both accessed 1st March 2010). The 
presentation made to the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry by the Hurunui Water Project 
(HurunuiWaterProject, 2008) is particularly interesting to this study. In the presentation, the 
following questions are purported to represent the local community view: “Why is the project 
so difficult? Why does so much water go out to sea? Why do fishermen and canoeists have so 
much influence when they contribute so little? Why are there so many statutory processes?” 
When compared with the high in-stream values held by other, admittedly often more 
geographically remote stakeholders such as anglers and canoeists, the potential for serious 
social conflict arising from such widely divergent worldviews and perspectives as exist in 
Canterbury becomes clearly apparent. What is also interesting to this study is the involvement 
of Ngai Tahu in the Hurunui Water Project. This supports the observation made in earlier 
sections, that notwithstanding the Maori Environmental ethic and cosmology, the tensions 
between economic development and abstractive values for freshwater, and conservation of 
less tangible in-stream values, exists within cultures as well as between them. 
 
On the other hand, there has been considerable social capital developed by ECan since the 
arrival of Bryan Jenkins, (ECan Chief Executive Officer) in 2003, and his post-regulatory, 
collaborative approach to complex, adaptive, common-pool freshwater systems governance. 
This is perhaps most apparent in the wide support for the Canterbury Water Management 
Strategy, almost ten years in the development. Further, since the publication of Creech et al. 
(2010), and that report’s recommendations to relieve the Council of its freshwater 
responsibilities, there has been strong and vocal support for the Council from a wide range of 
sources.  
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 8.3.3 Institutional Outcomes in Canterbury, and for Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere 
The institutional outcomes of the RMA under the recent post-regulatory, collaborative ECan 
approach have also been mixed. As Creech et al., (2010, p5) point out, early failures in 
planning, and in freshwater management and consenting have undoubtedly hindered progress 
towards sustainability in Canterbury. This poor performance in the 1990s raised transaction 
costs and levels of uncertainty for users, and lowered the robustness and quality of lowland 
freshwater systems in particular. However, as also noted, the turnaround in the Council and its 
approach since the appointment of Dr Jenkins has resulted in some valuable gains for the 
region’s freshwater governance rule-sets (Ibid). The Canterbury Water Management Strategy 
at the regional level, and the Statutory Agencies Group for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, are 
prime examples of this. These two approaches to decision-making for freshwater systems 
have both emerged in response to what have been identified in this study as polycentric IWM 
problemsheds, in the relevant scales of SES. The polycentric IWM challenges to both scales 
of SES are summarised in Table 10, and described below.  
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Table 10: Polycentric Challenges to IWM in Canterbury Region, and for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
 Canterbury Region Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
The locus of 
decision-making 
power has 
become unclear. 
ECan decisions undermined by Legal 
rulings; decision-making tensions between 
developers, councillors, and Commissioners; 
Ngai Tahu’s statutory standing, proposed 
transfer of decision-making power from the 
Council to an appointed not elected Regional 
Water Authority. 
Multiple systems of property rights; 
imbricated decision-making authorities at 
different scales (e.g., DoC/Ngai Tahu, 
District Councils; ECan)  
Implications of Creech et al., (2010) 
report for the lake are still unclear, but 
may affect the Statutory Agencies Group. 
There is a new 
spatiality to 
policy-making 
and politics. 
Currently four scales of management at 
ECan: regional, catchment, stream-reach, 
and individual properties. Also global 
market forces (particularly relating to dairy 
and tourism) are becoming increasingly 
influential.  
Because Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere is a 
lowland lake, land-use up-catchment is of 
critical importance.  
The standard 
view of 
participation and 
democratic 
governance may 
have to be re-
thought. 
Regional council decision-making 
constrained through councillors as elected 
representatives; questions of block allocation 
to approved authorities; the renaissance of 
Ngai Tahu; the regional-scale, multi-
catchment CWMS, and the implications for 
devolved decision-making within the 
recommendations of Creech et al., (2010). 
The renaissance of Ngai Tahu; the 
development of the Statutory Agencies 
Group; the increasingly influential role of 
the Waihora Ellesmere Trust. 
Scientific 
authority is 
undermined.  
‘Science’ has not prevented (and technology 
has in fact accelerated) overshoot in 
freshwater allocation in Canterbury; 
Insufficient monitoring and data for robust 
decision-making over cumulative effects 
(e.g., Lynton Dairies case). 
Science has not prevented (and 
technology has accelerated) the decline of 
Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere; conflict 
between competing Ngai Tahu and 
Science perspectives. 
The context of 
policy-making is 
expansive.  
Policy regarding freshwater benefits and 
their allocation impact on, for instance, 
national hydroelectric supplies, export 
earnings, local biodiversity, and Maori 
cultural wellbeing. 
Policy for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
will impact on Ngai Tahu cultural 
wellbeing, wider recreational values, 
biodiversity and wildlife values, and 
upstream land-use for example. 
 
The locus of decision-making power has become unclear: This is particularly the case for 
Canterbury Region in the wake of the recommendations from Creech et al. (2010), to replace 
elected Councillors with an appointed Canterbury Regional Water Authority. However, prior 
to that, the Canterbury Water Executive and ten water management zones proposed by the 
Canterbury Water Management Strategy had just entered implementation, and prior to that, 
the courts had presented several challenges to ECan’s consenting authority (e.g., Lynton 
Dairies v Canterbury Regional Council (ECan), as already reported. Before that, there had 
been a central government ‘call in’ for the Waitaki catchment, and a resulting Resource 
Management (Waitaki Catchment) Amendment Act, 2004, no 77, which was, and to an 
extent remains, a sorely contested issue (Creech et al., 2010 and 7th Sept, 2004; Hansard, 
2004; Pauling & Arnold, 2009). 
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In the case of Te Waihora, the Ngai Tahu Settlement of 1998, and the resulting Joint 
Management Plan with the Department of Conservation (2005), put them in a strong position 
to challenge upstream actions that may adversely impact on their ‘property’, i.e., the bed of 
the lake and lake margins, and associated Mahinga kai. As with the regional-scale SES, the 
court decisions on allocation and cumulative effects blurred the decision-making locus, and 
had adverse impacts on the Lake. Lastly, while potentially of smaller impact than at the 
regional scale, the Creech recommendation (Creech et al., 2010) to install an appointed 
Regional Water Authority, also has implications for the informal but effective Statutory 
Agencies Group, and the locus of decision-making power for Te Waihora/lake Ellesmere.  
 
There is a new spatiality to policy-making and politics: there are two different 
manifestations of this challenge at the regional scale in Canterbury. Firstly, there are now four 
geographical scales of decision-making being addressed at ECan, each with different issues. 
These are:  
Regional, where key issues are water availability and land use intensification; 
Catchment, where sustainability levels of water use and its effects, cumulative impacts of 
water use, and reliability of supply are the main issues;  
Subcatchment or stream-reach, where environmental flow requirements in river reaches and 
management of streams and riparian margins are the most important issues, and;  
Individual property level, where the land use practices that influence water quality and water 
quantity are defined. (Adapted from Jenkins, 2006, p3). 
 
Secondly, the national government’s intervention in the governance of Canterbury’s 
freshwater, particularly in light of its stated development aims, demonstrates the increasing 
influence of global markets to the country. These issues apply equally to Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere. 
 
The standard view of participation and democratic governance may have to be re-
thought:  
The more recent approach reported in the literature has been to ask how “authorities and 
stakeholders [can] reach policy agreements that serve them well? (Scholz & Stiftel, 2005, p. 
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 5/6). This has been addressed in the Canterbury and Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere SESs 
through formal and informal collaborative approaches to plan development, and the 
increasing use of self-regulation. However, where decision-makers are elected, they are in a 
difficult situation. If politicians misjudge social opinion about an issue, then they will simply 
be voted out at the next election, whether or not their views are ecologically sound. 
Particularly in New Zealand, where the regional councils are elected, this has caused some 
considerable difficulty. The life of a freshwater politician cannot be easy – after all, if ‘too 
harsh’ a line is taken, and held, then they will find themselves out of office and no longer able 
to exert any influence, as witnessed by the recent events at ECan.  
 
Scientific authority has been undermined: The challenge has now become one of 
identifying, generating, acknowledging and integrating different or competing information, or 
ways of knowing, effectively. This is particularly with respect to inadequate science for legal 
rulings on cumulative effects (Lynton Dairies v Environment Canterbury), and the Maori 
cosmological conflict with the Pakeha (‘Western’ science). This second issue is especially 
acute where the clashes involve the Maori perspective on the mixing of waters, and the Maori 
interpretation of management responsibilities which demands that the ‘essential character’ or 
essence (Mauri) of a place be retained. This is in direct contradiction to the Pakeha 
perspective of management, which includes the right to change the resource by making 
improvements (subsection 4.3.2). That said, Ngai Tahu appear to be becoming increasingly 
supportive of the Lake research undertaken by the Waihora Ellesmere Trust, for example . 
Finally, Creech et al., (2010, p26) criticise ECan (particularly resource consenting) as being 
“science led rather than science informed.  
 
The context of policy-making is expansive:  The Region’s contribution to the national 
coffers through primary production and hydroelectricity generation has already been noted. 
Furthermore, as hydrological data is gathered and the hydrology of the region is increasingly 
understood, the potentially distant implications of actions become clearer. Moreover, since the 
introduction of the Local Government Act (2002) and its requirement for the development of 
Long-Term Council Community Plans based on the ‘four well-beings’ (economic, 
environmental, social, and cultural, although this latter is not really applicable to freshwater), 
the critical nature of freshwater to all aspects of society is demonstrated, and the expansive 
context of freshwater decision-making is becoming increasingly apparent.  
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 One worrying example of polycentric challenge is the central government’s stated intention to 
reduce the volume of freshwater that reaches the sea. This aim does not yet appear to have 
been considered in terms of the potentially devastating effects that changes in salinity may 
have on fragile coastal ecosystems and ecological communities, as discussed by Hayward and 
Ward, (2009) in relation to Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, for example.  
 
Even for a lowland ‘sink’ such as Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, the context of policy-making 
has become increasingly expansive over the last two decades. This is because of the wide 
range of values and benefits that the Lake provides and that are increasingly being articulated, 
including inter alia: customary Ngai Tahu values including Mahinga kai; the internationally 
important migration stop-over and destination for birds; the commercial eel fishery, and; the 
Lake’s increasingly appreciated recreational and amenity values, recently enhanced by the 
Rail Trail, for example (Little River Rail Trail, www.littleriverrailtrail.co.nz accessed 2nd 
March 2010, also (Booth, 2009). 
 
This section has reported on the outcomes of the RMA for Canterbury, and for Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere. In the following section, I will first identify the broader institutional 
arrangements that have been implicated in the generation of these outcomes by interview 
respondents, and supported by secondary data. Then, I will analyse their role in front-loop 
elements of the multi-scale IWM processes.  
 
8.4 Institutional Arrangements and Multi-Scale Front-Loop 
Elements of IWM 
In the foregoing two sections, I have characterised the key internal contextual factors of 
regional and Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere IWM processes under the RMA, and their multi-
scale outcomes for the resources, IWM institutions, and user-groups at these scales. It is 
widely acknowledged that at the regional scales, freshwater resources are under increasing 
strain, and are in some instances over-allocated (e.g., the Selwyn/Rakaia groundwater 
system). On the other hand, significant progress has been made in some areas of management, 
particularly with regard to the general health of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, and many of its 
wide range of complex adaptive ecological communities (Hughey & Taylor, 2009; Pauling & 
Arnold, 2009).  
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 What, then, are the problematic institutional arrangements for IWM in these SESs, and what 
has been their role the multi-scale RMA outcomes for Canterbury, and Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere? In this section, I will first describe the key problematic institutional arrangements 
to sustainable freshwater outcomes in these coupled SESs. These are described in the order of 
the market forces, the systems of property rights, and the competing cosmologies and social 
appreciations of the freshwater systems. Then, I will analyse their role in: the social selection 
of the emerging operational rules in use, and the individual decisions arising (subsection 
8.4.2), and; the resulting multi-scale patterns of use, and coupled institutional voids 
(subsection 8.4.3). These front-loop elements of the IWM process are shown in bold in Figure 
38. 
 
 
Figure 38: Representing Institutional Arrangements and Multi-Scale Front-Loop Elements of IWM for 
Evaluation 
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8.4.1 Institutional Arrangements 
Interview respondents identified several institutional arrangements that were considered to be 
particularly problematical for IWM in the case Canterbury, and for Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere. As with the national-scale SES, these are: 
1) A lack of clear limits to freshwater use, and a vision for the freshwater systems, in 
combination with the neoliberal agenda; 
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 2) Multiple types of property rights, some of which are in conflict. This includes legal 
rulings that have reinforced the persistence of the inadequate first in first served 
approach to allocation of freshwater system benefits, and confirmed the increasing 
security of tenure in water resource consents as property rights; 
3) Competing cosmologies and worldviews (specifically Maori and Pakeha).   
 
8.4.1.1 The Neoliberal Agenda and Market Development 
The regional and national markets for water have changed significantly over the last two 
decades, as demonstrated in subsections 8.2.1 and 8.3.1. New Zealand’s economy is still, as it 
has always been, heavily dependent upon export revenues from primary produce, particularly 
dairy. However, as already noted, tourism revenue flows are becoming increasingly 
important. As might be expected in a purposively selected exemplar of regional and local-
scale IWM challenges in New Zealand, the problems and conflicts present in these SESs are 
essentially the same as those at the national scale.  
 
There has been increased hydro-electricity generation, dairy farming, and irrigation, and also 
increased urban consumption of water and its benefits, and clearer articulation of in-stream 
recreational values. In particular, the long-term neo-liberal strategising from the hydro-
electricity and primary production sectors far outstripped strategising for environmental 
planning at ECan during the early years. This situation demonstrates a lack of business 
acumen in decision-makers, and has resulted in an increased economic value for water at the 
expense of other environmental, Ngai Tahu, and social values, and allocation overshoot in 
some freshwater systems. Over the last two decades in particular, dairying in New Zealand 
nationally has become an effective monopoly, and questioning its future viability or failing to 
enable its expansion is “political suicide” (Skelton, Research interviews, April 2008, p7), as 
recently demonstrated in Canterbury. However, there have been some encouraging recent 
developments towards a more balanced approach, for instance the call-in of the dairy 
proposals in the Mackenzie Basin, already mentioned.  
 
High land prices in North Island and availability of water in Canterbury (even though it is a 
dry area) “opened the floodgates” in the late 1990s (Donaldson, Research interviews, April 
2008, p3), and drove dairying South under the country’s free market. “Technology and the 
value of dairying products in particular, is enabling them to invest in changing that 
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 environment… to more or less remove the natural constraints” (Rennie, Research interviews, 
April 2008 p12). The capital investments for required irrigation infrastructure are now 
considered to be economically viable, because the global dairy boom has distorted resources 
allocation and land prices. Since the global economic meltdown of November 2008, many 
dairy farmers are finding themselves over-indebted.  
 
Another area of particular concern in New Zealand at the time of writing is the Mackenzie 
Basin, in South Canterbury. This is another dry-land area, but both more iconic and 
ecologically fragile than the already heavily modified Plains, and which is being considered 
for dairy expansion and/or intensification, including increases in irrigated hectares and 
effluent disposal. The CEO of ECan, Dr Bryan Jenkins, wrote to the Environment Minster on 
the 23rd of Dec, and three of the larger proposals were ’called in’ by the Minster on the 27th 
Jan, 2010, as matter of national interest (New Zealand Government, www.beehive.govt.nz 
accessed 1st March 2010). As I have noted in Chapter Seven, it remains to be seen whether 
this is to ensure protection from, or exposure to, economic development. However, public 
(and farming) opposition to the proposals has already been very strong (Mackenzie 
Guardians, mackenzieguardians.co.nz accessed 1st March, 2010), and the Environmental 
Defence Society has launched proceedings against these proposals in the High Court 
(www.eds.org.nz/ accessed 5th March 2010). 
 
There appears to be a growing, if reluctant, acceptance that limits are being reached, and 
farmers will no longer have virtually ‘free’ access to water. It should be noted that proposals 
for water storage and irrigation in Canterbury have been around since the 1930s. While 
financial cost was prohibitive, there was no dam, but the contexts have changed, and the 
question of freshwater storage and associated intensities and types of land-use has come back 
to the fore (Skelton, Research interviews, April 2008). Interestingly, one role of ECan as 
suggested by Dr Jenkins, is that the council is “there to be the social conscience, and most 
people do not like having a social conscience, because it is constraining on their behaviour” 
(Research interviews, June 2008). It appears that a regulatory style is not welcomed in rural 
Canterbury, and there has been (and still continues to be) a strong resistance to the constraint, 
or perceived constraint of individual freedoms for public benefit where water is concerned.  
 
On the other hand, at the second Waihora Ellesmere Trust (WET) Living Lake Symposium in 
November 2009, the overall lake condition from an integrated environmental management 
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 perspective was reported as approximately 70% of ecological optimum. Given that the 
ecological condition is a market represented by recreational, biodiversity, and Mahinga kai 
values for example, as the lake health continues to improve from ‘dead’ (although obviously, 
reports of its death were greatly exaggerated), it becomes increasingly expensive to attain 
another unit of ‘health’ (the law of diminishing returns). The lake is no longer the single 
focus. This has expanded, and what is now being discussed are management regimes for 
surrounding wetlands and riparian enhancement. Because the ‘market’ for riparian and 
wetland improvement is still relatively ‘untapped’, lake management will now essentially get 
‘more bang for its buck’, from stream-reach projects. This, of course, is primarily focused on 
lowland stream flows and quality enhancement, or (partial) re-instatement, which in turn are 
likely to generate two outcomes.  
1) The lake will benefit without further management efforts beyond the protection of current 
levels of ecological health.  
2) Lowland stream health leads directly to consideration of up-catchment socio-economic 
pressures. 
 
However, in this instance, there are more people, representing a wider range of interests, to 
drive the agenda-setting and decision-making. In other words, the balance of power with 
respect to the management of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere is slowly tipping in a new 
direction. Outcomes for the lake, and the region, remain in the balance, but at least the core 
problems are now being identified, articulated, and considered. 
 
8.4.1.2 Property Rights 
The reinstatement of Ngai Tahu customary use rights, development of the dairy industry and 
associated irrigation practices, and hydroelectricity production, have been key influences on 
the emergence of multiple types of property rights attaching to land and water in Canterbury. 
Further, because of increasing intensities of water use, rights domains with respect to multi-
dimensional benefits from this complex adaptive common-pool resource are increasingly 
overlapping, as identified by Giordano, 2003. Under the RMA, as under the 1967 Water and 
Soil Conservation Act, water remains a publicly (Crown) owned resource. So far, there has 
been a constraint on the issuance of water rights because of ongoing Maori challenge to ‘own’ 
water under the Treaty of Waitangi. This issue is yet to be resolved, but regional councils 
have so far concentrated on freshwater management rather than ownership. Burton and 
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 Cocklin (1996, p96) report that in this matter, “There is justifiable concern on the part of 
many Maori claimants ‘that the resolution of their Treaty-based historic grievances will be 
pre-empted by consents or other decisions pursuant to the RMA’ “.  
 
Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere is now subject to multiple types and systems of property rights, 
including those attaching to land, water, fisheries, recreational access, and cultural expression 
for Ngai Tahu, as the incumbent iwi (Table 11).  
 
Table 11: Selected Key Property Rights for Aspects of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere and Associated 
Benefits 
Aspect/Benefit Selected Key Property Rights  
Freshwater • Crown Property, also often;  
• ‘Presumed’ private rights, and; 
•  Emerging private rights 
Bed of the Lake  
 
• Private property (where Ngai-Tahu owned, it can be considered the property 
of that community). 
Margins of Lake  
 
• Private property- individual farms/properties; 
• Private/community property – Ngai Tahu land and Marae; 
• Crown Property, e.g., land belonging to the Conservation Estate and under 
the administration of the Department of Conservation.  
Fisheries and 
Mahinga Kai   
• Fisheries are a mix of customary and private quotas, and purchased public 
access.  
• Mahinga kai is linked to the Ngai Tahu customary rights, linked into land 
and resources. 
Riparian Strips 
and Plantings  
• Mixture of private and public property. 
Up-catchment • Private property as individual farms, some held by multinational 
corporations. 
• ‘Community’ property such as Selwyn District Plantations, and Ngai Tahu 
held-land. 
 
These aspects and rights are variously held as common property (in the case of Ngai Tahu as 
a collective entity), Crown (public) property (e.g. Department of Conservation land), and 
private property (e.g. individual farms).  Increasingly in law as well as public perception, 
water resource permits are being viewed as property rights, with right of tenure ("Aoraki 
Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd ", 2005).  
 
Along with the regional council’s freshwater role, and the potentially successful outcomes of 
the Canterbury Water Management Strategy, public discussion over the re-negotiation of 
rights to water would appear to have been one of the more immediate casualties of the recent 
Creech et al., (2010) recommendations, and resulting central government actions. Without 
even beginning to address the wider cosmological or property rights issues which are 
emerging through Maori claims, the Canterbury Strategic Water Study has already identified 
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 that the re-negotiation of property rights is central in the minds of Cantabrians to any question 
of storage, and should be undertaken before the construction of such infrastructure is begun. 
Unfortunately, as has been so clearly flagged by Ministers and their representatives, the drive 
is to ‘remove regulatory roadblocks’ to the further development of freshwater storage, and 
irrigation practices. This does not support any expectation that the freshwater rights debate 
will happen ahead of a physical infrastructure fait accompli. 
 
8.4.1.3 Competing Cosmologies and Worldviews 
As already noted, there is a wide range of competing worldviews and social appreciations of 
freshwater systems in Canterbury. These range across a continuum, from the perspective that 
every drop of water that reaches the sea is wasted at one end, to the perspective that the best 
place for water is in freshwater systems at the other. Clearly, there needs to be a ‘middle 
road’, but it is interesting to note that as a representation of Canterbury popular opinion in the 
matter, the Regional Council has been evenly split between more extreme expressions of 
these two interests since the 2007 elections.   
 
As an interesting example of possible middle ground, under s33 of the RMA, Ngai Tahu 
could accept a transfer of authority for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere and its catchment 
management, although they would still be bound by RMA processes. Several interview 
respondents considered that Ngai Tahu accepting management functions might be good for Te 
Waihora (Rennie; Fish and Game respondent; Farming respondent; Research interviews, 
2008). This was because under such a transfer, management would have to conform to Maori 
customary approaches already described, and Ngai Tahu would need to maintain the 
semblance of kaitiaki (guardianship) over their home röhe through an environmentally 
sustainable regime. That said, Ngai Tahu also has aspirations in many sectors of the South 
Island economy (see, for example, Ngai Tahu Holdings Group, www.ngaitahuholdings.co.nz 
accessed 24th Feb 2010) and are also well aware of the benefits of the development of storage 
for irrigation, (Jansen, Undated) and of the dairy industry ("Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai 
Tahu Properties Limited and Canterbury Regional Council (NZCA 71)," 2008; Unknown, 
2007). As I have already noted in subsections 7.2.3.1 and 8.2.3, the continuum of social 
freshwater appreciations between development and conservation exists within cosmologies, as 
well as between them, and there may be tensions between the corporation (Ngai Tahu 
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 Holdings Group) as opposed to the Iwi (as guardians). One example of the potential for this, 
already described, is the Ngai Tahu involvement in the Hurunui Water Project.  
 
8.4.2 Emergent Operational Rules in Use that Frame Choices 
Once again, as with the national scale SES, there was a serious ‘policy lacuna’ (Memon and 
Gleeson, 1995), and the Natural Resources Regional Plan for Canterbury is yet to be 
completed. Although the RMA set up a system of regional plans and policies that enabled 
regional councils to “do some proper planning if they wanted to”, hard decisions (preparing 
water management plans) were postponed (Skelton, Research interviews, April 2008, p2). 
There were some special factors in the Canterbury region context. ECan arose from a 
catchment board and United Council merger, (essentially planning and engineers) where 
engineers were more numerously represented in new RMA structure. In the opinion of many 
interview respondents therefore, early ECan did not properly appreciate its planning function 
(Donaldson; Hughey; Fish and Game respondent; Memon; Regional Councillor; Rodgers; 
Skelton; Research interviews, 2008). First generation resource plans “were not terrifically 
well resourced, or well thought through, or generated by people who had been trained in 
resource management” (Donaldson, research interviews, April 2008). There was therefore 
limited ECan staff capacity to see connections between surface flows and lowland streams, 
for example.  
 
Further, Regional Councils were persuaded that block allocation to activities was beyond 
their mandate, a viewpoint encouraged by MfE at the time, so as not to be seen to be 
‘picking winners’. Finally, there was a significant judicial barrier to the new planning 
approach. Judges and Commissioners still saw themselves as ‘wise men’ choosing between 
potential uses, as they had been under the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act and its 
1981 amendments, and “did not like this new system which had this fundamental 
environmental underpinning” (Skelton, Research interviews, April 2008 p10). Nationally 
and regionally, there has been strong resistance from district councils to regional councils 
being involved in land-use planning. In particular, there is a long history of bad feeling 
between the regional and some territorial authorities in Canterbury (Creech et al., 2010). At 
the time of their introduction, Regional Councils were wrongly seen by District Councils as 
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 the “big bogey” because of their overview function (Skelton, Research interviews April 
2008, p6). This was at least in part “politically mischievous” (Ibid).  
 
The Local Government Act 2002 enhanced regional powers, but there is still no capacity to 
require consents for stocking densities. Diffuse pollution from intensive farming remains 
poorly regulated, “a huge gap” (Fish and Game respondent, Research interviews, June 2008, 
p3) and a missed opportunity. Having said that, it was also noted that the RMA had ‘beaten’ 
point-source pollution, “we’ve moved beyond that as a country, and I think that’s one battle 
we should be proud of having won” (Ibid p2).  
 
8.4.3 Unsustainable Patterns of Use and the Institutional Void 
As is widely appreciated by IWM scholars and practitioners, land-use and freshwater use are 
interdependent (Mitchell, 2005). The changes in land-use with respect to dairy farming in 
Canterbury between 2002 and 2007 are quite marked (Dalziel & Saunders, 2009) and are 
summarised in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Dairy Changes in Canterbury, 2002-2007. Source: (Dalziel & Saunders, 2009, pp. 8,9,10) 
 2002 2007 change 
Number of dairy 
farms 
820            2.5% 858              9% 4.6% 
Numbers of dairy 
cattle 
542,610     5.8% 754, 937    8.3% 39.1% 
Grassland (ha) 1,212,694    38.5% 1,252,564   40.7% 3.3% 
 
From the same report, while sheep and deer farm numbers dropped quite dramatically (26%, 
and 26.3% respectively), and beef farm numbers went up slightly (10%), the number of dairy 
farms in Canterbury did not change significantly between 2002 and 2007 (a 4.6 % increase). 
However, although the number of dairy farms did not rise dramatically, the regional dairy 
herd did (39.1%), and is now the second largest in the country. Since the total area of 
grassland rose only by 3.3%, the implications for stocking densities of dairy cattle in 
Canterbury are obvious, and include the impact of effluent disposal and nitrogen leaching on 
waterways.  
 
The institutional void in Canterbury is thus demonstrated as arising from several factors. The 
Natural Resources Regional Plan was not notified until 2004, by which time it was already 
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 effectively out of date. It is still not operational, and has now been superseded by the 
Canterbury Water Management Strategy, 2009. The Waitaki ‘call in’ of 2004 also 
demonstrates a lack of institutional capacity at that time. The ongoing lack of national-scale 
guidance, and of capacity-building over the last two decades is also identified as a key aspect 
of the Canterbury institutional void.  
 
8.4.3.1 Key Policies and Plans for Canterbury and Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
Although it has been suggested that Canterbury is too large for a single planning authority to 
be effective, regions need coherence in economic, social, and environmental terms 
(Gunningham, 2008). From this perspective, Canterbury is not too big, (especially when 
compared to, for example, the Murray Darling Basin in Australia) - it needs that size for 
cohesion. Looking at the region from a social perspective, “you may get some differences 
between South Canterbury, Mid Canterbury, and North Canterbury, but if you look at the 
colour of the letterboxes as you go South, they really don’t change to blue and gold from red 
and black until you get past the Waitaki” (Jenkins, Research Interviews, June 2008, p14) 
(Cantabrians are famously ‘one-eyed’ (biased) about their rugby team, The Crusaders, whose 
colours are red and black). 
 
In the absence of a Natural Resources Regional Plan, three key public policies aimed at 
protecting and improving streams and rivers in Canterbury are: the Dairying and Clean 
Streams Accord; the Restorative Programme for Lowland Streams and; the Living Streams 
project. The first has enjoyed mixed results as already noted in subsection 7.4.3.3, and is 
discussed in greater detail in subsection 8.4.3.3 below. The two latter initiatives have been 
well supported and are enjoying early successes (Ecan, www.ecan.govt.nz accessed 2nd 
March, 2010). Two of these that particularly relevant to the wellbeing of Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere are Harts Creek and Boggy Creek (ECan, 2009b). More recently, the Environment 
Canterbury Long Term Council Community Plan, a requirement under the Local Government 
Act (2002), is cited as a ‘good example’ by the Controller and Auditor General Website 
(www.oag.govt.nz accessed 26th Feb 2010).  
 
Finally for the regional-scale SES, is the Canterbury Water Management Strategy (2009), as 
already referred to. This is a collaborative outcome of almost a decade. The Canterbury 
Water Management Strategy is an innovative, and essentially polycentric approach to the 
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 issues facing Canterbury with respect to the governance, and particularly the allocation, of 
freshwater and its multi-dimensional benefits. As already noted, the Strategy provides for ten 
water management zones, each making decisions regarding their own zone, and a semi-
autonomous Water Executive to oversee the strategy implementation and address Regional-
scale concerns or issues. This new Strategy was facilitated by the non-statutory Canterbury 
Mayoral Forum, and published in November 2009, with wide support from all ten Districts, 
and their Mayors. Unfortunately, this Strategy had already been undermined by a letter from 
the ten District Council Mayors to the Minister for the Environment in the September of that 
year, and in defiance of the ‘no surprises’ agreement of the Triennial Agreement between 
ECan and the Districts (Mayoral_Forum, 2005) 
 
The result of this was the Investigation into the performance of Environment Canterbury 
(Creech et al., 2010), under s.24 A of the RMA amendments (2005), considering resource 
management functions. The recommendation that the Regional Council be relieved of its 
water management functions in favour of an appointed Canterbury Regional Water 
Authority (Creech et al., 2010), has already been noted. The implications of this 
recommendation are wide-ranging, including those relating to the public’s right to elected 
representation, and the implementation of the Strategy. In effect, the CWMS appears to have 
been too successful for the entrenched economic (dairy/irrigation) development interests in 
the region, and nationally. It threatens the well flagged intentions of the current government 
to remove blocks to (economic) development in the region. This appears to be a very big 
gamble on dairy export earnings, and will effectively lock in the region, and the country, to 
dairy. Further, why now? The timing and content of this report is strongly suggestive of 
central government seeing (and attempting to seize) an opportunity to usurp the wide-
ranging social, cultural, and environmental benefits that are now beginning to trickle into the 
region, after six or seven years of real progress, and a great deal of highly skilled effort by a 
great many people. Any 'gains' made, or emergent, after the point of Commission take-over 
are highly unlikely to be widely advertised as the result of the previous authority's efforts.  
 
Lastly, the idea of an incoming Commission at this stage in the implementation of the 
Canterbury Water Management Strategy will surely be detrimental, as it would be for any 
fledgling authority. Decision-making frameworks have just been agreed upon, and are hardly 
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 begun (both at huge cost), when the locus of decision-making power has been transferred to 
a less representative, even newer 'authority' which will almost certainly perceived as 
illegitimate by many, if not most, of Canterbury. The Councillors and Mayors of 
Canterbury's TAs may be vociferous enough, and, apparently, more influential than might be 
expected in other economic conditions, but they are a very few people in comparison the 
population of Canterbury and New Zealand. On the other hand, as perverse and outcome as 
the current situation appears at the regional scale, as observers have already noted this may 
be the catalyst for the type of publicly demonstrated social freshwater appreciation that is 
required for a regional social sustainability transformation. Unfortunately, at this stage in 
proceedings, the probability of this being sufficient to over-ride potential economic 
development so strongly encouraged by the national government, is not high. 
 
8.4.3.2 Key Legal Rulings 
The key legal rulings are as discussed in subsection 7.4.3.2, and relate to: first in first served 
allocation approach ("Fleetwing Farms v Marlborough District Council (3 NZLR 257 (CA))," 
1997); security of tenure ("Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd ", 2005), and; 
cumulative effects ("Lynton Dairies v Canterbury Regional Council, Decision No. 
C108/2005," 2005). Other rulings of interest include Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu 
Properties Limited and Canterbury Regional Council (NZCA 71), and Central Plains Water v 
Synlait Ltd, 609 (NZCA 2009), two refinements of the first in first served allocation 
approach.  
 
8.4.3.3 Informal Social Action to Address the Institutional Void 
In subsection 7.4.3.3 I noted that one of the better known of New Zealand’s informal social 
actions aimed at addressing an institutional void in freshwater governance was the Fish and 
Game ‘Dirty Dairy’ campaign. This was launched in 2002, and resulted a year later in the 
Dairy and Clean Streams Accord (2003), a voluntary agreement between Fonterra, and the 
Ministers for the Environment, for Agriculture & Forestry, and Local Government 
representing the Regional Councils. Five years on, there would appear to be an interesting 
difference of opinion regarding the effectiveness of this voluntary approach.  
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 The Dairying and Clean Streams Accord does not seem to have performed particularly well in 
Canterbury (Blakemore et al., 2009; Deans & Hackwell, 2008b). Deans & Hackwell, (2008a, 
p. 24) representing Fish and Game, and Forest and Bird respectively, are strongly critical of 
the snapshot reporting. Amongst other issues, they refer particularly to the Rhodes 
Stream/Petrie’s creek catchment in South Canterbury, suggesting that some of Fonterra’s data 
as reported by the MfE might be less than accurate. Further, in their opinion, the Accord has 
not fulfilled its intentions, and should be abandoned in favour of stronger regulatory 
measures.  
 
A peer review of Deans and Hackwell’s (2008a) critique of the Accord and its monitoring, 
from Federated Farmers (Jessen & Harcombe, 2008, p. 17), roundly concludes that the Deans 
and Hackwell (2008a) critique “makes baseless and misleading statements unsupported by 
verified or independent sources of information”. Meanwhile, the The Environment 
Canterbury dairy report (Blakemore et al., 2009) concludes that there has been little change in 
practice over the last five years, although it also notes that the dairy industry is becoming 
more engaged in leadership and compliance. As to the claims and counterclaims of the 
opposing parties, the report merely states that “Environment Canterbury has previously 
reviewed the information supplied by Fonterra and its shareholders in the tier II Petrie’s Creek 
and Rhodes Stream catchments. The information is considered to be at odds with 
Environment Canterbury’s physical inspections of the catchments in 2007” (Ibid, p20). 
Clearly, there is progress yet to be made in this area. That being said, ECan and Fonterra 
support staff have developed action plans for each farm within the Rhodes/Petries catchments. 
Blakemore et al., (2009, p22) state that “these actions plans are formulated around the five 
aspects of the Clean Streams Accord and have been well received by the farmers”.  
 
In general, it seems that the non-statutory collaborative approach to freshwater governance 
has been more successful than the statutory regulatory approach in Canterbury. However, 
Interview respondents were generally agreed (and supported by the wider literature) that both 
approaches are required: that neither people nor rules can generate and maintain sustainable 
freshwater outcomes by themselves, and that both were needed to work together. 
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 8.5 Discussion and Concluding Comments 
From the foregoing sections of this chapter, with respect to freshwater in Canterbury, and for 
Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, there is now a layering of: international and national 
conservation perspectives; external economic drivers; Ngai Tahu cultural imperatives, and 
Pakeha social imperatives. Some of these include: the emerging questions of Tangata Whenua 
ownership of water resources under the Waitangi Tribunal processes, now potentially coming 
to a head in Canterbury; the need to clarify and enforce other water rights bundles; a 
technologically and water availability-driven neoliberal response to the boom in the global 
dairy market, which is rapidly locking Canterbury into dairy and irrigation; climate 
variability; poor management from ECan for the first decade; and contested science. Taken 
together, these factors have generated what one respondent called “a bloody mess” (Rodgers, 
Research interviews, April 2008; p3). Interestingly, this is a very succinct description of 
polycentric governance systems as described in the wider literature (Blomquist, 1992; 
Blomquist and Schlager, 2005; Ostrom, 1999).  
 
In this section, I will discuss the fit of the study results with the theoretical expectations 
developed in Chapter Five. There, I proposed that institutional arrangements exerted an 
influence on IWM outcomes. This proposition was supported by the findings of Chapter 
Seven, which unfortunately concluded that the predominant influence of these institutional 
arrangements on RMA freshwater outcomes for the national-scale SES has been strongly 
detrimental.  
 
The broad findings of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, it is clear that despite the impressive 
advances made by ECan since 2003, (particularly with respect to the adoption of post-
regulatory collaboration in decision-making), the institutional arrangements identified in this 
chapter have exerted a detrimental influence on RMA freshwater outcomes in Canterbury. 
Unfortunately, the enduring, and apparently still dominant perspective of freshwater as a 
resource which is there to be abstracted (e.g., for irrigation), or used instream for private 
economic benefit (e.g., for hydroelectricity generation), has proved remarkably resistant to 
change. Ultimately, it is these institutional arrangements which have driven the District 
Mayors’ letter to the Minister in Sept 2009, the recommendations of Creech et al. (2010), and 
central governments speedy response to those recommendations.   
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 Secondly, however, (and perhaps unsurprisingly, given the Lake’s lowland, brackish nature) 
this study has found that the abstractive use perspective is less dominant in the Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere SES. Instead, the New Zealand ‘outdoors’ characteristic is strongly 
demonstrated, showing strong support for activities related to in-stream uses and healthy 
ecological systems. Further, there remains the IWM paradox, that increased abstraction from 
the Rakaia and/or the Waimakariri ‘upstream’, of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, and increased 
Plains irrigation, may actually improve lowland stream flows and the water balance of the 
Lake.  
 
The opportunity to address a chronic ‘open access’ mentality in Canterbury has arisen through 
the public demand, voiced in the Canterbury Strategic Water Study, (a non-statutory process) 
for a reconsideration of the structures and contents of bundles of property rights. Where they 
have not been blocked by public opinion, ongoing proposals for storage have so far been 
thwarted by economic shortfalls between the value of water, and the cost of technology to 
produce a more reliable supply infrastructure, i.e. dams: following the recommendations of 
Creech et al. (2010), this now seems set to change. Lastly, ECan has clearly demonstrated 
over the last six or seven years that collaboration with users is one of the keys to drawing, and 
maintaining, sustainable limits to use.  
 
The case study of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere has provided many examples of the challenges 
to freshwater governance. The water resource system is heterogeneous temporally and 
spatially and needs to be managed by catchment, but it is clear from the hydrological linkages 
and the required social cohesion for effective management that this needs to be from a wider 
catchment, if not regional, perspective. There are multiple competing and collaborating uses 
and user-groups, over multiple jurisdictional, property rights, temporal and geographic 
imbrications. There are historical grievances from Ngai Tahu which are yet to be legally 
settled, but quite aside from questions of freshwater ‘ownership’, as owners of part of the 
Lake bed, they are in a strong position to challenge upstream activities that compromise the 
wellbeing or value of that Tangata Whenua common property. There are tensions between 
upstream and downstream users, between the abstractive users of the system and the non-
abstractive users, between rural and urban populations, and between district and regional 
councils. There is also an encouraging, science-led progress towards meaningful collaborative 
governance between ECan and stakeholders, enhanced and facilitated by the Waihora 
Ellesmere Trust towards increasingly inclusive, and scientifically informed, decision-making.  
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From the perspective of markets, patterns of use, and an emerging institutional void, dairy 
intensification has outstripped institutional capacity to manage it (to regulate internal patterns 
of use) in Canterbury. This is largely because the dominant institutional arrangements 
welcomed the opportunities it brought for private economic benefit, and therefore by 
extension, regional economic development. Further, the rules (institutions) were designed 
under a perception that there would be plenty of water for everybody. There can be little 
debate that Canterbury enjoys plenty of water in global terms: however, the distinction 
between plentiful and limitless is beginning to be understood by many New Zealanders. Yet, 
perhaps the biggest challenge to sustainable freshwater governance in Canterbury at the 
moment is the way in which the critical, underlying issue of property rights re-negotiation is 
being subsumed by a battle over perceived dairy profits from water use. To be sure, farmers 
who have survived the System Change of the 1980s, and the removal of subsidy, and who 
have gone on to see and fill a niche in the market, have done exactly what the prevailing 
neoliberal agenda and facilitative RMA mandate have encouraged. Resentment arising from 
recent spectacular gains in the dairy industry has focused on reasons why dairy is bad for the 
environment and should go, or on casting dairy farmers as thieves who are making private 
profit from a public resource, without paying for its use. Now, to be sure, as demonstrated 
above there is evidence that there is some merit in both of these arguments. But it is also 
worth considering whether the debate would be so acrimonious, if dairy was operating at the 
same scales and intensities but was only just managing to break even economically.  
 
Canterbury is a region in transition, and is an exemplar of both the wickedness of the 
problemshed which has generated the emergent polycentric IWM processes, and of the 
wickedness of the challenges facing this process. The case study has shown that the system 
change in Canterbury from the RMA- driven, effects-based regulatory approach, to the 
management of common-pool resources, to an LGA- embracing strategic post-regulatory 
collaborative model is well under way. However, perhaps one of the most interesting findings 
from this case study has been the role of chance in proceedings. Key pieces of legislation, key 
groups, actors, appointments, and collaborative drivers have been in the right place at the 
right time to produce an outcome (the Canterbury Water Management Strategy) that could 
have been good for the structure and processes of Canterbury’s water resource decision-
making, if not yet for its water resource systems themselves. Of course this did not mean that 
these resources and their wider ecologies were no longer threatened, or that a period of 
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 intense, heated, and acrimonious conflict did not loom on the immediate (and protracted) 
horizon. What it did mean was that Canterbury was poised to make water management 
decisions in a way, and through a framework, that could have made a positive contribution to 
New Zealand’s water management history.  
 
Unfortunately, it would appear that the Canterbury Water Management Strategy may have 
been a victim of its own success. This conclusion has been reinforced by the central 
government’s recent activities, professed perspectives, and plans for water, particularly 
relating to Canterbury region. This has been clearly signalled by the Prime Minister John Key, 
who intends to “remove regulatory roadblocks” to increased freshwater storage and irrigation 
in Canterbury (Parliamentary address, Feb 18th, 2010), in order that “less of the water that 
currently pours out to sea does so” (Parliamentary Debates, Feb 23rd, 2010). 
 
8.5.1 Key Chapter Findings 
The evaluation as reported above has generated the following key findings. 
• Ongoing lack of capacity-building and guidance by central government has been a key 
area of shortfall. Embedded institutional arrangements, particularly property rights, markets, 
and perverse legal rulings, have proved highly detrimental to IWM outcomes at the regional 
scale. In particular, the apparently still dominant appreciation of freshwater as an abstracted 
economic good has proved remarkably resistant to change.  
• The Regional story since 2003 has been one of a potentially highly effective and 
sustainable IWM outcome, undermined at the eleventh hour by economic interests 
(particularly dairy, irrigation, and hydroelectricity generation), lobbying at the national scale. 
In short, the Canterbury Water Management Strategy has been a victim of its own success.  
• Within the above, RMA outcomes in Canterbury are mixed. In general, alpine and hill 
rivers remain relatively healthy, but lowland streams are coming under increasing strain. 
• Ngai Tahu are finding voice, and enjoying increasing, although still limited influence. 
However, they must also deal with diversity of opinion between exploitation and conservation 
within themselves.  
• At the local scale, perverse outcomes at the regional scale may yet provide benefits for 
Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere. This is a typically IWM paradox. 
• Chance remains an often critical, but unforeseeable element in IWM proceedings. 
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 In the last two chapters I have first identified key institutional arrangements which have 
proved to be problematic to successful RMA outcomes for freshwater systems in New 
Zealand, at multiple scales of SES. I have then analysed their role in front-loop elements of 
the RMA cycles at each scale of SES. The detrimental effects of markets, competing and/or 
overlapping systems of property rights, the first in first served allocation approach, and 
dominant social appreciations of the SES freshwater systems, have been demonstrated in the 
national-scale and Canterbury SESs. The exception has been the findings for Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere, which as a brackish lowland lake unsuitable for abstractive uses, 
has benefited from the resurgence in social appreciations of its biodiversity, recreational, and 
Ngai Tahu customary values. Arguably, such a resurgence can occur at local scales but is 
much more difficult to accommodate nationally or regionally. 
 
How have these problematic institutional arrangements come about? In Chapter Five I argued 
for the conceptual perspective that particularly in polycentric problemsheds, such as have 
been identified for all three SESs, problematic institutional arrangements are the historically 
embedded social sustainability transformation avoidance tactics of a society, with respect to 
its patterns of freshwater system use. Thus, in the following Chapter Nine, I will seek 
evidence of the proposed historical origins of the problematic institutional arrangements 
identified in this and the previous chapter. 
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9  The Historical Origins of Problematic Institutional 
Arrangements in New Zealand 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have demonstrated the highly detrimental role played by specified 
institutional arrangements in the front loop of the complex adaptive IWM process in New 
Zealand under the RMA cycle, 1991-2009. The evaluations in the previous two chapters were 
undertaken at the national, regional, and local scales. The institutional arrangements 
implicated as particularly problematic to the fulfilment of the sustainability intentions of the 
RMA, have been identified in broad terms as relating to the three main internal contextual 
factors of the evaluative framework. As analysed in the foregoing chapters, these are: market 
forces, particularly as they relate to the export of primary products; misalignment or tensions 
between multiple systems of property rights, and; competing Maori and Pakeha cosmologies, 
and competing worldviews along the continuum of preservation, conservation, or 
exploitation.  
 
To recap briefly, in Chapter Four, I re-drew IWM as the social process of the integrated 
management of complex, adaptive, common-pool freshwater systems. Two key questions 
remained for consideration in Chapter Five: firstly, why have sustainable freshwater outcomes 
been so elusive, particularly in places with IWM advantages? Secondly, in what ways do the 
current polycentric IWM challenges exceed the capacity of current institutional designs to 
address them? As I theorised in Chapter Five, answers to these questions have their roots in 
the history of social sustainability avoidance tactics, arising from the particular confluence of 
plentiful freshwater, technological capacity to store freshwater for a more reliable supply, and 
a pioneer social context, focused particularly on economic development.  
 
From this theoretical perspective, I argued that the current freshwater challenges in New 
Zealand (and other type 4 IWM contexts) are so wicked because they are deeply embedded 
within 150 years of sustainability avoidance tactics, rather than having undergone a social 
sustainability transformation. In other words, the institutional arrangements identified as 
underpinning current unsustainable IWM outcomes in New Zealand, should have their origins 
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 in the repeated reification of unsustainable social appreciations of, and patterns of multi-
dimensional use of, the freshwater systems. 
 
9.1.1 Chapter Aim 
Thus, it is the aim of this chapter to investigate the historical origins of these institutional 
arrangements. This analysis will seek evidence to support the theory that these are historically 
embedded social sustainability avoidance tactics, as suggested by the theoretical perspective 
on the emergence of polycentric IWM problemsheds proposed in Chapter Five. Further, the 
analysis can contribute to the clearer understanding of the emergence of current polycentric 
IWM problemsheds both in New Zealand, and in the wider literature. 
 
Therefore, the focus of this chapter is on the ‘institutional sediments’ (Healy, 2005), that 
underpin the current situation of constitutional politics in New Zealand, with respect to the 
governance of that country’s freshwater resource systems. This element of the evaluative 
framework is highlighted in bold, in Figure 39. This is particularly important in light of the 
bicultural differences tensions between worldviews, and the impending rights and governance 
conflicts, as already discussed.  
 
 
Figure 39: Representing Institutional Sediments for Evaluation 
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9.1.2 Chapter Overview 
This chapter is laid out as follows. In the following section, I will describe the historical 
underpinnings of the institutional arrangements implicated in the current multi-scale 
polycentric IWM problemsheds in New Zealand. Then, in section 9.3 I will analyse these 
findings from the perspective of the development of the current cosmological contestation and 
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The previous two chapters have demonstrated that the institutional inertia associated with the 
effective non-implementation of the RMA’s sustainability intentions, at all scales of decision-
making, is an outcome of the influence of broader institutional arrangements on the front loop 
IWM processes. These processes are: the emergence of operational rules in use from the 
social interpretations of the IWM institutions, and their influence on individual decision-
making, and; the resulting emergent patterns of cumulative use. Having implicated specific 
institutional arrangements in the current polycentric IWM problemsheds at multiple scales, 
the final task is to analyse the historical origins of those institutional arrangements. How have 
they come about? Why have they endured? A summary of the historical underpinnings to 
IWM in New Zealand is shown in Table 13.   
9.2 The Origins of Problematic Institutional Arrangements  
 
competing worldviews, multiple systems of property rights, key legislative change, and 
developing markets. Section 9.4 will present a summary of chapter findings. 
 
 Table 13: Summary of Main Historical Underpinnings to IWM in New Zealand 
 
     
       
IWM Cycle Customary Maori 1840, Treaty of 
Waitangi cycle, 
culminating in 1941 
1941-1967, The Soil 
Conservation and Rivers 
Control Act 
1967-1981, The 
Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 
1981-1984, The 
“Wild and 
Scenic’ 
amendments 
1991-2009, The 
Resource Management 
Act 
Cosmology Maori Pakeha Pakeha Pakeha 
Re-emergence of 
Maori 
Pakeha 
Re-emergence of 
Maori  
Both: Maori 
relationship with 
freshwater recognised. 
Property 
Rights 
Kinship based, 
customary 
Presumed riparian Riparian Crown Crown Crown, customary, 
increasingly private 
Legislative 
Focus 
Maintenance of 
Mana 
Development of 
physical and 
legislative 
infrastructure. 
Soil erosion 
Pollution and 
allocation 
between uses 
Environmental 
values 
Sustainable 
management; 
ecological, social, 
economic values 
Decision-
making 
arrangements 
Holistic approach 
Decisions expected to 
take time and 
discourse. 
Dependent on 
cooperation. 
Leaders directly and 
personally responsible 
for outcomes. 
Ad hoc approach. 
Centralised 2-tier 
system. 
Focus on flood control 
and provision of 
drinking supplies. 
Difficult or 
‘unproductive’ projects 
not tackled. 
Integrated Catchment 
Management 
Centralised 2-tier 
system. 
Compromised by schism 
between Min of 
Agriculture and the Soil 
Conservation and Rivers 
Control Council. 
Central Government as 
developer. 
Integrated water resource 
management 
3-4-tier system. 
Central Government as developer and 
conservator. 
Statutory bodies, including recreational 
and conservation groups, could apply 
for a conservation order. 
Integrated Water 
Management 
A two-tier system, 
effects-based. 
Hampered by lack of 
rules or guidelines, 
and the neoliberal 
paradigm. 
Markets Limited Technology, 
absence of money, 
reliance on ‘mana’ 
and ‘tapu’. 
New technologies, 
domestic and export 
markets. Exports are 
primary produce. 
Increasingly challenging 
international markets. 
Rapid technology 
transfer post WWII. 
Government as developer until 1981. 
Heavily subsidised export sectors. 
Free market, neoliberal 
approach, increasingly 
criticised. 
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Patterns of 
interaction and 
outcomes 
Due to lack of 
controlling technology 
and a valuable 
connaissance, Maori 
had learned to live 
with the constraints of 
their water resource 
systems. 
Deforestation leading 
to accelerated soil 
erosion, flood damage 
costs.  
Ad hoc and 
uncoordinated 
collection of 
legislation.  
Parts of North Island 
lost up to 50% of their 
soils. 
Schisms between the 
Soil Conservation and 
Rivers Control 
Committee and the 
Ministry of Agriculture 
prevented successful 
integration of soil 
conservation and water 
control projects. 
Increasing conflict 
between multiple uses as 
well as users. 
 
Catchment management blocked by 
parochial district boards. 
 
Increasing public/NGO involvement. 
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This evaluation begins with a brief review of key customary Maori concepts and practices, 
with respect to the governance of freshwater. It is increasingly being recognised that 
indigenous peoples have a great deal of ‘connaissance’6 to offer to freshwater governance 
efforts (Meppem & Bourke, 1999; Prystupa, 1998; Tipa & Welch, 2006; J. Williams, 2006). 
As already mentioned, in New Zealand, Tangata Whenua have a strong environmental ethic 
and a completely different cosmological and cultural appreciation of the freshwater resource 
base from Europeans. Further, Maori are not only specifically identified as a special interest 
group in the RMA 1991, whose relationship with their natural resource base is a matter of 
“national importance” (RMA 1991, s.6). They are also still in the process of negotiating 
reparation for past wrongs through the Treaty of Waitangi settlement process. The concepts 
and perspectives that underpin this worldview are therefore highly relevant to the study 
(Maxwell & Penetito, 2007; Tipa & Welch, 2006; J. Williams, 2006). 
 
9.2.1 Customary Maori Freshwater Governance 
Tangata Whenua are thought to have arrived in Aotearoa between 850AD (Maxwell & 
Penetito, 2007) and 1300AD (Pawson & Brooking, 2002). Customary Maori society was a 
technologically limited (no metalworking or metal tools), post-collapse society that moved 
between subsistence (J. Williams, 2006), and a rich and highly developed social system and 
oral culture (Ballara, 1998; Gudgeon, 1885; Tipa & Welch, 2006). The early period of Maori 
habitation followed the pattern of heavy initial consumption of resources and expansion, as is 
the typical pattern for pioneer societies (Anderson, 2002). The key points of Maori customary 
freshwater governance are presented in Figure 40.  
 
The exact causal chains behind the population crash, estimated to have occurred during the 
1400s, are unknown, but large-scale deforestation and species extinctions have been dated as 
occurring around that time (Anderson, 2002; Pyle, 1992). Given the technological constraints 
of the society, the freshwater resources post-collapse were probably not significantly affected, 
although prolonged drought may have been a factor in the collapse (Diamond, 2005). 
However, it is noted that after this crash, a holistic attitude was adopted that adapted patterns 
of life to conform to the temporal and spatial patterns of the environment, rather than the 
other way around (O'Regan, 1984; Patterson, 1994).  
 
 
6 Used by LeFebvre to mean ‘a knowledge less formal, more local’ (c.f. Cocklin & Blunden, 1998, p. 62).  
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Figure 40: Representing Customary Maori Freshwater Governance for Evaluation. 
European Contact 
Introduction of metals, concepts, technologies
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1500s Deforestation/extinctions 
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Seasonal or event-
triggered Rahui. 
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Hapu-led kinship-based user-
groups  
Cheating highly visible 
Decision-making Rules:  
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free speech, and consensus achieved 
through protracted discussion. 
Constitutional; iwi, led by Ariki 
hapu involvement voluntary 
Collective-Choice; hapu, led by Rangatira
Operational; whanau, led by kaumatua
1800 
Interaction characterised by ‘connaissance’ and 
‘mobility. Leaders held personally responsible for 
outcomes
1300 1750s
Arrival 
Technology-limited instream uses. 
Resource system health a matter of 
community mana. 
Markets based on mana and taonga, not 
money. 
Considerations of: 
whakapapa; kaitiakitanga; 
reciprocity; mana, tapu and 
utu, characterise attitudes 
towards using water 
resources through 
cooperative connaissance. 
Environmental conservation perspective 
except where considered expedient to use 
resources 
Interactions characterised as 
hapu-based, complex, 
expedient, reciprocal. 
Issues of equity. 
 
 As previously stated, Maori society was, and remains, structured around a kinship regime of 
three tiers: Iwi, (tribe or clan), hapu (often called a sub-tribe), and whanau, or extended family 
group (Ballara, 1998; King, 2003; Te Waihora Joint Management Plan, 2005; Tipa & Welch, 
2006). Ballara (1998, p. 163) states that the “…largest, most successful hapu …were the 
largest socio-political units whose members at least sometimes acted together as a corporate 
group”. Through this overlapping system, “…sophisticated management systems were 
established and enforced. These allocated specific areas to specific rünanga, and determined 
their usage rights within those areas” (Marsden, 1989, p. 3). Although descended from (most 
probably) a small group of individuals, Maori were not ‘one people’. There appears to have 
been no single or national authority, or even regional ones: this was essentially a small-scale, 
polycentric society (Ballara, 1998; Gudgeon, 1885; Maxwell & Penetito, 2007). Gudgeon 
(1885, p10) goes so far as to suggest that “There never was a general government or general 
intertribal polity among the Maori race. They had no common head, no common tribunal, no 
common interest”. Instead, the individuality of each Iwi (and to a lesser, although often still 
considerable extent hapu and whanau) was a reflection of the rohe7, the mana of its historical 
and incumbent leaders, and the circumstances of the group (King, 2003; O'Regan, 1984). 
 
Importantly, markets for water resource system benefits operated through concepts of mana 
(power or standing) and taonga (value, or preciousness) which existed at a community as well 
as an individual level, rather than money (Patterson, 1994). The key methods of governance 
for pre-European contact Maori were mana and tapu. These are seen as two ends of a 
continuum, where tapu is the negative aspect, and mana the positive. These attributes come 
from a spiritual aspect, and are part of every living (and inanimate) thing (Gudgeon, 1885; 
Marsden, 1989; Maxwell & Penetito, 2007; Tipa & Welch, 2006; J. Williams, 2006). 
 
Mana may be interpreted as positive power, influence, or standing of an entity. Mana came 
from whakapapa (ancestry or lineage, traced back to deities) knowledge or actions (for 
example, esoteric understandings or bravery in battle), or the possession of taonga (‘precious’ 
things, including natural resources). Moreover, the “…concept of mana was collective to the 
community as well as being individual” (Pyle, 1992, p63). A community would lose mana if 
their rohe’s resources were depleted, particularly to the extent that they were unable as hosts 
to provide regional delicacies to their guests (Ibid). From the point of view of natural 
                                                 
7 A rohe is a geographical territory. 
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 resources and their use, Patterson (1994, p. 406) states that their mana was often ‘delegated’ 
to a human authority who became their kaitiakitanga, or guardian, but that “…mana does not 
have to be seen as an authority over a part of the environment so much as an authority over 
other beings in relation to that part of their environment”. This is a key point of note, since it 
directly echoes the observation from Bromley (1992), noted in subsection 4.3, that property 
rights are less about relationships between individual people and the resource, than they are 
about relationships between individual people.  
 
Tapu lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from mana. This is often interpreted as ‘sacred’ 
but may benefit from the wider terminology of ‘out of bounds’. Tapu is not so much a rigid 
and unquestioning adherence to rules, as it is a way of seeing life: for Tangata Whenua, 
“…the right to make use of the ‘resources’ of the world in which one lives has to be 
established, and is conditional” (Patterson, 1994, p402). It is the respect due to any thing that 
is not yours. The strength of tapu could be considerable, and avoiding tapu objects certainly 
required great care and attention from all members of the community at all times (Gudgeon, 
1885; Maxwell & Penetito, 2007; Polack, 1840). 
 
A truncated or shortened form of tapu employed in resource management was (and remains) 
known as rahui. Rahui fulfilled two functions. The first was the conservation or regeneration 
of the resource, and the second was the provision of time and space for healing after a 
disaster, e.g., to allow the elements to remove tapu after a death. When the period of rahui 
was over, the ban was lifted through ritual, and the resource became available for use again 
(Maxwell & Penetito, 2007; Patterson, 1994). 
 
From the above, it would appear that the customary approaches to water management 
employed by Maori post-collapse resulted in outcomes of stability in institutional 
arrangements. Whether this was due to low population densities and levels of technology is 
difficult to say, but almost certainly these factors had a large influence, and the longevity of 
such management structures as were employed will have been enhanced by the negligible 
rates of change, particularly of technologies and markets, leading to a relatively stable 
demand for resources. However, from a more modern IWM perspective, the frequent problem 
of inequity in resource allocation typically reported in customary commons situations 
(Giordano, 2003) was certainly present.  
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 9.2.1.1 Key Points of Maori Customary Freshwater Governance 
Resources were managed through a system of mana, tapu and rahui. Decision-making 
structures were polycentric, and discursive, ‘free speech’ processes were used to reach 
consensus. Maori were deeply embedded in their immediate environment, and their attitudes 
to water were strongly rooted in their cultural respect for whakapapa, tapu, and mana (subject 
to a degree of collective expediency) (James, 1993; Marsden, 1989; O'Regan, 1984; Patterson, 
1994). These are based on Maori cosmology and worldview that links humans to the natural 
world around them, as well as their ancestors (the eldest and most important of which were 
gods). This was a post-collapse society whose perspectives of power and wealth were based 
on the prowess, wellbeing and productivity of themselves and their natural resources. 
 
Property rights approaches were viewed in much the same way as nowadays, in so far as 
they relate to social relationships. But as already noted in Chapter Seven, there is a 
fundamental opposition between the current ‘Western’ right of management (the right to 
regulate internal patterns of use, and to transform the resource by making improvements), 
and the Tangata Whenua environmental ethic, which states that the essential Mauri (the life-
force) of the resource must remain intact (J. Williams, 2006). One of the major issues arising 
from this is the Tangata Whenua resistance to the mixing of waters. This clearly holds 
potential for conflict in current management approaches (Tipa & Welch, 2006).  
 
Patterns of interaction are characterised as- hapu based; complex; expedient; and reciprocal, 
and outcomes were apparently sustainable. It is not possible to know what role chance has 
played, or which choices have not been made, given the temporal remoteness of this 
analysis. However, it seems likely that technology was a very limiting factor in management. 
 
It has been the purpose of this subsection to offer a brief overview of the key points of 
customary Maori cosmology, their social decision-making practices, and systems of property 
rights. In the following subsections, I will provide a characterisation of the key points of each 
of the IWM cycles in New Zealand between 1840 and 1984, as they relate to the chapter aim. 
As stated in subsection 9.1.1, this is to seek evidence of currently problematic institutional 
arrangements as historically embedded ‘institutional sediments’ (Healy, 2005). 
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Since 1840, New Zealand as a country has traditionally based its economic growth on the 
development and export of its primary natural resources (King, 2003; Park, 1995; Valentine et 
al., 2007). As well as the ubiquitous use of water as a refuse site, particularly in towns and 
cities, particular early examples are: water powered mills for flour and timber in the 1840s 
(Roche, 1994); extractive uses in gold-mining in the 1850s and 60s (Ward and Scarf, 1993); 
hydroelectricity generation from the 1880s (Wheen, 1997), and; the advent of refrigerated 
shipping which opened up the export markets for meat and dairy products, as well as wool 
(Ericksen, 1990). Indeed, dairying had always been part of British plans for their latest 
acquisition (Park, 1995). Control of rivers was also needed to maintain travel and transport 
routes (Ericksen, 1990; Memon, 1993; Park, 1995; Ward & Scarf, 1993). All of these export 
goods are heavily dependent on plentiful, clean water, and during the early stages of 
settlement and infrastructure development, rights to water were awarded on a first-come first-
served approach which even then, quite rapidly proved to be inadequate (Ericksen, 1990). 
Along with the new markets came new means of accessing resources that had previously been 
too remote or too marginal to exploit. 
 
The ‘discovery’ of New Zealand in the mid 1700s triggered a flood of new settlers from the 
overcrowded nations of Europe, in particular the United Kingdom. The speed and scope of the 
changes that came after 1840 were of a scale that Maori could not have imagined, and began 
“… a revolution in land use” (Ward & Scarf, 1993, p. 63), based on an assumed system of 
English Common-Law riparian rights. Thus, the new culture also prized the holding of land 
and its natural resources, but on an individual level rather than a collective one, and “to many 
of the assisted migrants leaving a near feudal agricultural system in the United Kingdom, the 
idea of owning a piece of land was extremely important” (Ward and Scarf, 1993, p64). A 
further major area of mutual incomprehension was the fact that Pakeha culture did not have 
any direct spiritual or ancestral link to particular resources. Many Maori fought bitterly and 
long to hold their lands, and it was not until 1870 that peace broke out and the government 
could devote itself to issues of national economic development (Memon, 1993). 
 
Beginning with the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the current IWM challenges in New Zealand 
can be traced through several ‘causal chains’ (Agrawal, 2002). The evaluative framework for 
this IWM cycle in New Zealand is shown in Figure 41. 
9.2.2 IWM under the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840 - 1941 
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Figure 41: Representing the IWM cycle under the Treaty of Waitangi for Evaluation. 
 
  
However, New Zealand’s water resource systems could (and can still) be very unpredictable. 
Until the 1900s, potential markets had been primarily constrained by the need provide potable 
water to communities and businesses as part of a growing colonial outpost, and to prevent 
what little physical infrastructure as existed from being damaged, or entirely swept away, by 
flooding (Memon, 1993; Roche, 1994). During this period, a shortage of capacity meant that 
triage decision-making was inevitable, and management was typically “fragmented over 
limited lengths of a river: in some cases on one side of it” (Ericksen, 1990, p50), reinforcing 
the social tendency to use rivers as boundaries, rather than catchments. This is still the case in 
some districts in New Zealand such as Selwyn, as discussed in the previous chapter. Overall, 
the planning system of the late 1800s is generally criticised as more ad hoc than strategy 
(Memon, 1993; Roche, 1994; Sharp, 1991; Wheen, 1997). 
 
Catchment-based River Boards of the time were concerned almost entirely with the 
prevention of floods and flood damage, until the detrimental effects of soil erosion finally 
made themselves felt in the early 1900s. By then, occupied land had risen to 40 million 
hectares, “representing in effect the closing of the agricultural frontier in New Zealand” 
(Roche, 1994, p. 25). In the 1920s, the Great War and the following economic depression had 
hit Europe, and the British markets were heavily compromised (King, 2003; Roche, 1994). It 
was during this period that the first Labour government was elected and began the then 
visionary process of developing a welfare state, along with its attendant regulated markets and 
subsidised production (Memon, 1993). By the 1930s, the erosion of soils had finally become 
as much of a concern as the management of floods, by which point some areas had lost up to 
50% of their soil (Ericksen, 1990; Memon, 1993).  
 
9.2.2.1 Key Points of IWM under the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 - 1941 
The new pioneer society held views of freshwater systems that were both sacrilegious and 
incomprehensible to Maori. There was little or no understanding of the type of youthful 
geology, hydrogeology, or soil types of New Zealand. Detrimental environmental outcomes 
were rapidly felt, and Dobson’s (1871) management recommendations “represented one of 
the first statements in the New Zealand context, of an integrated approach to catchment 
management” (Roche, 1994, p. 21). However, shortfalls in capacity meant that triage 
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In 1941, New Zealand became “one of the first countries in the world to recognise, through 
legislation, the interrelationship between land and water resources, and the importance of 
management on a catchment-wide basis” (Ericksen, 1990, p51). The Soil Conservation and 
Rivers Control Act 1941, was an innovative effort at integrated catchment management, as it 
was then called. The evaluative framework for this cycle is shown in Figure 42. 
9.2.3 IWM under the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act, 1941 
 
By the 1930s the crisis of soil erosion and the downstream impacts of this (siltation, turbidity, 
etc) which had arisen through unsustainable land uses, were threatening production. District 
committees were established under the aegis of the Public Works Department to address soil 
erosion, and the floods of 1938 added impetus and urgency to this task (Ericksen, 1990). It 
was against this background that the new legislation was developed (Ericksen, 1990; Memon, 
1993; Roche, 1994). The following subsection considers the IWM cycle in New Zealand 
under the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act of 1941.  
 
The first come first served approach to the allocation of freshwater and its benefits was 
introduced to New Zealand very early in its Pakeha history. The overarching approach to 
governance during this period has been characterised as a “…laissez faire exploitation of the 
country’s wealth… a process equated with economic growth, individual advancement and 
community betterment” (Memon, 1993, p29). 
 
Rights to water were now presumed riparian, with the exceptions of hydro-electricity 
generation, and water for gold mining in Otago. The New Zealand SES was now based on: 
individual ownership of land and associated natural resources such as freshwater; money, and; 
the construction of physical infrastructure for flood prevention and supply, made available by 
the new export trade. In essence, land was property, and property equated to wealth. That 
said, New Zealand was also one of the first countries in the world to develop a welfare state.  
 
decision-making had to be used, and difficult or ‘unproductive’ projects were not addressed, 
and an ad hoc and uncoordinated collection of legislation accumulated.  
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Figure 42: Representing the IWM Cycle 1941 – 1967 for Evaluation 
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 The changes that came with this Act were fundamental. Although the Act legitimised the 
previously assumed English Common-Law system of riparian rights, it also instigated 
catchment boards directed by the central Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council 
(SCRCC), which was mandated to impose taxes and develop rules (bylaws).  
 
Catchment scale management and planning responsibilities were delegated to regional 
catchment boards by the SCRCC. These regional catchment boards were considered as 
corporate bodies under legislation, and survived until the System Change of 1984-1991 swept 
them into the wider re-structuring, and expanded the regional role to all natural and physical 
resources. The 1941 Act did not make catchment boards mandatory for the simple reason that 
“…it was politically expedient at the national level” to leave this as a voluntary choice by 
locally interested parties (Ericksen, 1990, p53). 
 
Lance McCaskill (one of the original policy entrepreneurs associated with the Act’s 
development) saliently observed that “these were far-reaching solutions to enable control of 
land use in a country where the landowner claimed a traditional right to treat the land as he 
saw fit” (c.f. Roche, 1994, p. 46). Indeed, during the development of the 1941 Act, an attempt 
was made to include Crown rights to limit stocking densities and types. This was eventually 
abandoned, after fierce opposition from the farming lobby and the suggestion that the 
catchment boards would be able to levy such high rates that the future of farming would be 
jeopardised (Roche, 1994). Further, there was a considerable degree of continuing distrust 
which had arisen during the Royal Commission of the 1930s, over any suggestion that water 
rights could be constrained by the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council “without 
adequate compensation” (Ibid p53).  
 
An amendment to the Act passed in 1946, and held up by almost a decade of controversy over 
the Royal Commission report, “…enabled Soil Conservation Committees at district level to 
specify the class of stock to be carried on land for agricultural or pastoral purposes, to 
regulate stocking, ploughing and cultivation of land, and to place restrictions on changes to 
land use, but such committees had never been formed” (Roche, 1994, p64). Between the 
legacy of the Royal Commission into the Sheep-farming industry in the 1930s, the protracted 
wrangle with the Department of Agriculture over the placing of soil conservators, and delays 
in amending legislation, the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council remained in 
uncertainty for over a decade, severely constraining its possible effectiveness. Reasons for not 
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 adopting catchment boards included conflict over “… the basis of representation, reluctance 
to pay additional rates, difficulties in developing rating classifications and objections to the 
powers conferred on catchment boards” (Ericksen, 1990, p53). To combat this reluctance, the 
SCRCC resorted to larger grants and subsidies (Memon, 1993, Roche, 1994).  
 
Markets for New Zealand produce were not immune to the wider influence of global events. 
The Second World War impacted strongly on the demand for agricultural produce, and 
exports of meat, wool and dairy products continued to grow. An important point to note here 
is the continually increasing role of the Government in resource development as an 
entrepreneur, which increased significantly after the post Second World War boom in 
population and economy (Memon, 1993). During the 1950s, increasingly noticeable effects 
from pollution were emerging, as a result of new chemical uses and intensification of 
industries (Ward and Scarf, 1993). Moreover, the continually increasing population and 
production pressures meant that by the 1960s, significant conflicts were occurring not just 
between users, but between competing uses (Ward and Scarf, 1993). In 1963 the Manapouri 
Te Anau Development Act came into being, enabling the construction of hydro-electricity 
generation dams that were intended to supply aluminium smelters. There was public outrage 
at this, and the concessions to conservation that were won at that time arguably marked the 
‘coming out’ of New Zealand’s environmental movement. In response to the debacle, the 
Minister of Works established a ten-department committee to address the increasingly urgent 
problems of competing water uses. This was followed by the 1964 New Zealand Institute of 
Engineers conference, where the Minister of Works, the Hon P B Allen, suggested in the 
opening speech that  
“…foremost, some agency must take on the job of completely coordinating all water 
administration to ensure effective action… there is also a need for allocating functions to 
someone for the many matters that are not now the responsibility of any particular 
organisation- water conservation, water allocation, further aspects of water quality and 
general administration (and) comprehensive research.” (Ericksen, 1990, p59 c.f Allen, 1964).  
 
The three reasons given for the conference were; the problems relating to competing uses of 
water; “…the failure of existing structures to deal effectively with large polluting industries, 
and ; “a fear of the unbridled power of the Crown riding roughshod over potential users” 
(Ericksen, 1990, p59, c.f Howard, 1988).  
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 9.2.3.1 Key Points of IWM under the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 
1941 - 1967 
This Act introduced the concept of integrated catchment management, but ironically this was 
compromised by sectoral schisms between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Council (SCRCC). The wide-ranging powers of the SCRCC 
and the voluntary nature of the regional catchment boards that would operate under its aegis 
were a significant departure from the previous arrangements. However, the strongly 
centralised nature of water management resulting from this arrangement has been heavily 
criticised by Memon (1993) as being unable to adequately understand or respond to regional 
needs.  
 
The Manapouri Te Anau Development Act 1963 sparked public outrage at ‘state sponsored 
vandalism’ that seemed to be inherent within the Government’s increasing role as resource 
developer and the ‘think big’ approach of the time, and marks the coming out of New 
Zealand’s Environmental movement.  
 
Ultimately, the Act failed to deliver on its integrated management intention. In particular, the 
1945 amendment provided for Soil Conservation Committees, whose role was to regulate the 
livestock types and densities, and agricultural land-uses and intensities. However, these were 
never formed, and the amendment became what may be one of the earliest symbolic IWM 
policies in the world. Further, large-scale point-source pollution had exceeded the capacity of 
the legislative structures to address effectively. 
 
Twenty-five years earlier, the 1941 Act had addressed the interconnected issues of soil 
erosion and flooding. By 1967, however, the IWM problemshed in New Zealand had moved 
forward through a second developmental cycle, and new approaches to regulating emerging 
scales of pollution, and to allocating freshwater benefits amongst competing uses was needed. 
The response was another visionary and innovative piece of legislation that abandoned the 
prevailing riparian rights system and vested all rights to the appropriation, damming, and use 
(including use of assimilative capacity) in the Crown. Thus, the following subsection 
considers the IWM cycle in New Zealand under the Water and Soil Conservation Act from 
1967 until 1984, including the Wild and Scenic Rivers amendment of 1981. 
  
 205
 206
 
 
All rights to use water were now vested in the Crown (Ward and Scarf, 1993; Wheen, 1997). 
This repealed the Riparian rights regime of the 1941 Act, but not the Act itself. The two Acts 
existed alongside each other, making for significant confusion. The main management tool 
provided by the 1967 Act was the reform of water rights, which was to be “the means by 
which water classification and water allocation plans could be implemented” (Ericksen, 1990, 
p66). This remarkably uncontested shift in property rights was the result of political 
negotiation which assured influential users (particularly the farming lobby) that the status quo 
of water allocation would remain essentially unaffected. Thus, the property rights system for 
water and land in New Zealand now vested all rights to the appropriation, damming, and use 
(including discharge) of water in the Crown, and permits were required before any private 
citizen could engage in any such activity beyond that which would meet their immediate 
family and stock drinking needs (Ericksen, 1990; Ward & Scarf, 1993; Wheen, 2002). 
Ericksen (1990, p62) observes that decision-making arrangements under the 1967 Act were a 
“commendable attempt at instituting Integrated Water Management in New Zealand”. Among 
the many features of the Act which would coordinate such management were “a good system 
of grants to entice cooperation, a democratically elected local system of management, and 
powers to act on a wide range of functions” (Ibid).  
 
As summarised from Wheen (1997, p79), this Act aimed to “promote a national policy in 
respect of natural water, and to make better provision for the conservation, allocation, use, 
and quality of natural water… and [to] promote and control multiple uses of natural water…, 
and to ensur[e] that adequate account is taken of all the needs of primary and secondary 
industry, water supplies…, fisheries, wildlife habitats, and all recreational uses of natural 
water”.   
 
The Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, was an imaginative and farsighted one, and forms 
the basis of the RMA as it relates to water. The evaluative framework for this cycle is shown 
in Figure 43.  
9.2.4 IWM under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 - 1984 
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Figure 43: Representing the IWM Cycle 1967 - 1981 for Evaluation 
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The 1981 amendment (usually referred to as the ‘Wild and Scenic Rivers’ amendment) took 
another large step along the road to holistic resource management. This time, it was not the 
rights of the Crown (or the public) which were being addressed, but the rights of the 
Environment itself, (albeit from a heavily anthropocentric view). Here, the country 
acknowledged that protection of certain bodies of water (in the form of Water Conservation 
Orders) was necessary to ensure the continued flow of their benefits. Although New Zealand 
had legislated for (largely) aesthetic benefits which had little or no obvious economic value 
(the scenery), through the development of its National Parks a century earlier, this was the 
first time that such a non-tangible set of benefits had been acknowledged with respect to 
water bodies specifically. New Water Conservation Orders could be applied to either 
nationally or locally important water resources, and importantly, provided for statutory bodies 
“to make application nationally or locally, to preserve as far as possible in its natural state the 
wild and scenic characteristics, etc, of a water body” (Ward and Scarf, 1993, p67). Although 
the Act was visionary and bold, it had serious problems in operation. It “proved full of legal 
pitfalls because there could be many claims on one body of water and many uses of it already 
in existence” (Ericksen, 1990, p66 c.f. Poole, 1983). The 1981 amendment radically changed 
the way that surface waters were valued in law in New Zealand, but was ultimately 
compromised by the necessary time-frames for applications, the costs of resource 
investigations and analysis of competing claims, and uncertainty over the legal result (Ward 
and Scarf, 1993).  
 
9.2.4.1 Key Points of IWM under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 – 
1984, and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Amendment, 1981 
One major innovation that was introduced after 1967 was the development of a water 
classification system. This was expected to integrate with the existing land capability 
classification to finally provide an integrated framework for land and water use decision-
making. The water classification system was developed by the Water Pollution Council 
(WPC), and provided for four types of freshwater, and five types of saline (Ericksen, 2990; 
Ward and Scarf, 1993; Roche, 1994). 
 
The 1967 Act was always going to be difficult to implement successfully, given its 
cooperative nature and its attempts to address subjective trade-offs between uses as well as 
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 user groups. In essence, this was an Act that aimed to provide a framework for ‘decisions on 
water allocation through water rights based on the interlocking concepts of multiple use, 
beneficial use, and balanced use (Ericksen, 1990, p66). With the 1981 amendment, this scope 
was broadened from the purely anthropocentric to include environmental and in-stream 
values. These were never going to be uncontested legislations. 
 
This section has identified and described the historical origins of the currently problematic 
institutional arrangements in New Zealand, relating to: market influences and the neoliberal 
agenda; conflicting and competing systems of property rights and rights domains; allocation 
difficulties, and; competing cosmologies and worldviews. As predicted by the theory 
proposed in Chapter Five, the key institutional arrangements identified as problematic in the 
foregoing chapters have been shown to be historically embedded, and sometimes repeated, 
avoidance tactics.  
 
The following section will discuss the study findings from this theoretical perspective. 
 
9.3 Analysis of Historical Underpinnings of Problematic 
Institutional Arrangements for IWM in New Zealand 
In previous chapters, I have proposed that New Zealand’s current freshwater governance 
problems are so wicked, because they are the cumulative outcomes of many cycles of 
sustainability avoidance, and reification of unsustainable social appreciations and patterns of 
interaction, instead of a sustainability transformation. In other words, as reported in the 
interviews, New Zealand is “still in pioneer mode”, a “young country that has not really had 
to face up to resource shortages yet”, with a “Daniel Boone mentality” (Hughey, 2008; 
Skelton, 2008, Research interviews, jointly and severally). Avoidance tactics have already 
been identified as legislation that was blocked, or that had no ‘teeth’, was not implemented, or 
that avoided overshoot and/or reduction in individual levels of use, through economies of 
coordination, technology, or both. In this section, I will consider the findings reported above 
from this perspective. 
 
In Chapter Five, I considered the paradox of the current generation of wicked IWM problems, 
which already exceed the capacity of existing institutions to address equitably and efficiently, 
being most acute in certain IWM advantaged SESs. Integrated Water Management advantages 
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 include plentiful freshwater, available technology for storage and transport, and extant 
collaborative, or at least cooperative, IWM plans, policies, and programmes. I theorised that it 
was the particular confluence of these attributes with a pioneer social background that had 
generated multiple cycles of social sustainability avoidance, rather than transformation in 
these SESs. Arising from this theoretical perspective is a typology of IWM contexts, in which 
New Zealand, and other similar SESs such as Florida or British Columbia, are considered as 
type 4. These are described as developed, ‘Western’ jurisdictions with abundant freshwater 
(albeit unevenly distributed through time and space), the technology and infrastructure to 
have secured essential domestic supplies, and a European, pioneer background. The 
theoretical perspective suggested that in each cycle of IWM, type 4 SESs have avoided 
socially unpalatable reductions in levels of use through various combinations of technological 
efficiencies, and/or economies of coordination, but that in doing so, they have reified 
unsustainable social appreciations of the freshwater resource, making future change more 
difficult. In this chapter, I have shown that the New Zealand cycles of IWM development 
have followed the pattern of increasing complex, contested, and wicked IWM challenges: 
control of floods; provision of domestic supplies and infrastructure; control of nutrients and 
pollutants, and; the protection or restoration of ecological systems. Comparing these results 
with the observed pattern of IWM development in Florida as noted by Scholz and Stiftel 
(2005), during the same broad period (Table 14), shows that these two SESs have indeed 
followed the same pattern of IWM challenges. This lends support to the theoretical 
perspective.  
 
Table 14: Development of IWM in Florida and New Zealand 
Everglades in the 20th Century  New Zealand in the 20th Century 
Control unwanted floodwater Control of unwanted floodwater the 
SCRC Act 1941 
Sustain water supply to a growing 
population 
Sustain water supply and infrastructure 
the SCRC Act 1941 
Control nutrients from land-use 
intensification/interactions 
Control nutrients/pollution  
W&SC Act 1967 
Bring about ecosystem restoration Ecosystem restoration/protection W&SC 
Act 1967 and W&SR Amendment Act 
1981 
 
In the century and a half since the Treaty of Waitangi, agriculture, and particularly the dairy 
industry and associated irrigation practices, has enjoyed the characterisation of being ‘the 
backbone of the country’. Unfortunately, the agribusiness sector does not seem to have 
realised that without legs, or feet, or other ‘limbs, organs, senses, and dimensions’, the 
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 backbone will not get very far. The ongoing exportation of freshwater in the form of milk 
solids and other primary produce may be understandable from the point of view of 
maintaining national revenues for development of infrastructure, but as demonstrated in the 
foregoing two chapters, it has generated a lock-in, and has also retarded a more holistic 
approach to the country’s natural wealth. Other problems have resulted from a lack of 
coordination of legislation, lack of integration between professional disciplines (primarily 
between the water engineers and soil conservators of the 1940s and 1950s), and turf 
protection between agencies. Further issues have arisen through agency or government 
capture (as in the resistance to stocking rate controls in the 1941 Act), and the principles of 
riparian rights to water which were imported wholesale from English Common Law. Until 
1967, these riparian rights had first supported and then enforced the individual’s right to use 
his land (and the associated water resources) as he saw fit, without consideration of the wider 
context. The transfer of water rights to the Crown in 1967 was a remarkable achievement, but 
between the lack of commitment to the newly mandated regional councils and the ‘parochial’ 
nature of the local catchment boards, this Act was never fully allowed to deal with issues that 
it had been designed to address. 
 
It seems that the more enduring and successful facets of the RMA 1991 owe more to the 1967 
and 1981 water management legislation than to System Change. Although the RMA 
consolidated a great many statutes, it streamlined and ‘rationalised’ environmental planning. 
There is very little in the RMA for water that was not in place under the 1967/1981 system of 
governance, and much that has been inherited word for word. One of the main differences is 
that regional councils have been accorded statutory standing, but many were already in 
voluntary existence, so the difference here is really one of commitment. If the management 
body is voluntary, it must develop commitment through consensus-building. If the body is 
statutory, it possesses a degree of ‘command and control’.  
 
New Zealand has generally opted for cooperative legislation in water management, beyond 
the conscriptive powers of river boards to execute flood prevention works. This has not 
always worked as it was perhaps envisaged, due to the widely-recognised problems of 
commitment implicit within any cooperative agreement (Hajer, 2003; Margerum, 2001). One 
key challenge for IWM has been that because IWM has emerged from an overshoot that has 
already happened, institutional design has been one step behind uses. Sustainability 
overshoots are the reason that institutions are needed, but institutions appear to have been 
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 consistently one step behind in the arms race between increasing social-economic pressures 
arising from, amongst other things, human ingenuity and entrepreneurial flair, and their 
necessary regulation.   
 
9.4 Chapter Summary and Concluding Comments 
The aim of this chapter has been to seek evidence in support of the theoretical proposition that 
institutional arrangements particularly implicated in the emergence of polycentric IWM 
problemsheds in type 4 SESs such as New Zealand, have their roots deeply embedded in a 
century and a half of sustainability avoidance tactics, with respect to freshwater. The results 
of this analysis, as described in the foregoing sections, support this proposition.  
 
At its broadest, and bluntly put, it has not been politically expedient to actually implement the 
rules which have been carefully, expensively, and often imaginatively designed with the 
specific intention of addressing existing freshwater system overshoot in New Zealand. 
Therefore, the conclusions reached in this chapter are that there is strong evidence to support 
the theoretical perspective of problematic institutional arrangements as historically embedded 
social sustainability transformation avoidance tactics. More particularly, from the summary 
above, several recurring themes begin to emerge. These are: 
• Unresolved, or irreconcilable tensions between Maori and Pakeha cosmologies, and 
resulting worldviews with respect to freshwater, its values, perceived limits to use, and 
management; 
• A perverse endurance of the first in first served allocation approach; 
• Ad hoc accretions of legislation, where need and urgency are the drivers; 
• Catchment scale focus. Water and land have been considered at the catchment level, 
but management has never really achieved integration. This has often been due to 
schisms between professional disciplines within and between management agencies 
(e.g. the engineers and the soil conservators of the 1941 Act), or between governance 
levels (e.g. no autonomy for regional unified councils under the 1967 Act);  
• Attempts to constrain land use or intensity of use have failed. There has been a 
continuing emphasis on primary productivity, but environmental costs of intensifying 
productivity have not been fully reflected in water resource management;  
• Successive legislations have been either the product of agency capture (e.g., the 1941 
Act), or have suffered emasculation through lack of statutory power, resources, or turf 
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 protection/uncertainty. Further, successive legislations have failed to enforce 
particular arrangements, either through non-implementation (e.g., councils mandated 
for but not formed) or by making them non-statutory (i.e., voluntary).  
 
Overall, although the most challenging aspects have generally been avoided (those more 
wicked problems based in conflicting subjective values), the changing systems of New 
Zealand’s institutional design for freshwater governance has shown several positive attributes. 
It has grown and adapted in step with changing contexts, understandings, and pressures. It has 
provided an imaginative and often visionary framework for design of institutional 
arrangements, yet these have often been either blocked or ignored, typically by the rural/ 
agribusiness/hydro-electricity lobbies. Where need or urgency have existed in order to prevent 
structural damage to property or infrastructure, or compromise life or economic wellbeing, 
reaction has been quick and typically engineering-based. However, when any kind of 
subjective values have been considered, the environment has regularly been subsumed in the 
quest for economic development, as noted in the wider work by Owens (1997). As Ericksen 
(1990), and Ward and Scarf (1993) have noted, ironically much of the ‘cavalier’ treatment of 
New Zealand’s water resources has arisen from their very abundance and quality. 
 
Thus, the analysis in this chapter has provided support for the theoretical proposition that as a 
type 4 IWM context demonstrating emergent polycentric IWM challenges, the problematic 
institutional arrangements identified in the previous two chapters will be deeply embedded in 
New Zealand’s social history. After over 150 years, the ‘hard’ questions, the core challenges 
of competing cosmologies, worldviews, ways of knowing, of valuing, of deciding on issues 
and making long-term plans, and of using freshwater system benefits for private, community, 
or public good have yet to be properly addressed, or limits to use set in national policy. 
Current central government manoeuvrings notwithstanding, New Zealand must finally 
identify, and accept, its freshwater quantity frontier. As already noted, the quality frontier was 
reached with the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act, although as also noted, water 
quality, particularly in lowland streams and water bodies such as Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
(The Manawatu River notwithstanding), remains at times dangerous to human, and animal, 
health (ECan, www.ecan.govt.nz accessed 24th Feb 2010). With the exception of the 
individual successes of the Water Conservation Orders such as that on the Rakaia River, 
limits to use are long overdue in New Zealand, and the freshwater overshoot that has occurred 
in the meantime will be difficult and expensive to remediate.  
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This chapter concludes the empirical portion of this study, in fulfilment of the third research 
objective, as stated in subsection 1.4. The final objective of this research, the derivation of 
insights, is addressed in the following Chapter Ten. There, I will reflect upon the implications 
of the study findings for the future of New Zealand’s freshwater resources, and for the 
conceptual perspective argued for in this thesis. This is that the social sustainability 
transformation process is a necessary and non-substitutable driver for ‘successful’ IWM. 
Further, that the wider, complex adaptive systems of a society’s institutional arrangements 
exert a powerful influence on the sustainability or otherwise of IWM outcomes, which must 
be taken into account in the design of IWM institutions, if they are to have a chance of 
fulfilling their sustainability intentions.  
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10  Discussion and Conclusions 
10.1 Introduction  
The overarching research problem addressed in this study has been the ongoing IWM 
implementation gap and resulting unsustainable freshwater outcomes, particularly in what 
have been identified in Chapter Five as type 4 SESs such as New Zealand. Emergent 
polycentric IWM problemsheds in these SESs already exceed the capacity of existing 
institutional designs to address them, and the literature is increasingly of the opinion that 
given the wide range of contexts under which IWM operates, there is no ‘one way’ or single 
scale that is capable of generating and maintaining sustainable freshwater outcomes. The 
literature is clear that the need for more robust models of IWM, and associated evaluative 
frameworks capable of their accommodation, is both critical and urgent.  
 
This overarching problem has been considered in terms of three main research questions. 
Why have sustainable IWM freshwater outcomes been so elusive in jurisdictions such as New 
Zealand? What is the role of institutional arrangements in IWM outcomes? And, how do 
IWM problemsheds in countries like New Zealand exceed the capacity of current institutional 
design to address them? 
 
Arising from the research problem and questions, this study has had two main research aims. 
The first aim has been to reconceptualise IWM, in order to provide a more robust theoretical 
understanding of its elements, processes and problems. Related to this, the second aim has 
been to employ that understanding in a multi-scale evaluation of the role of key problematic 
institutional arrangements in IWM outcomes in New Zealand, under the RMA 1991. 
 
In order to achieve these two aims, this study has so far been guided by the first three of the 
four research objectives as stated in section 1.4, and recapped below. 
• The first objective was to seek a more realistic and conceptually robust theoretical 
underpinning for IWM. This was addressed in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. 
• Based on this, the second objective was the development of an evaluative framework for 
the re-conceptualised IWM process. This was addressed in Chapter Six. 
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 • The third objective was the employment of the evaluative framework in the multi-scale 
case study analysis of the role of institutional arrangements in IWM outcomes in New 
Zealand. The case study results were presented in Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine. 
The remainder of this chapter will address the final research objective as recapped below. 
 
10.1.1 Chapter Aim and Overview 
The aim of this chapter to fulfil the fourth and final research objective as stated in section 1.4, 
which is to identify insights arising from the study, and to draw conclusions on: 
a) The theoretical underpinning for re-conceptualised IWM; 
b) The evaluative framework, and; 
c) The influence of key institutional arrangements on IWM outcomes in New Zealand, 
and some suggestions towards improved future outcomes.  
 
In the following section 10.2, I will briefly summarise the main conceptual arguments and 
empirical findings of this study. In section 10.3 I will reflect on the study findings from the 
perspective of their conceptual contributions, and in section 10.4, I will likewise reflect on the 
significance of the empirical findings from the perspective of reconfiguring institutional 
arrangements for IWM in New Zealand. Finally, in section 10.5, I will reflect on the 
shortcomings and strengths of the study, and suggest some areas for future research.  
 
10.2  Thesis Summary 
Having defined the research problem, questions, aims, and objectives in Chapter One as 
reported above, and detailed the case study methods in Chapter Two, in Chapter Three, I 
reviewed the origins and attributes of IWM as reported in the literature. In this chapter, I 
identified several stages of procedural development in IWM that ranged from coercive 
through cooperative to collaborative, and most recently, polycentric. I described the currently 
recommended collaborative planning process as comprising the elements of: initiation; 
problemshed definition; resourcing for collaborative plan development and implementation; 
coordination of the collaborative planning process; outputs (the plan), and; outcomes. I also 
noted that the narrow focus on good planning process does not necessarily result in 
sustainable freshwater outcomes, and highlighted three key areas of difficulty for IWM. These 
were: the perennial nature of IWM; the necessity to accommodate multiple scales of 
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 governance, and; the increasingly normative nature of decision-making contestations within 
and between multiple SESs.  
 
In order to address these difficulties, in Chapter Four I broadened the field of enquiry to 
include two key literatures, also pertaining to the attainment and maintenance of sustainable 
freshwater outcomes. These are complexity thinking, and Commons Theory. Firstly, I 
identified a theoretical convergence in the IWM, Commons, and complexity thinking 
literatures, regarding the procedural attributes of the collaborative and integrated plan 
development and implementation process (detailed above). Then, employing concepts, 
practices, and insights gleaned from this wider enquiry, (especially regarding the 
characteristics of complex adaptive systems and their processes of complex adaptive change, 
and freshwater’s status as a complex, common-pool resource), I proposed a re-drawn model 
for IWM, in response to calls in the literature as already noted. The proposed IWM model, as 
developed in Chapter Four, re-draws IWM as one type of complex adaptive process of social 
change, through collaborative planning processes addressing the integrated management of 
complex common-pool freshwater systems. As I noted in that Chapter, this re-drawn, 
complex adaptive model of IWM can be used as a building block, whereby it can be used as a 
way of “breaking down complex processes into small chunks that can be used in multiple 
ways and recombined repeatedly at diverse levels” (Ostrom, 1999, p523).  
 
The key elements of the proposed model for IWM in Chapter Four are as follows. The 
management concept of integration remains robust, and well-suited to the governance of 
complex, common-pool freshwater systems. Re-drawn IWM adopts a complex adaptive 
systems perspective, where systems can learn and change through experience, and can 
generate new, larger-scale systems. Complexity thinking offers a perspective of changing 
IWM procedural attributes from coercive to cooperative, collaborative and now polycentri, as 
cycles of complex adaptive change. This occurs through front-loop processes of 
entrepreneurial exploitation and emerging patterns of use, and back-loop processes of system 
disturbance and reorganisation. These complex adaptive procedural attributes apply to any 
complex adaptive system, such as freshwater, societies, or the wider systems of institutional 
arrangements through which it is argued that SESs frame decision-making in IWM. 
 
The re-drawn IWM model also identifies institutional change and IWM as concurrent, 
coupled, but essentially different processes, whereby cycles of IWM are punctuated by 
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 institutional re-design in order to accommodate challenges posed in new political spaces. New 
political spaces emergent between collaborative and polycentric IWM are characterised by 
Hajer (2003) as: the locus of decision-making power has become unclear; there is a new 
spatiality to decision-making; the nature of citizen involvement may need to be re-considered; 
scientific authority has been undermined, and; the context of policy-making is expansive. 
These ‘preconditions to a good deliberation’ (Ibid), are generated in response to an emerging 
institutional void, and associated unsustainable trajectory of cumulative SES freshwater use. 
The process of social sustainability transformation, with respect to freshwater, was also 
identified as a key, imbricated process. 
 
From the theoretical convergence identified in the three contributing literatures, the process of 
collaborative and integrated plan development as proposed in the IWM model comprises the 
elements of initiation, problemshed definition, resourcing of collaborative plan development 
and implementation, coordination of the collaborative plan development, outputs, and 
outcomes. Rule-sets also identified in this theoretical convergence for collaborative IWM are, 
at the collective-choice level, rules for scope, membership, position, authority, information, 
and aggregation/decisions. These rule-sets are used to guide the collaborative crafting of rules 
for individual decision-making at the operational-choice level, which relate to boundary, 
allocation, input/output, and penalty. Taken together, these rule-sets are considered in terms 
of the resulting systems of collective-choice level and operational-choice level property 
rights. Lastly in Chapter Four, I also noted that the re-drawn model for IWM, as proposed, 
remained unable to reliably generate sustainable freshwater outcomes in the type of IWM 
context of greatest interest to this study, such as New Zealand. Indeed, the polycentric IWM 
problemsheds currently being experienced in this type of jurisdiction already exceed the 
capacity of existing institutional designs to address fairly and effectively. This raised three 
key inter-related challenges, addressed through a conceptual synthesis in Chapter Five.  
 
The three challenges addressed in Chapter Five were: the increasingly normative nature of 
decision-making in polycentric IWM; structural challenges to institutional design posed by 
polycentric IWM, and; the underpinning question of why sustainable freshwater outcomes in 
jurisdictions such as New Zealand have remained so elusive. In this chapter, I argued that the 
critical, non-substitutable driver for sustainable freshwater outcomes from any approach to 
decision-making is a social sustainability transformation. I further argued that the perennial 
nature of IWM, the increasingly normative challenges to decision-making, and ongoing 
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 sustainability gaps, when considered together over long time-scales can be understood and 
explained from the perspective of cycles of complex adaptive social change. This perspective 
as applied to the relationship between these three difficulties suggests that in spite of 
legislative evidence, SESs such as New Zealand have not yet addressed the underlying social 
issues and unsustainable social appreciations of freshwater systems, which have generated 
freshwater overshoot. Instead, they have successfully applied avoidance tactics which have 
raised the effective limits to use, but have also reified, and further embedded the underlying 
socio-economic drivers.  
 
SESs with IWM advantages, such as New Zealand, are identified in Chapter Five as type 4 
IWM contexts. From this typology, type 4 IWM contexts are characterised as technologically 
developed ‘Western’ jurisdictions with extant collaborative or cooperative IWM policies, 
plans, or programmes, and plentiful freshwater resources (although unevenly distributed over 
time and space). These SESs have invested in physical infrastructure for storage and transport 
of freshwater, and have already secured essential domestic supplies. Yet these are the SESs 
where the currently intractable polycentric IWM challenges are most noticeable. Therefore, 
following on from the above, I argue that these SESs are still to undergo their freshwater 
sustainability transformations. The key to this situation is, of course, ‘constitutional will’, 
described as the combination of political will and social capital that results in the 
identification and social acceptance of limits to multidimensional freshwater use. 
 
The foregoing three chapters (7, 8, and 9) have reported the findings of the empirical portion 
of this study, in fulfilment of the third research objective. Thus, in these chapters I have 
applied the evaluative framework developed in Chapter Six to a multi-scale analysis of the 
role of institutional arrangements in IWM outcomes in New Zealand during the RMA cycle. 
The particular focus of the empirical evaluation has been on the role of wider institutional 
arrangements in RMA outcomes, through the shaping of emergent front-loop stages in the 
IWM process of complex adaptive change. For the IWM process as re-drawn in this study, 
front-loop stages are specified as: emerging operational rules in use, framing the selection by 
individuals of one action strategy from many available, and; resulting patterns of interaction, 
and cumulative levels of multi-dimensional freshwater system use.  
 
Chapter Seven has identified key problematic institutional arrangements in New Zealand, and 
demonstrated their devastating effect upon the fulfilment of the RMA’s sustainability 
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 intentions at the national scale. In that chapter, the framework was applied to a national-scale 
analysis of the role of: dominant social freshwater appreciation (‘plentiful’); unresolved 
tensions between systems of property rights (e.g., the capacity for private financial gain from 
public property), and; the neoliberal agenda as so successfully employed by the country’s 
agricultural sector, in emergent front-loop RMA processes at that scale.  
 
In particular, the focus of analysis was on the way that these institutional arrangements had 
‘filtered’ the RMA institutions, to shape the emergent (socially acceptable) operational rules 
in use. In the first instance, these framed successive national-government choices (inaction), 
thus influencing the trajectory of cumulative patterns of use (highly unsustainable). 
Unfortunately, the combination of social appreciations, systems of property rights, a 
neoliberal agenda with very few limits to freshwater use, and a growing dairy export market, 
also provided sufficient resistance to the ‘curtailment’ of individual freedoms, (as represented 
by the facilitatory, effects-based, RMA and its amendments, and the LGA 2002), to ensure an 
institutional void, and even perverse legal rulings, where identification and enforcement of 
limits to freshwater use, for agriculture in particular, was concerned.  
 
The focus for analysis in these chapters was the role of institutional arrangements in the front-
loop interactions of the RMA cycles. This was particularly with reference to the influence of 
institutional arrangements on the individual selection of action strategies, and the trajectory of 
the emerging cumulative patterns of use which have resulted in unsustainable IWM outcomes 
at the local, regional, and national scales of governance. The institutional arrangements 
present in New Zealand have exerted a detrimental influence on the sustainability intentions 
of the RMA. Further, the results of Chapters Seven and Eight have demonstrated that the 
RMA, and IWM, are competent to generate and maintain sustainable freshwater outcomes for 
New Zealand’s freshwater systems, as well as for Canterbury and Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere, considered in Chapter Eight. The issue has been that the RMA has not been used. 
The foregoing chapters have demonstrated that the failure of IWM to generate and maintain 
sustainable freshwater outcomes in New Zealand is a direct result of the unsustainable 
influence of that country’s institutional arrangements. Furthermore, those institutional 
arrangements identified as the most critically detrimental to the achievement of the RMA’s 
freshwater sustainability intentions, have been clearly demonstrated in Chapter Nine to be the 
historically embedded outcomes of ongoing sustainability avoidance tactics. In particular, 
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 successive legislative efforts to constrain individual farming freedoms for the wider collective 
benefit have simply never been allowed to succeed. 
 
10.3 Reflections on the Conceptual Contributions 
In this thesis I have proposed a more realistic, and theoretically robust model for collaborative 
IWM. I have extended this re-drawn model through a theoretical synthesis, to address the 
normative and structural challenges that face institutional design for polycentric IWM 
problemsheds. As part of this, I have proposed a theoretical perspective on the underpinnings 
and emergence of polycentric IWM problemsheds, in what are termed in this study type 4 
IWM contexts, such as New Zealand. I then developed a framework for the evaluation of 
IWM and associated complex adaptive processes, identified as institutional change, and social 
freshwater sustainability transformation.  
 
The results of this evaluation have clearly demonstrated that wider institutional arrangements, 
particularly those relating to the worldviews, markets, systems of property rights, and the de 
facto locus of decision-making power, are pivotal in the generation of IWM outcomes, 
sustainable or otherwise. Institutional arrangements influence IWM outcomes through their 
role in the social selection of operational rules in use. In this study, emergent operational rules 
in use have been defined as IWM institutions after they have been interpreted, amended 
and/or supplemented by the wider complex adaptive social system of institutional 
arrangements. Thus, emergent operational rules in use are a collection of socially acceptable 
institutions, which include but are not limited to, IWM rules. The emergent operational rules 
in use are then used by individuals to frame decisions regarding the exercise or otherwise of 
their allocated property rights. The cumulative effects of these individual decisions give rise 
to patterns of use, and sustainable or unsustainable freshwater outcomes. 
 
I have applied that framework to the evaluation of the historical origins, and the role of key 
problematic institutional arrangements in emergent front-loop RMA processes, at multiple 
scales of governance. This evaluation has undertaken the following steps. First, the 
framework was used to identify key problematic institutional arrangements in New Zealand. 
Next, I analysed their role in the front loop IWM phases of the RMA 1991-2009, at multiple 
scales of decision-making. Lastly, I analysed the historical origins of these particularly 
problematic institutional arrangements. This analysis found that they were indeed deeply 
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 embedded within New Zealand’s social history. Beyond the technological avoidance tactics 
employed, resistance to the curtailment of individual freedoms for a collective benefit has 
presented in this study as iterative, symbolic policies, in the form of Act after imaginative, 
innovative, and ultimately unsuccessful, Act. Each could have generated and maintained 
sustainable freshwater outcomes, and some even generated significant advancements towards 
this ostensibly desired social goal. But their sustainability intentions were, quite simply, 
prevented from fulfilment by the role of export revenues from primary produce, particularly 
as provided by the increasingly influential agriculture lobby.  
 
New Zealand is yet to undergo its sustainability transformation with respect to its freshwater 
systems. This is because of a highly successful series of previous avoidance tactics that have 
reified unsustainable perceptions and patterns of use. This is a characteristic of SESs in type 4 
IWM contexts. Institutional sediments have been identified as highly influential in the 
‘failure’ of IWM to generate and maintain sustainable freshwater outcomes. Given the lack of 
‘constitutional will’ implied by the above and implicated in the emergence of the current 
polycentric IWM problemshed, IWM has been performing well at increasingly difficult tasks. 
Polycentric IWM is so wicked because it is required to address the core questions that have 
defied resolution during all previous attempts. Also, in type 4 IWM contexts, the essential 
potable supplies have been secured, so contestations are now a normative debate over how to 
use an SES’s ‘disposable freshwater income’ to the greatest common benefit.  
 
The foregoing chapters have clearly demonstrated that institutional arrangements in New 
Zealand, and in Canterbury, relating to property rights, markets, and cosmologies and 
worldviews have been, and continue to be the key barriers to sustainable freshwater outcomes 
in that country. Furthermore, Chapter Nine has demonstrated that the most problematic 
expression of these has been the ongoing resistance to regulation of land-use. In particular, 
there has been an ongoing and successful resistance to the constraint of individual freedom for 
a wider collective benefit by the agricultural and economic development sectors of the 
society. This has been demonstrated as a deeply embedded institutional sediment, resulting 
from a century and a half of successfully negating legislative attempts to address the 
detrimental effects of land-use practices arising from those sectors. These avoidance tactics 
have facilitated the ongoing dominance of the unsustainable social appreciation of freshwater 
systems and their benefits in that country. 
 
 222
 In summary, the key conceptual findings of this thesis are that: 
• A complex adaptive perspective of IWM as cycles of social learning can help to 
explain the presence of procedural difficulties, since each cycle must re-negotiate 
IWM institutions to accommodate changing IWM contexts. 
• Employing a complexity thinking perspective enables a description of Polycentric 
IWM as an emergent, self-organising outcome of (potentially multiple, concurrent) 
collaborative IWM ‘failure(s)’, operating at the aggregate collective-choice level of 
decision-making without any one single ‘ultimate’ decision-making autonomy, and 
thus subject to unpredictable, and self-generating change that is not subject to control 
from above.  
• Wider, socially constructed complex adaptive systems of institutional arrangements 
are critical to IWM outcomes, through their influence on the front-loop elements of 
the IWM process of complex adaptive social change. 
• IWM should now be considered in terms of one of several imbricated complex 
adaptive processes critical to the attainment and maintenance of sustainable freshwater 
governance. Others particularly noted here are those of institutional change, and social 
sustainability transformation. 
 
10.4 Reflections on the Empirical Findings 
The RMA has been identified in this study as a symbolic policy – ‘a good Act not 
implemented’. This must be considered as a clear indication of a lack of ‘constitutional will’ 
for a sustainable freshwater transformation in New Zealand. This conclusion has been 
strongly supported by the recent government commissioned report into ECan (Creech et al., 
2010), which clearly signals a central government intent to develop, and Canterbury Plains 
are to be the ‘sacrifice paddock’. Next on the list may be the Mackenzie Country in South 
Canterbury, already the subject of a call-in by the Minister, in respect to consent applications 
for three large dairy developments in that iconic and fragile area. After the fundamental 
production shift from pasture to the housing of dairy cattle to combat winter weather in the 
farther south regions of New Zealand, Southland will become the next most attractive source 
of land and water for the industry in this country. Otago’s regional water plan looks robust at 
this stage, and has excellent buy-in from Ngai Tahu, so that region may be expected to be less 
of a development target.  
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 Moreover, the arguments for introducing water use charges, while perfectly reasonable and 
understandable, and even sensible, cannot be further investigated without a realistic debate on 
the issue of compensation for those who will lose out from the rule-change. The resistance to 
this seems obtuse, and seems to be in danger of becoming a case of history repeating itself. As 
shown in Chapter 9, the matter of the control of rates of stocking on land was raised in the 
1930s, and almost entirely due to the perception that changes to the rules which would 
adversely affect farmers were not to be compensated for, the opportunity was missed. It is 
easy to see from this case study the way in which unintended consequences of policy can 
converge into perverse outcomes, but perverse outcomes in themselves cannot be taken as a 
reason to negate perfectly legitimate compensation issues when rules are changed. 
The conclusion that New Zealand has yet to properly address its sustainability issues with 
respect to the governance of its freshwater systems has been drawn from the analysis and 
discussion of the empirical results. Post Treaty of Waitangi, a series of ‘avoidance tactics’ has 
generated a succession of more complex and increasingly subtle institutional arrangements 
that negated the necessity to change patterns of use. This has been the result of the particular 
combination of the quality and quantity of the freshwater systems themselves, the 
technological capacity available, and the Pioneer perspective. The exceptions to this have 
been the 1967/1981 legislations, that made water Crown property, addressed point-source 
pollution, and environmental values. In particular, the Water Conservation Orders, part of the 
1981 Amendment, have proved themselves one of the most enduring, robust, and successful 
pieces of legislation in New Zealand. This is for the simple reason that they identify 
ecological flow regimes, set limits to use, and enforce them. This model was certainly 
travelling the right direction for sustainable freshwater outcomes, but was derailed by the 
system change of the 1980s and the new, neoliberal paradigm under which it was conducted.  
 
It has been this combination of free marketeering, along with the perception of plenty as 
demonstrated by the voluntary nature of regional water planning, which has been the key 
contributor to the current situation. So far, the RMA 1991 has been effectively a symbolic 
policy, or Act, since this study concludes that it has been that it is ‘a good Act not 
implemented’. The issues identified by this study also find that the issues with this Act 
(flawed to begin with; never implemented; contestation over the meaning of Section 5, and; 
the development of ‘default’ case law in lieu of regional council implementation), are all 
constitutional-choice level issues, reinforcing the emerging importance of this governance 
level in iterative IWM decision-making.  
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As a symbolic policy, the central reason for the failure of the RMA as IWM legislation in the 
national-scale New Zealand SES, is already widely recognised as including a lack of 
leadership and political will (section 7.1).This implies that notwithstanding the explicit 
sustainability intentions of the RMA, New Zealand has not yet undergone the necessary social 
sustainability transformation, with respect to its freshwater systems. From the perspective of 
lack of ‘constitutional will’ (comprising leadership, political will, and social capital, as 
defined in Chapter Five), it must therefore be considered that in spite of the facilitative nature 
of the mandate, even the few institutions designed to limit individual freedoms for public 
benefit that were included were either unwelcome or unpalatable. How were they avoided? 
Essentially, they have been ignored – unimplemented, as discussed. Because of the resource 
quality and quantity, particularly in the exemplar national- and regional-scale SESs, it has not 
been politically expedient to draw limits to freshwater resource use until remarkably recently. 
Neither has it been considered politically expedient to proactively address the underlying 
property rights conflicts and misalignments, and social contestations over strategies for 
allocation. This situation has now changed with respect to a Proposed National Freshwater 
Policy Statement. However, central government have stepped in to potentially take control of 
freshwater decision-making in Canterbury with remarkable speed. This, coupled with the 
overt intention to increase storage for irrigation and dairy expansion in particular, does not 
suggest that a public debate on the re-negotiation of property rights to freshwater and its 
benefits is imminent.  
 
The New Zealand Experiment with a neoliberal approach to the development of freshwater 
uses, under the presumption from policy-makers and the public (if not Maori), that water was 
plentiful, has not worked well for the freshwater systems. But the key point here is that in 
global terms, water is plentiful in New Zealand. The country lies in the top ten nations 
globally for per capita freshwater availability. Even accepting that this natural plenty is very 
unevenly spread across time and space, there is more than enough to meet domestic and stock 
drinking requirements, even at currently high stocking rates. Therefore, the question of the 
sustainability of dairy and related irrigation practices in dry-land areas such as the Canterbury 
Plains must be re-addressed. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment’s report 
‘Growing for Good’ (M. Williams, 2004) highlighted difficulties with intensification of 
agribusiness land-use, but like other potential constraints on individual freedoms, was 
essentially ignored to the general detriment of New Zealand’s freshwater systems and wider 
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 environment. One reason for this is that New Zealand’s economy is still based on the export 
of its primary produce, of which freshwater is the most significant. The fact that it is exported 
in the form of milk powder, as a very low-value-added basic product, does not negate the fact 
that the export of freshwater is essentially what contributes the major portion of that country’s 
annual revenue. Indeed, there are now more dairy cows in New Zealand than there are people 
(5.6 million as at June 2008) (Bascand, 2009). 
 
From the above, it is the reluctant conclusion of this study that the window of opportunity for 
a social sustainability transformation is closing rapidly at the national scale, without a 
sustainability transition having been undergone. Unless there is a rapid, vocal and influential 
outcry at the intent of the Creech report (Creech et al., 2010), the opportunity for a 
sustainability transformation will be missed at this national scale, and for this electoral cycle, 
at least. Further, the Creech report findings, and its subsequent government level 
implementation decision, must be realistically interpreted as seriously compromising the 
validity, possibly the future, certainly the probable Government responses to 'non-binding' 
recommendations, of the Land and Water Forum, too.  
 
From the study findings, it seems as though New Zealand has another cycle or two of learning 
yet to go, before it is ready for the prerequisite social sustainability transformation that will 
enable 'successful' IWM. From the discussion above, it is clear that the sheer complexity of 
IWM, the complexity of the systems involved, their complex adaptive nature, and 
interdependencies of timing and preparation means that chance must play a key, but by 
definition unpredictable role in IWM and the generation and maintenance of sustainable 
freshwater outcomes. Now, New Zealand must address a very wicked problemshed indeed. 
Current challenges to sustainable freshwater IWM outcomes identified include the Maori 
claims to freshwater benefits, the existing lock-in to the dairy export market, and 
compensation issues for those that will be adversely affected by rule-changes. The immediate 
future for New Zealand’s ‘good debate’ looks messy.  
 
In conclusion, the RMA has brought New Zealand very close to a social sustainability 
transformation. Clearly, fundamental constitutional-choice decisions remain to be made at all 
scales of decision-making, but primarily by individual New Zealanders. At this stage, they are 
the only actors in this ‘Drama of the Commons’ who can now prevent the country from lock-
in to low value-added export of its water.  
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In summary, the key empirical findings of this thesis are that: 
• New Zealand is yet to undergo a social sustainability transformation with respect to its 
freshwater governance.  
• New Zealand, and particularly Canterbury, are at the point of being locked-in to 
unsustainable dependence on the revenues generated by the export of their natural 
resources and low value-added produce. 
• The RMA has become a symbolic policy. 
• The Canterbury Water Management Strategy has been a victim of its own success in 
challenging embedded and powerful agricultural and energy-production interests.  
• The urgently needed debate regarding the collective re-negotiation of property rights 
to freshwater system benefits (as Crown property) is yet to be undertaken. This is 
particularly acute in the case of the inherited, inadequate, but remarkably persistent 
‘first-in-first-served’ approach to allocation of those benefits. 
• Institutional arrangements relating to market forces, legislation, policies, and plans, 
competing cosmologies, and social customs, have been demonstrated as exerting a 
critically detrimental influence on RMA sustainability intentions across multiple 
governance scales.  
• Perverse outcomes at the regional-scale SES, through national-scale SES interference, 
may well paradoxically generate beneficial outcomes for the local-scale SES. 
 
10.5 Study Strengths and Weaknesses and Future Research 
In this section, I will consider the research process, described in Chapter Two and applied in 
this study, from the perspective of its improvement. In this study, I have identified two 
excellent examples of difficulty in this type of research: it is not always possible (or even 
likely) that a researcher will be able to identify the underlying drivers for actions easily, or in 
rapidly changing situations such as have been discussed above, in real time. This is 
particularly the case in respect to commercially or politically sensitive information, as 
demonstrated by the report on ECan (Creech et al., 2010), and the violation of the Triennial 
Agreement of ‘no surprises’ by Canterbury’s Mayors. While this argues in part for the 
approach adopted by Steins & Edwards (1999a), whereby the researcher lives with the 
community under analysis until it is felt that they ‘can be trusted’, this approach is unrealistic 
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 in the corridors of central, or regional, government. Moreover, there remains no guarantee that 
such information will be forthcoming, accurate, or useful. This is a research problem that is 
implicit within the very nature of IWM, and exceeds the scope of this thesis to address.   
 
Secondly, I noted in Chapter Two that the flexibility of the selected methodology was both a 
strength and a weakness of the approach. During this study, particularly in the last eighteen 
months, contexts locally, regionally, nationally, and globally, have all experienced significant 
and rapid change. It is my opinion that the evaluative framework has coped well with this, and 
has demonstrated a capacity to accommodate and integrate ‘breaking news’. Further, I 
consider that in this study at least, the flexibility and capacity of the methodology and the 
framework to respond to rapid changes in the subject of the evaluation, have proved to be 
positive attributes.   
 
10.5.1 Some Suggestions For Future Research 
This study does not attempt to create a theory of everything for freshwater governance, nor to 
answer all questions pertaining to that subject. In particular, there are several key areas that 
have emerged in this research that deserve closer interrogation. These are presented below.  
 
Further longitudinal studies are (urgently) needed (Adams et al., 2002; Agrawal, 2002; 
Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007; Steins & Edwards, 1999a). In particular, further study as to the 
elements, processes, imbrications, and triggers or catalysts for change in wicked 
problemsheds, which coordinate the preparation, redundancy of learning and leadership, 
window of opportunity, and transformation of a society, are clearly indicated from the results 
of this research, and supported by the wider literature (Abernethy, 2005; Berkes, 2002; 
Blomquist & Schlager, 2005; Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Medema et al., 2008; Memon & 
Weber, 2008; Painter et al., 2008; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005; Singleton, 2002; Weber & 
Khademian, 2005; Yorque et al., 2002). In this respect, New Zealand nationally, and 
Canterbury and Te Waihora / Lake Ellesmere in particular, are demonstrated as a rich vein for 
further enquiry into these urgent and important areas.  
 
Arising from the above, the following testable hypotheses are suggested for future studies in 
this area: 
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 Ho: The outcome of IWM institutions (derived from coercive, cooperative, collaborative, or 
polycentric decision-making processes), is directly dependent upon the attributes of the wider 
social systems of institutional arrangements in which they are embedded.  
Ho: Polycentric IWM, as defined by the presence of Hajer’s (2003) five ‘preconditions to a 
good deliberation’, will emerge at the aggregate collective-choice level, as the outcome of 
(potentially several concurrent) collective-choice level ‘failure(s)’. 
 
There remains an interesting line of enquiry in the tentative typology of IWM contexts 
developed in this study. The polycentric problemsheds being experienced by what are here 
identified as type 4 jurisdictions have been typified in the wider literature (cited in Chapter 
Five) as the most complex, wicked, and normatively contested experienced by freshwater 
managers so far. I have theorised that this is because of the peculiar interactions between the 
resource, technology, worldview, and institutions in these societies, which has allowed 
unsustainable social appreciations of freshwater systems to become increasing embedded in 
the social fabric, and thus more difficult to change. In New Zealand, the approaches of the 
Nordic countries are being studied as a possible model for change (Salmon, 2007 and also the 
proposed National Policy Statement, 2008). There are a great many potential benefits to this 
model, but unless the fundamental difference between these societies and New Zealand, so 
clearly demonstrated by Creech et al. (2010) is understood (i.e., that these are mature, 
conservationist societies, instead of pioneer exploitative ones), there may be more resistance 
than anticipated to the proposed changes. Clearly, this is another area deserving of more 
research. 
 
Arising from the above, the following testable hypotheses are suggested for future studies in 
this area: 
Ho: SESs in type 4 IWM contexts (including plentiful freshwater, technological capacity, 
and, critically, a Pioneer background) are more likely to generate PIWM over time than those 
SESs where this combination of attributes is incomplete. 
Ho: Where collaborative (or at least, enforceable) re-negotiation of property rights has not yet 
occurred, the use of market instruments for allocation of freshwater benefits will generate 
perverse (unsustainable) IWM outcomes. 
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